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A CONFLICT OF DISINTEREST:
THE PROBLEM OF PARTY IN THE EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC

An Abstract of the Thesis by
Darren Morgan

This study examines the lost classical republican virtue of disinterestedness—its
early role in the nation’s founding, its eventual subordination to partisanship, and its
enduring legacy in the realm of politics. Two seminal documents shaped Americans’
early ideas regarding disinterestedness, namely James Madison’s Federalist, No. 10 and
George Washington’s “Farewell Address;” however, these cornerstones of impartial
politics built upon a long history of classical republican thought from both ancient Rome
and mother England. The eventual impracticality of such a virtue quickly gave way to a
more enticing and interested form of politics in the early republic—one where lines were
rapidly drawn between those in favor of federal power and elite rule and those who
preferred a trajectory toward state power and egalitarianism. In this transition from the
theory of classical republican virtue to the practice of party politics, one can clearly see
the continued influence of classical disinterestedness especially and rather ironically in
the language of partisan politicians. The virtue evolved, but it did not die. Classical
republican virtues, such as disinterestedness, still attract the attention of pundits today as
they “reach across the aisle” and seek “bipartisan solutions” to political issues the United
States faces. The idea of impartiality still has a certain appeal to constituents as well.
Voters are both interested in political unity, and many express a level of exhaustion in
polarization and the division that partisanship tends to breed. Disinterestedness has
witnessed times of revival in our past; however, it more than resonates in the modern
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United States and has real implications in the climate of our most recent political
struggles.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

One cannot even speak of US politics today without the assumption of party.
Political parties reign supreme in the modern realm of politics, but their development was
not always welcome, and certainly, their supremacy was never intended. The founding
generation disparaged parties as self-interested factions with a penchant for divisiveness
and eventual oppression. Ironically, that same generation founded the very first formal
parties: the Federalists and the Democratic-Republicans. This thesis focuses on the
classical republican virtue of disinterestedness in the early American republic. How and
why did the idea of faction and party transition from “baneful” to helpful—from
necessary evil to positive good?1 The vice has become—if not virtue—then at least vital
to the body politic, and the development was rather rapid and early in the republican
experiment. What we know today as fundamental and institutionalized, matured within
the first few decades of the early republic. Disinterestedness, in practice, quickly went by
the wayside, no doubt; but did its theoretical or ideological form disappear? Did this
early transformation serve or harm the republic? Are parties custodians or killers of
republicanism? Does disinterestedness offer a cure for divisiveness? These questions are

George Washington, “Farewell Address, 1796,” Avalon Project, Yale University Law School,
2008 (Accessed December 22, 2020), http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/washing.asp.
1

1

often overlooked in the current political sphere, but the answers may provide prudence in
a highly polarized society.
Disinterestedness, as a term, has a complicated and ironic etymology; as a virtue,
it is perhaps even more complex. From a rare seventeenth-century past participle to a
core tenet of classical republican virtue, disinterestedness is perhaps back where it first
began, resting soundly in obscurity. Today, the word could easily be mistaken for
“uninterested” or “disengaged,” but for eighteenth and nineteenth-century Americans, the
term held esteem and wide usage. As Gordon S. Wood aptly noted, “They placed the
character of republicanism—integrity, virtue, and disinterestedness—at the center of
public life.”2 It was a core tenet of republican character, and the founding generation
littered their writings with its usage and application. Wood looked to the work of Dr.
Samuel Johnson and his 1755 A Dictionary of the English Language for his definition:
“superior to regard of private advantage; not influenced by private profit.”3 This selfsacrificial impartiality, anachronistic in many ways and almost as foreign to the modern
voter as the term itself, is at the heart of this study.
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Gordon S. Wood, The Radicalism of the American Revolution (New York: Vintage Books,
1991), 103.
3
Gordon S. Wood, “Interests and Disinterestedness in the Making of the Constitution,” in Beyond
Confederation: Origins of the Constitution and American National Identity, ed. Richard Beeman, Stephen
Botein, and Edward C. Carter II (Williamsburg: University of North Carolina Press, 1987), 83-84; John
McIntyre, “Not Interested,” The Baltimore Sun, February 20, 2007, Accessed July 7, 2021,
https://www.baltimoresun.com/bs-mtblog-2007-02-not_interested-story.html; David Bromwich, “The
Genealogy of Disinterestedness,” in A Choice of Inheritance: Self and Community from Edmund Burke to
Robert Frost, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989), 108. McIntyre makes use of Wood and
Johnson as well in drawing clarity for his own students, who he admits tend to see the term as synonymous
with “uninterested.” Quoting from Wood’s Revolutionary Characters: What Made the Founders Different,
McIntyre shows both the difficulty of the terminology in modern contexts and shows the difficulties of
simply referring to the word as “impartial.” Bromwich notes the modern confusion with “uninterestedness”
but says that its tendency toward synonymity with “impartial or detached” is equally erroneous to the
“overeducated reader.”
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Additionally, literary and philosophical works of the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries reveal the complexities of the term. They demonstrate the eventual break with
Victorian ideals, and provide insight into the literary transmission’s impact on the
political transmission so central to the application in this thesis. Immanuel Kant, William
Wordsworth, William Hazlitt, John Keats, Charles Dickens, Matthew Arnold, Walter
Pater, Friedrich Nietzsche, Oscar Wilde, and countless others struggled to place the term
into its proper epistemological context.4 The discourse surrounding the term’s meaning
is of central concern; the disagreements and misconceptions regarding disinterestedness
demonstrate why the word can be regarded as high virtue to some and high-browed
vanity to others.
David Bromwich provides a helpful characterization: “Disinterestedness, for the
person who keeps to it, ought to mean that his final judgment will be affected by nothing
but what he sees, hears, and feels to be the merits of the case. He has no vested interest

4
Nick Zangwill, “Aesthetic Judgment,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, (Spring 2021
Edition), Edward N. Zalta, ed., Accessed July 8, 2021,
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2021/entries/aesthetic-judgment/; Mark Jones, “Recuperating Arnold:
Romanticism and Modern Projects of Disinterestedness,” boundary 2 18, no. 2 (Summer, 1991), 78;
Jacques Khalip, “Virtual Conduct: Disinterested Agency in Hazlett and Keats,” ELH 73, no. 4 (Winter,
2006), 886; Charles Dickens, Little Dorrit, Project Gutenberg, 2016 (Accessed July 7, 2021),
https://gutenberg.org/files/ 963/963-h/963-h.htm. For Kant, disinterestedness was viewed in light of the
aesthetic as a universal judgment of taste, claiming that “pleasure in the beautiful is ‘disinterested.’”
Wordsworth applies the term in the political realm, going as far as to assert “interests of universal humanity
over those of a party or nation.” In his study of Hazlitt and Keats, Khalip illustrates that “disinterest,
retaining its Kantian flavor, had become successfully incorporated into much late eighteenth-century
philosophical thought, gesturing to diverse aesthetic, social, and political structures of critical detachment
and objectivity derived from the Enlightenment.” Jones calls Arnold’s concept of disinterestedness a
“frank supernationalism.” Dickens’ discontent with the ideal is evident in Little Dorrit (1857): “He was the
most disinterested of men,—did everything for Society, and got as little for himself out of all his gain and
care, as a man might.” Pater, Nietzsche, and Wilde rejected Arnold’s assessment and found
disinterestedness to be more synonymous with the idea of “‘uninterestedness’ and thus…antithetical” by
nature. These various studies on poets, essayists, and philosophers of the periods that parallel as well as
bookend the historical context of this thesis shed light on the obvious complexities and controversies that
surround the term and broader conceptual frameworks regarding disinterestedness. The idea proved much
larger than just simply a word in common usage; it sparked debate among intellectuals and evolved
drastically by the late nineteenth century.
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in what he undertakes to judge, and his thoughts will not be swayed by prejudice, by
tormenting fears or habitual associations.” This is not strict impartiality or even
neutrality, which Bromwich says would be “unimaginable…human nature being what it
is,” but rather a suspension of self-seeking judgment and action based upon sound
patriotic reason and justice on behalf of a larger community.5 The founders and early
leaders of the republic, while it might be convenient to label “idealists,” were no
strangers to the tendencies toward self-interest; their writings confirm an understanding
of disinterestedness in line with Bromwich’s insightful definition.
Additionally, the terms “party” and “faction” must be closely examined.
Madison, who drew from the work of Scottish philosopher David Hume, used the terms
interchangeably, but that was not the case with all the political minds of his day or even
of previous generations.6 The English political theorist Lord Bolingbroke said, “For
faction is to party what the superlative is to the positive: party is a political evil, and
faction is the worst of all parties.”7 At times the words appear synonymous or at least
categorically related evils; at other moments distinguishing between the two is perhaps a

David Bromwich, “The Genealogy of Disinterestedness,” 109; Thomas L. Pangle, The Spirit of
Modern Republicanism: The Moral Vision of the American Founders and the Philosophy of Locke
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1990), 55; James Madison, “The Federalist No. 10, November
22, 1787,” in The Essential Debate on the Constitution: Federalist and Antifederalist Speeches and
Writings, ed. Robert J. Allison and Bernard Bailyn (New York: Literary Classics of the United States,
2018), 126. Pangle discusses “the four ‘cardinal’ virtues, and the third in his list encapsulates the notion of
disinterestedness most closely. He calls it “justice (meaning especially reverence for law, unselfish
sharing, and public spirit).” Thus, this study will also consider the usage of “justice” in terms of how it
relates to the more specific virtue of disinterestedness. For example, in Madison’s Tenth Federalist, he
describes the “medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of
their country, and whose patriotism and love of justice, will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or
partial considerations.” Madison’s description of favorable representatives in the government contains very
similar traits and mentions the idea of justice (among other thoughts) in place of the term disinterestedness.
These patriotic leaders would best be able to mediate the various factions of the republic.
6
Mark G Spencer, “Hume and Madison on Faction,” The William and Mary Quarterly 59, no. 4
(October, 2002), 880.
7
Henry St. John, 1st Viscount Bolingbroke, Patriotism: On the Idea of a Patriot King: And on the
state of Parties at the Accession of King George the First (London: A. Millar, 1749), 162.
5
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method of justifying one while vilifying the other. The evolution was tied in many ways
to the shift in the early American republic from the first party system of Hamilton and
Jefferson to the second party system of Clay and Van Buren. This thesis will argue that
the shift coincided with a sentiment regarding party, namely that parties moved from
necessary evils to positive goods; that transition naturally led to a necessity to
differentiate between parties and factions. Promoting party and upholding the traditional
view of disinterestedness was in some form possible to a mind like Martin Van Buren,
whereas faction continued to take on much more negative connotations.
A final matter of terminology and technical concern is the usage of “founders.”
In the study that follows, “founders” will be used in place of the members of the founding
generation and interchangeably at times. Though many of the individuals at hand in
terms of documentary evidence would be classified as “founding fathers,” that term does
not appear in the following pages; it can evoke too narrow a group to work well in this
context.8 For example, there were several lesser-known members of society in the United
States, such as minister William Gordon or Dr. Joseph Warren, that wrote and spoke
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Thomas L. Pangle, The Spirit of Modern Republicanism, 2; Alan Gibson, Interpreting the
Founding: Guided to the Enduring Debates over the Origins and Foundations of the American Republic
(Lawrence: Kansas University Press, 2009), xi, 135; Andrew Jackson O’Shaugnessy, “Celebrating the
Founders,” Review of To Begin the World Anew by Bernard Bailyn and A Leap in the Dark by John
Ferling, William and Mary Quarterly 61, no. 3 (July, 2004), 576-77. Pangle says that “the Founders were a
widely assorted lot with differing opinions and varying intellectual capacities”—a truth that must be
weighed and intentionally considered whenever trying to make any kind of generic statement of an entire
generation of people. It is the intention of this study to provide a variety of these “differing opinions and
varying intellectual capacities” in order to arrive at a more objective assessment of the diverse period.
Gibson identifies the recent trends to expand the term from its traditional usage as referring to just the
“elite” or “patriarchal” founders to one that includes some significant contributions from social historians
of the era, namely other classes, genders, and even races. Finally, O’Shaugnessy’s review notes the
continued debate amongst historians regarding the influences of the “founding fathers” relative to ordinary
Americans. Recognizing the deficiencies of both sides of the debate, he does offer a word of caution about
propping up the “ordinary”: “Historians, in an admirable effort to make history more inclusive, might have
wistfully described the past in more democratic terms than the evidence will support and attributed too
much agency to ordinary people.” One will find that the traditional “founding fathers” will not come up
lacking in the research that follows, but there is a conscious effort to draw from more “ordinary” accounts
when possible.
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words of import and impact into the period deserving of recognition for their
contributions, though they often fail to make popular lists of what is typically defined as
“founder.”9 As Ralph Lerner perceptively noted, “the nuanced sophistications of the few
stand in greater need of deflation than the jeers and cries of the many.”10 Though what
follows is primarily political and intellectual analysis rather than social history, attention
to notions of patriarchy in titles like “founding father” also come into consideration.
Consider, for instance, the work of Mercy Otis Warren, an early female voice on the
Revolution and its meaning. The usage of “founders” or “founding generation” is
admittedly a generic designation in most instances, and where a name can be attributed to
the respective source, one will be provided.
This thesis will seek to revisit the lost virtue of disinterestedness as a possible
solution to political polarization and eventual republican decline. The founders assumed
that their “medium of a chosen body of citizens”—their elected officials and
representatives—would rise above the fray of faction to make decisions that would
benefit the whole of society, not merely patronize the preferences of a particular party.
They could not have foreseen that the expected impartial mediators of factional strife

Joseph Warren, “An Oration; Delivered March 6, 1775: At the Request of the Inhabitants of the
Town of Boston; to Commemorate the Bloody Tragedy of the Fifth of March, 1770,” Dr. Joseph Warren
on the Web, (Boston: Edes and Gill, Joseph Greenleaf, 1775), (Accessed July 24, 2021),
http://www.drjosephwarren.com /2015/03/warren%E2%80%99s-1775-boston-massacre-oration-in-fulltext-our-country-is-in-danger-but-not-to-be-despaired-of/. Warren even recognized his lack of fame and
influence at the time compared to some of his more well-known contemporaries, saying, “You will not now
expect the elegance, the learning, the fire, the enrapturing strains of eloquence which charmed you when a
LOVELL, a CHURCH, or a HANCOCK spake; but you will permit me to say that with sincerity, equal to
theirs, I mourn over my bleeding country: with them I weep at her distress, and with them deeply resent the
many injuries she has received from the hands of cruel and unreasonable men.” Thus, there was an
awareness of some sort of hierarchy even amongst those of the founding generation, but this study has still
chosen to classify them more broadly.
10
Ralph Lerner, “The Constitution of the Thinking Revolutionary,” in Beyond Confederation:
Origins of the Constitution and American National Identity, ed. Richard Beeman, Stephen Botein, and
Edward C. Carter II (Williamsburg: University of North Carolina Press, 1987), 43.
9
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would take up the helm of partisanship, nor that an executive would eventually do the
bidding of one party over another. Nevertheless, those who might have been considered
“least likely to sacrifice…the true interest of their country…to temporary or partial
considerations” have erased what advantages republics might have had over pure
democracies, namely their ability to “control the violence of faction.”11 Many historians
have dismissed disinterestedness as an impractical remnant of republican virtue or even
diminished its ideological significance. Whether unintentional or perhaps natural for
some, but for others, the motives are a deliberate effort to explain and legitimize partisan
politics as a positive good in US history. This thesis will insist that disinterestedness was
a viable virtue favored by the founding generation, that it evolved through the colonial,
Revolutionary, and early republican eras, and that it must be revived and valued to
sustain republican governments.12
In the eighteenth century, the greatest compliment one could pay his fellow man
was that he was “disinterested,” one unconnected to any particular faction, group, or
interest—one whose duty and patriotism far outweighed any sort of political patronage.
That idea stemmed from studies in classical republicanism, a familiar training for the
founding generation.13 Washington, Hamilton, Adams, Jefferson, Madison, and Monroe

James Madison, “The Federalist No. 10,” 121, 126.
In focusing on a singular republican virtue, one runs the risk of overemphasizing its significance
by cherry-picking decontextualized evidence from a wide array of sources, seeking to arrive at answers or
solutions to modern problems by looking to those of a very different time and place, or some mixture of the
two. It is not the goal of this thesis to assert that disinterestedness as a republican virtue was the most
significant facet of founding ideologies nor to argue that it was universally understood and accepted by
those who spoke or wrote of its value; rather, by examining the virtue in context from both the documents
of the period and the analyses of numerous historians over the last century, the goal is to resuscitate a
transhistorical truth about popular forms of government.
13
Carl J. Richard, The Founders and the Classics: Greece, Rome, and the American
Enlightenment, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994), 53, 66. Historiographical trends, of which
“republicanism” is, will be discussed at length below. It should be noted, though, that although this study
attempts to weave a fuller picture by acknowledging several historiographical paradigms—subscribing to
none in particular—there is a clear connection and assumption of a portion of the “republican” school of
11
12
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all vilified the idea of faction or party; their public pronouncements and private
correspondences provide insight into a concept that is all but foreign to a modern
audience. Yet these very same administrations ushered in the first party system, so one is
left with a resounding “why?”
The development and ascendancy of political parties in the early American
republic was either a practical result of popular government or an irresponsible disregard
for the lost virtue of disinterestedness. Popular histories have placed the founding
generation on pedestals of pristine, impenetrable republican virtue, yet many intrepid
historians have challenged that station on a variety of fronts. Did the founders truly value
the republican ideal of disinterestedness? Did they really intend to place partyless leaders
in positions of power? Were they responsible for vanquishing or vindicating party
politics in the great republican experiment? Students of the early American republic need
to struggle with these assumptions and disputes in order to understand modern political
dynamics, when and where they surfaced, and why one cannot even fathom speaking of
politics today without a presumption of the presence of party.
A shift from constitutional theory to constitutional practice was, in part, the
reason for the emergence of political parties. We know, for example, that the Madison of
the late 1780s had quite the about-face by the early 1790s, as Noah Feldman tells us in
his biography of the Father of the Constitution. Feldman’s emphasis on Madison’s
transformations include his shift from “advocate of strengthening centralized government
into an advocate for maintaining state prerogatives,” as well as being a staunch
spokesperson for federalism into an equally effective patron of public opinion and

thought regarding the founding.
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interest.14 Madison’s theory and practice, one will find, were in a constant cycle of
research and development—his experiences must be weighed against the ideology he was
reading and developing.
Was the transition caused by the development of “legitimate opposition,” as
Richard Hofstadter detailed in the late 1960s? Hofstadter wrote in the context of what he
referred to as the “high pitch” of “discontent with the workings of the American party
system,” but even amid such political dissatisfaction, he claimed that party’s ascendancy
was both natural and beneficial to the early republic.15 Similarly, a context of political
discontent and party polarization plagues the US today, which leads one to reassess
whether or not Hofstadter’s analysis was accurate? Sean Wilentz would certainly concur
with his predecessor. His more recent work, The Politicians & the Egalitarians: The
Hidden History of American Politics, argues that partisanship was fundamental to the
early republic and its presence is largely responsible for many of the greatest social
changes in US history. Partisanship as an evolving concept and eventual replacement for
disinterestedness is at the heart of this research as well.16
Perhaps disinterestedness did not truly disappear but rather just devolved to a
lesser degree of importance among political leaders and their respective constituents. In
his autobiographical work, Martin Van Buren—party apologist to many and major player
in the development parties as Americans know so well today—continued to use the term
as a virtue to be upheld in the highest esteem. His usage suggests that the ideal continued

14
Noah Feldman, The Three Lives of James Madison: Genius, Partisan, President, (New York:
Picador, 2017), 339, 341.
15
Richard Hofstadter, The Idea of a Party System: The Rise of Legitimate Opposition in the
United States, 1780-1840, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969), xi-xii.
16
Sean Wilentz, The Politicians & The Egalitarians: The Hidden History of American Politic,
(New York: W. W. Norton, 2017), xiv-xx, 4-9.
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to permeate political rhetoric and literature despite its obvious abandonment in the literal
sense. Reconciling this transformation and detailing how exactly the virtue of
disinterestedness could coexist in a political climate driven by party discipline relative to
one’s interests is also a priority of this study.
The thesis will explore the aforementioned questions through the lenses of theory,
practice, and evolution of factions and parties in the early American republic. The
chapter dedicated to theory focuses on the classical republican ideal of disinterestedness,
where it came from, and what influenced the founding generation in their contempt for
partisanship. In examining the practice of disinterestedness, one sees the reality and
practicality of party in the founding generation through the development of the first party
system. Finally, the evolution of disinterestedness in chapter four investigates the
presumed legitimization of party through the development of the second party system.
Ultimately, the thesis will seek to contextualize the initial treatment of party as something
to avoid, to its emergence as a necessary evil in the first party system, and eventual status
as a positive good by the time the second party system takes hold.
The founders’ classical training led to a belief that factions and parties were
destructive rather than constructive forces in popular governments of old. There are a
number of factional fixations outside of the classical republican habits that hearkened
back to the Greco-Roman tradition. The founders also had a precedent for factional strife
firmly rooted in English history. Their formative philosophical underpinnings were
decisively attached to their classical and English conceptions of party. Experiences as
English subjects taught them first-hand the notions of partisanship (i.e. Court and
Country, Whigs and Tories). These influences are examined in the first section,

10

providing the necessary background and context for understanding the founders’
thinking. Classical and Enlightenment thinkers must be examined alongside the founding
generation in order to gain a fuller understanding of the development of disinterestedness.
The founders’ republican experiment proved parties to be more potent than they
expected or desired. The relative unity of the Revolution quickly faded into sectional and
regional disputes; the comradery surrounding the writing and ratification of the
Constitution was short-lived as well. Many founders continued to write unfavorably
about party, but their deeds proved that party might be a useful political vehicle and
organizing force in the early republic. Thus, practice trumped theory in many ways.
Washington and others noted the increased level and danger of the “spirit of party,”
memorializing sentiments ironically echoed from the halls of polarized congresses for
generations to come.17 By the time Washington left office, anti-party thinkers like
Jefferson and Madison, had already taken major strides in the development of party
machinery. This ironic transformation will serve as the basis for chapter three.
Parties took on popular appeal rather quickly. By the late 1820s, a second party
system, much more in line with that of today’s parties, emerged. Rather than seeing
parties as parasitical, though, they had become practical—even preferable—to going
without their interested spirit. It is hard to imagine a political realm today without
mention of party, and that solidification was well underway by the time of Andrew
Jackson’s presidency. Chapter four will inquire into the perceived popularization of
party, the forces that precipitated this development, and the possible problems that
emerged as a result of the transformation.

George Washington, “Farewell Address, 1796;” John Avlon, Washington’s Farewell: The
Founding Father’s Warning to Future Generations, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2017), 32.
17

11

In order to discuss virtue and vice—disinterest and avarice—one must explore
concepts associated with human nature. The founders were “grounded in a conception of
human nature,” which bolstered their “deepest arguments” and explain their own
conceptions of morality. Human nature, constantly on the thoughts and prominent in the
rhetoric of the early republic, is a theme throughout all chapters of this thesis. The
founders affixed great responsibility to the leaders and citizenry of the republic, warning
against the dangers of unrestrained selfish interest and encouraging checks upon one’s
wanton desires. Any discussion of classical republican virtue requires an awareness of
the founders’ philosophical and ideological underpinnings. From the writings of Thomas
Gordon to the actions of Van Buren, the issue of human nature permeates this study
through the convergence of various passions and interests. The intersection of
historiographical debate and human nature in this study centers on whether or not selfinterested liberalism can be reconciled with self-sacrificing republicanism.18
To most contemporary historians of the early republic, disinterestedness is dead.
Those who subscribe to this notion are in good company too, “since,” as Alexi de
Tocqueville wrote in his 1830s tour of the US, “the period of disinterested patriotism is
gone by forever.”19 Many historians view the ideal as incongruent to the development of
democratic institutions. While historical authorities of the period at least pay homage to
the notion of classical republican disinterestedness, few have focused sustained attention
on the virtue itself. Perhaps none has given more consideration to the idea than
distinguished historian of the early republic, Gordon S. Wood. Nearly all of Wood’s

18
Thomas L. Pangle, The Spirit of Modern Republicanism, 2; Alan Gibson, Interpreting the
Founding, 13.
19
Alexi de Tocqueville. Democracy in America, Vol. 1, Translated by Henry Reeve, Project
Gutenberg, 2013 (Accessed February 19, 2021), https://www.gutenberg.org/files/815/815-h/815-h.htm.
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major works address the significance of disinterestedness, and while this study will give
substantial attention to his work, the two deviate in one significant way. Historiography
teaches us that the separation of time and space massively impedes interpretation. Wood
argues at least partially from this premise on his assessment of the ideology of
disinterestedness when compared to current understandings of the terminology. At hand
is whether or not separation necessitates departure. Or put another way, does the distance
of more than two centuries preclude one from recognizing and embracing classical
republican virtue? Wood argues that many of the founders “stood for a classical world
that was rapidly dying,” but this thesis attempts to demonstrate that disinterest did not
meet its death in the early nineteenth century, rather it underwent a remarkable
transformation. Perhaps more importantly, the application of this study reveals the
modern demand for a revival of disinterestedness.
“[O]ld historical problems do not preclude new solutions: indeed, they require
them.” In the late 1960s, historian Bernard Bailyn noted how woefully inadequate
American history and historians had dealt with eighteenth-century politics. Whereas
English historiography of the same period placed politics in what Bailyn called
“prominence, indeed…dominance,” examining with detail “party or faction,” Americans
had barely examined the rich history, and then only “incidentally.”20 Since Bailyn’s
comments, historians have seen the treasure-trove of historical analysis, exploring the
realm of eighteenth-century politics in a deluge of important works over the last several
decades—both from English inspirations and American innovations.
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As with many long historical traditions, the historiography surrounding
disinterestedness has experienced the movements of a pendulum. From the great
tradition to the old consensus, from the progressives to the new consensus, from the
Lockean liberal line to the republican methodology, and finally from the multiple
traditions approach to the more modern dispossessed groups or forgotten Founders and
federal interpretation or unionist paradigm, the historiographical movements are
dizzying.21 By taking into consideration the forerunners in American political and
intellectual history—their magnificent foundations alongside their mistaken flaws—this
thesis will attempt the daunting task of treating the topics with measured and balanced
analysis. The goal is to avoid conforming to any particular historiographical camp, but
rather in the spirit of disinterestedness endeavor to consider the contrasting arguments to
form a better, fuller understanding of the subject at hand.
Prior to Charles Beard and the “progressive” interpretations that followed, it
should be noted that historians of the nineteenth-century “often celebrated the Framers as
disinterested patriots and maintained that the Constitution embodied objective principles
of justice…not the product of a single interest or class.”22 However, as Ellen Fitzpatrick
observed, one should first look to the work of E. R. A. Seligman, Beard’s influential
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major historiographical trends and interpretations of the founding generation, their motives, and
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to one particular department nor defined by any one dominant paradigm. Fitzpatrick’s historiographical
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synopsis of enduring and valuable legacies from each approach as well as identify areas of limitation within
each framework in order to help chart a path for future studies.
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predecessor and professor to see the roots of what Fitzpatrick called a progressive
“zeitgeist” in turn of the twentieth-century historiography. One only needs to see their
respective book titles to see their allegiances: Seligman published The Economic
Interpretation of History in 1902, and a little over a decade later, Beard released his
seminal and much more well-known work, An Economic Interpretation of the
Constitution of the United States (1913). Seligman and protégé, Beard, made waves in
the historical community with their assessment of early American history in what Ellen
Fitzpatrick categorized as “new interpretations that challenged revered notions of
American national history.” Simply put, these works emerged during a context when
political history ceased to encompass the whole of historical analysis and understanding;
the “great-man theory of history” gave way to social history. Also, much of their work
was grounded in an effort to help resolve economic issues arising from the industrial age
they lived in; likewise, this study’s historical reexamination of disinterestedness lends
similar tools with which to address contemporary problems in the realm of politics. The
context of the writing is key but should not preclude other interpretations through a sort
of contextual tunnel vision.23
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Ellen Fitzpatrick, History's Memory, 51, 54-56, 68-74; Sam S. Wineburg, Historical Thinking
and Other Unnatural Acts: Charting the Future of Teaching the Past, (Philadelphia: Temple University
Press, 2001), 6, 12; Alan Gibson, Interpreting the Founding, xiv-x. Fitzpatrick provides a nice overview of
the historiographical trends of the early twentieth century; she contextualizes the historians and their
respective analyses in a way that brings the modern student of history up to speed on the field’s evolution.
One comment made here and others throughout the thesis might appear to ring with presentism; however,
much historical inquiry is driven by practical and present concerns and should not necessarily be
scrutinized on that basis alone when transparency is attempted. Historians W. E. B. Du Bois and Fredrick
Jackson Tuner, contemporaries of the period but vastly different in their approaches, have valuable
thoughts on this notion. Du Bois remarked, “that it behooves nations as well as men to do things at the
very moment when they ought to be done.” Turner added, “If recent history, then, gives new meaning to
past events…it is important to study the present and the recent past, not only for themselves but also as the
source of new hypotheses, new lines of inquiry, new criteria of the perspective of the remoter past.” Beard,
also pushing the value of presentism, went further in his co-authorship of The Development of Modern
Europe: “In preparing the volume in hand…the writers have consistently subordinated the past to the
present. It has been their ever-conscious aim to enable the reader to catch up with his own times; to read

15

An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States did not just
make Beard’s writing “synonymous with the economic interpretation;” it also helped
popularize newer interpretations in the public’s mind. Grounded in English political
history and equipped with the experiences of Ruskin Hall in educating members of the
working class, Beard sat out to “lay a mine,” as he put it, in the American understanding
of its most seminal document, namely the Constitution. His thesis attacked the motives
of the framers of the Constitution—that they were not enshrining and ensuring egalitarian
principles in their efforts toward “a more perfect union” but rather placing a hedge
around their aristocratic authority within the supreme law of the land. Beard had an
inherent distrust of the founders’ motives, a questioning of how much historians should
rely on “professed beliefs,” in order to understand the period. In light of Beard’s
argument, the idea of a disinterested patriot vanished. Beard’s work brought to bear the
central fears of classical republicanism, those of self-interested mercantile elites, in full
force.24 After surveying the economic interests of the Constitutional framers, Beard
concluded: “It cannot be said, therefore, that the members of the Convention were

intelligently the foreign news in the morning paper.” His presentism was acknowledged and intentional; as
Fitzpatrick puts it, “he made no attempt to disguise the fact that his political convictions drove his narrative
of modern American history.” In response to Beard’s controversial work, Andrew C. McLaughlin warned
that historians should avoid falling victim to “the temptation to find in the past the present, not simply
conditions out of which the present came, and to find just what we expect to find and not the almost infinite
variety of motive and interest.” Wineburg admits that the past may be “a foreign country,” but it is “not a
foreign plane,” arguing that historians can sometimes sacrifice presentism at the altar of reductionism.
Historical analysis requires both an acknowledgement of the idea that the past can stand “on its own terms”
and that in some ways its terms have dictated present circumstances. Balance is key. Gibson sums up
much of the criticism on the historiography of the founding: “contemporary historians contend that…their
predecessors’ work…[is] skewed by the context in which it was produced and the aims of its authors.”
This is followed up with important advice for any work in the field—that it be “intimately familiar with the
Founders’ writings, but also keenly attuned to the theoretical and methodological assumptions,
contemporary goals, and outright biases and prejudices of the scholars who interpret them.” Finally,
beginning the historiography with Beard and the progressives merely follows the structure of most major
works of historiography like Gibson as well as Fitzpatrick for the most part.
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‘disinterested.’ On the contrary, we are forced to accept the profoundly significant
conclusion that they knew through their personal experiences in economic affairs the
precise results which the new government that they were setting up was designed to
attain.”25 This was not necessarily, as some Beard critics have assumed, a condemnation,
though. Beard goes on to claim that these were “practical men”—that they merely sought
to stabilize the government through the only logical means the 1780s afforded them:
“fundamental economic interests.”26
Beard’s thesis on the economic motives of the framers of Philadelphia in 1787
did, in fact, “lay a mine” in terms of historiography. His argument still reverberates into
the latest studies of the American Revolution and early republic. His chief critics
confirm the explosiveness, referring to his work as “a bomb to shatter the postAppomattox interpretation of the Constitution.”27 He went on to lay even more mines
despite a concerted backlash by journalists and historians alike in his economic
reassessment of the early republic with Economic Origins of Jeffersonian Democracy.
Both of these works, as well as the early historiographical trends of the twentieth century,
factor into this thesis. Carl Becker, Arthur Schlesinger, Max Lerner, and countless others
followed the path that Seligman and Beard charted in their subsequent work, but Beard’s
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fame in the field shifted to near-infamy by the close of the Second World War.28
The mid-twentieth-century saw a concerted backlash against Beard’s analysis
with historians like Douglas Adair helping lead the charge in the late 50s. Madison’s
Federalist, No. 10, an anchor document for this thesis, was a major point of contrast
between Adair and Beard, whom Adair acknowledges helped not only reinstate
Madison’s primacy in American history but also popularize the now oft-cited essay.29
Beard cites Federalist, No. 10 as the basis of his historical inquiry in An Economic
Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States and a necessity in precisely
understanding Madison’s “political science.” Quoting extensively from Madison’s
assessment of factions, Beard claimed that his thoughts constituted “a masterly statement

Ellen Fitzpatrick, History's Memory, 71-2, 88-9; Pope McCorkle, “The Historian as Intellectual:
Charles Beard and the Constitution Reconsidered,” 314-16; Alan Gibson, Interpreting the Founding, 12325. McCorkle provides the profound impact of Beard’s work in the field—his Economic Interpretation of
the Constitution of the United States’ third place ranking in the New Republic’s survey “Books That
Changed Our Minds.” The fact that the book saw seven additions in two decades and that he has achieved
a label in classifying historical interpretation, “Beardian,” speaks to the sustained influence as well. His
popularity held through the Great Depression, as his thesis matched nicely with the economic discontent of
the period. However, Beard’s fame really turned to infamy in the second half of the twentieth century, and
McCorkle looks at what is salvageable and valuable from his legacy. Gibson notes the staying power of the
progressive tradition and Beardian contributions as well as weaknesses. Rooted in what Gibson calls
“realism,” the progressive interpretation offered and continues to offer a down-to-earth, human
counterbalance to the heroic, even deified “great-men” school of thought central to unabashed American
exceptionalism. Beard and others demonstrated the significance of factors outside of the political sphere in
the founding generation, namely economic motives that illustrate that documents like the Constitution are
in many ways “antidemocratic.” The weaknesses of this framework, though, border on conspiracy.
Interests must be considered, but one need not do so at the expense of extinguishing the founders’
ideologies. It is not imperative to view these approaches as either-or; it is more beneficial to examine the
interplay of both interest and ideology.
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the former as “the great introducer of Marxist analysis.” Of note here from Pangle’s historiographical
critique is that while Beard’s interpretations may have been “simplistic and crude,” he at least brought to
bear “the decisive importance of Madison’s theme in the Tenth Federalist.” While this thesis will contend
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class against the dangers of an overzealous majority. In other words, his assessment of factions and their
danger to the republic has hidden in plain sight a heavy dose of self-interest.
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of the theory of economic determinism in politics.”30 While Adair acknowledged the
“brilliant beam of light” Beard cast upon constitutional interpretation, he also lamented
the “long shadow” his work seemed to have simultaneously thrown upon the profession
for the first half of the twentieth century. Chiefly, Adair accused Beard of gross
selectivity in his analysis, thus spotlighting certain elements of Federalist, No. 10 whilst
obscuring others in what the former contextually and ironically classified as “the most
important party tract of the Progressive Era.” It is those “others”—those areas left to
obscurity in Beardian analysis—that occupy the study that follows.31
Louis Hartz’s mid-twentieth-century work also played a significant role in the
historiography of the American Revolution, establishing a “liberal tradition,” wherein the
work of John Locke met a revival of American exceptionalism in post-WWII America,
the era of “consensus history.” Hartz sought to dispel what he considered the myths of
reducing founding philosophy “to economic or religious motivations,” while
championing the notion that “Americans knew only the perspective of Lockean
liberalism.” In his title work, The Liberal Tradition in America: An Interpretation of
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Charles A. Beard, An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States, 14-5,
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Douglass Adair, “The Tenth Federalist Revisited,” 48-50; Sam S. Wineburg, Historical
Thinking and Other Unnatural Acts: Charting the Future of Teaching the Past, 12. Adair’s accusations
address the manner in which presentism ceases to equip audiences with a full or contextually sound
interpretation of history and begins to merely serve as a modern tool of political rhetoric. He shrewdly
noted, “that every generation sees mirrored in the Constitution its own deepest political interests.” Again,
while this thesis originated within the context of twenty-first-century political polarization, what follows is
not purely an attempt to patch together a quilt-work doctrine of lost disinterested virtue. As Wineburg
noted, the historian’s job is to reconcile this paradox.
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American Political Thought Since the Revolution, Hartz goes as far as to say that Locke
represents “a massive national cliché” in American political philosophy. Americans’ lack
of a “feudal stage” or aristocratic putsch, in Hartz’s eyes, made their experience “unique”
and set apart from the basis of a Marxian argument. Hartz was a student of Tocqueville,
and his answer to the Marxian progressives like Beard lay in the pages of Democracy in
America. Hartz’s rejection of a direct comparison to the European models, either of the
ancien régime or classical republicanism, made his work distinct but also led to a
renewed effort to establish ties to the civic humanist tradition. Was the founding
primarily a product of classical liberalism or classical republicanism?32
Historians of the classical republican tradition Bernard Bailyn, J.G.A. Pocock,
and Gordon S. Wood factor into both the republican interpretations of the founding era as
well as the scholarship within this thesis, but their predecessors and critics must also be
considered and granted attention in evaluating the period and predominant thinking in
regards to the classical republican virtue, disinterestedness. While the radical Whig
tradition failed to make major waves in eighteenth-century England, Bailyn and scholars
of the republican school acknowledge quite a different acceptance and integration of such
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thought in the American colonies on the eve of the Revolution—one marked by Country
Party political thought more than “Lockean liberalism.” In Pocock’s analysis, a line
connecting Florentine civic humanist thought to England is drawn through the work of
James Harrington. Harrington applied the Machiavellian “ancient citizen” to the
“English freeholder,” according to Pocock, thus creating a conduit from seventeenth and
eighteenth-century civic humanism to the republicanism inherent in the English Whigs or
“Country Party”—those radicals of “post-civil war England.”33 Those radicals are given
substantial attention in the chapter that follows. Wood carries the same classical
republican thought through the post-Revolutionary period and into the creation of the
Constitution. These scholars reject Hartz’s liberal tradition, claiming instead that
republicanism lay at the heart of founding philosophy. The assessments and assumptions
of the republican school of thought remain a central part of historiographical debate.
Criticizing both the progressive’s conflict interpretation and the “consensus” of
his own generation, Hofstadter’s The Idea of a Party System: The Rise of Legitimate
Opposition in the United States, 1780-1840, details the evolution of United States’ party
politics from its early disdain as a necessary evil to its eventual permanence as a positive
good.34 His important work narrates the rise of party politics—an ascendancy he claims
was both natural and beneficial to the early republic; he logically links the backdrop of
English party politics, namely the Whig and Tory traditions, to the Revolutionary
generation’s distaste for partisanship. The Constitution, he claims in his second chapter,
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was “against parties” as well. However, in subsequent chapters, Hofstadter explains how
experience not only proved the idealism of the founders impractical but also showed just
how useful party organization could be.35
Hofstadter’s claim that although figures like Jefferson may have loudly
proclaimed the “anti-party cant of their age,” they “would have the happy inconsistency
to act in disregard of it,” is echoed by many modern historians.36 Wilentz confirms
Hofstadter’s work and builds on it by providing a glimpse into pre-Revolutionary
Pennsylvania, where an already entrenched political polarization was at work, despite the
“cant.” In The Politicians & The Egalitarians, Wilentz deems such inconsistencies as
politicking more than true anti-party sentiment—an appeal to “general distrust” of parties
“in order to assail their opponents.”37 In his essay on the historiography of the period,
historian Woody Holton speaks of the contested nature of things that have previously
been cherished as “facts”—these instead, Holton says, look more like a “series of
debates.” However, the idea of party opposition does not factor large on the contested
radar of current historiographical trends in the early American republic—earlier
historians like Hofstadter shattered the assumption of politicians above party, and those
notions are not widely debated as much topics that fall more in the vein of social history.
The Idea of a Party System fits neatly into what Holton refers to as the “master
narrative,” thus it does not tend to garner the attention and contention that current
historiographical trends follow.38
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Interestingly, in his examination of Madison’s oft-cited treatise against faction,
The Federalist, No. 10, Hofstadter leaves out an analysis of Madison’s full vision for the
maintenance of parties. Though he goes farther than Beard’s selectivity, by focusing
purely on what Madison proposed in controlling majority oppression of minority rights
through a large and extended republic, the reader is never introduced to the idea that
Madison’s constitutional republic would, “refine and enlarge the public views, by passing
them through the medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern
the true interest of their country, and whose patriotism and love of justice will be least
likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial considerations.”39 The check on the power of
a majority faction or party, would not be possible by way of its size alone; it would take
the virtue and vigilance of its elected officials as well. Hofstadter never fully examines
this component, brushing it off as “useless to rely on enlightened statesmen.” What
Madison considered contingent, Hofstadter and others like him have quickly dismissed.40
Additionally, in claiming a practical need for party organization and
demonstrating a natural propensity toward party affiliation, a central component to
arguments from historians like Hofstadter, Wilentz, Wood, and Holton, one might
inquire: if parties are requisite to free societies, why were they not prerequisite for the
Revolutionary generation that gained and sustained independence? One almost gets the
impression that this thinking might embrace a new American creed: “divided we stand;
united we fall.” Perhaps many have also gone too far in the assumptions that legitimate
opposition will remain constructive, responsible, and even constitutional in a republic, as
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historians like Hofstadter offer no logical alternative to a delicate balance between two
parties and quickly dismiss the idea of a system with three or more parties. Furthermore,
one could also claim that the idealism the founders placed upon the spirit of unanimity, a
sentiment Hofstadter repeatedly rebukes, merely transferred to a new idealism of the
second and subsequent generations, namely that of faith in the spirit of party comity. As
we know, once sectionalism and party crossed paths in the mid-nineteenth century, what
was once akin to sportsmanlike competition transformed into battlefield brutality.41
Another historiographical issue is the continuity of a strict dichotomy in politics.
Some would trace a clear line of the two-party system from the patrician vs. plebian to
Court vs. Country to Tory vs. Whig to loyalist vs. patriot to federalist vs. anti-federalist to
Federalist vs. Republican. These contrasted parties from Rome to England to the United
States provide a simple framework to examine party continuity historically, but they can
also oversimplify a much more complex realm of politics that is dependent on context,
coalitions, and complex competing interests. Perhaps no one has done more to
complicate this straight line of contingency more than Wilentz who masterfully muddies
the waters of factional disputes, disrupting the strict dichotomy model from the colonial
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period through the early republic in his impressive volume The Rise of American
Democracy: Jefferson to Lincoln.42
Much of the historiographical debate surrounding a subject such as classical
republicanism or civic humanism has traditionally centered on origins or foundations of
the founders’ thought or philosophy.43 Was the American experiment the result of
Machiavellian or Lockean philosophical underpinnings? How does one reconcile both
the traditional ties to republicanism with the emerging liberalism of the period? Did the
liberal philosophy defeat or replace republicanism and with it the notion of the necessity
of disinterested virtue? What was once considered “the putatively hegemonic status of
the liberal tradition,” found contention in the mid-twentieth-century.44 The discourse
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shifted in the post-1960s, following the instrumental work of Hofstadter, Wood, Pocock,
and others, to debates on departure—when and how much did the founders deviate from
classical republican roots? The coming of the Constitution’s bicentennial celebration of
the late 1980s saw a flood of scholarship about the meaning and legacy of that seminal
document, and with this rejuvenated study in the field came historiographical debate.
Out of the deluge of writing came a number of questions.45
Thomas L. Pangle criticized the growing consensus surrounding classical
republicanism, unapologetically calling out the hermeneutical failures of this trend,
especially Wood and Pocock, in his work The Spirit of Modern Republicanism: The
Moral Vision of the American Founders and the Philosophy of Locke. He, as the title
suggests, sees the break with “classical” republicanism to be early and decisive—that the
failure of historians to see this is tied to hermeneutical deficiencies to adequately and
accurately examine the classical republican inspirations that influenced the founders
paired with the lack of a deeply motivating and urgent set of circumstances that clearly
influenced those men and women. Historians, Pangle argues, lack not only the same
capacity as the founders to grasp earlier political philosophy but also the “passion” to do
so seriously. While Pangle clearly tends toward the Lockean tradition as the most
important influence in the founding documents, he argues for a much more
“multifaceted” approach that at times harmonizes both Lockean and Machiavellian camps
while also considering the experiences that surrounded the founding generation—
circumstances that differ greatly from those of the modern US historian.46

45
46

Thomas L. Pangle, The Spirit of Modern Republicanism, 1, 28.
Thomas L. Pangle, The Spirit of Modern Republicanism, 1-2, 28-9.

26

The pendulum seems to have rested somewhere in between the republican and
liberal traditions in much of today’s discourse. Instead of focusing on a philosophical
dichotomy, historians have begun to examine the interplay between the various traditions.
Neo-republicans like Wood have “moderated” their approach, a “multiple traditions”
method has become a mainstay of the scholarship, and the latest studies involve
expanding the realm of topics to include the dispossessed, the forgotten, and the wider
context of the Atlantic world. Neo-Lockeans, like Joyce Appleby, also admit the
“multiplicity of traditions,” but find founding thought to be anchored in liberalism.
While these new approaches have breathed new life into the historiography, there is still
sustained interest in attention paid to the older, aforementioned paradigms—what failed
to kill them apparently made them stronger. Alan Gibson, who attempts to provide an
overview of founding historiography from Beard through the early twenty-first-century in
his invaluable work Interpreting the Founding: Guide to the Enduring Debates over the
Origins and Foundations of the American Republic, suggests that a “modern study”
should focus on “the accretion of contested perspectives, not the replacement of one by
another.” The goal of this thesis is to offer just this sort of approach.47
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Pangle’s harsh criticism of the current or perceived historiographical consensus
should perhaps be mitigated, but his challenge and approach are intentionally considered
in the following thesis, namely that in order to see the founding generation “in their own
terms and spirit…demands of us that we truly open ourselves to the possibility that
political debate or argument is not simply or entirely reducible to ‘ideology.’”48 There is
a need to connect the founding generation’s ideology and experience, not simply pit these
two approaches against one another. Only then can one begin to more fully grasp the
radical transformations of the American Revolution and its profound legacy upon world
history.
Perhaps the two most seminal documents that offer as much of an apology of
disinterestedness as one might expect to find in founding writings, namely James
Madison’s Federalist, No. 10 and George Washington’s Farewell Address, deserve
special attention. The former saw renewed popularity following the groundbreaking and
controversial work of Charles Beard, whereas the latter formed an earlier lot of American
historical canon with perhaps reinvigorated attention today.49 Any student of the early
republic has to feel some sense of shock and perhaps awe when first encountering these
seemingly ethereal pieces of American political history and philosophy. What might
strike one as more surprising is that these two popular pieces were common refrains not

Thomas L. Pangle, The Spirit of Modern Republicanism, 28-9, 38. Pangle calls the “postsixties” consensus an “infatuation with ‘classical republicanism’” and further ascribes “ignorance” to
historians in this camp for their lack of understanding of the “original texts” upon which they base their
arguments.
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only of the founding generation but also of their English counterparts and Greco-Roman
archetypes. Disinterestedness is a virtue and concept that has faded into obscurity for the
modern audience, but as this thesis will demonstrate, it was a word that held weight in the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.
Though party appears part and parcel of the American experiment, especially 250
years later, the question still remains whether or not the transformation from a necessary
evil to a positive good was helpful or harmful. Has the forgotten virtue of
disinterestedness plagued the country in its darkest hours, or has it propelled the nation
forward through the difficulties of democratic disagreement and changes wrought
through conflict and compromise? The application of this thesis should inform those of a
modern generation of the potential problems and solutions those of a much earlier era felt
deserved much attention, thought, and inquiry.
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CHAPTER II

THE THEORY OF DISINTERESTEDNESS

There seems to be one never-failing test whence to distinguish a public spirited
Man; even an honest and disinterested heart. This is a sort of constitutional
Virtue, and whoever has it is secure against many of the most dangerous
temptations. The love of money and of power are violent passions, and few who
are strongly possessed with them can safely trust themselves. How naturally does
the avaricious man listen to any scheme for filling his coffers? How eagerly does
the ambitious man enter into measures for inlargeing his figure and power? How
apt are both to flatter themselves that they deserve all that they can possibly
possess, that whatever they can grasp is but their due, and that therefore they can
never grasp too much? Blinded by these favourite inclinations, they can bear
nothing that thwarts them; and, as they thus state the account on one side only, the
balance must be eternally one way.1
Thomas Gordon’s unnamed inspiration for the words above had their finger on the pulse
of the British Commonwealth, and yet these keen observations derive from an ancient
source. In Discourses Upon Tacitus, the insightful Scot perceptively parallels both
Roman and British experiences; those parallel experiences provide yet another line of
valuable comparison when placed side by side with the early American republic. The
statement is laden with classical republican jargon—words and ideas all too familiar to
the founders: the “public spirited Man,” the “honest and disinterested heart,”
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Publius Cornelius Tacitus, The Works of Tacitus in Four Volumes: To which are prefixed,
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inspirations behind writers like Trenchard and Gordon.
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“constitutional Virtue,” the “violent passions” of “money” and “power,” “the avaricious
man,” “the ambitious man,” self-flattery, and the “favourite inclinations” of human nature
are familiar phrases in the founders’ writings. These classical concepts lay the
groundwork for understanding the theory of disinterestedness as it would have been
understood among the founding generation—a generation versed, indeed immersed, in
the application of ancient history as well as the political philosophies of the
Enlightenment.2 As Gordon Wood observed, “They placed the character of
republicanism—integrity, virtue, and disinterestedness—at the center of public life.”3
Gordon, of course, co-authored a set of much more well-known essays with his
journalistic partner John Trenchard, under the pseudonym Cato. Those essays were
among the most prominent pieces of pre-Revolutionary literature in the English colonies,
and self-adulation or not, their writings stood and continue to stand “as impartial lessons
of liberty and virtue.”4 The eventual rebellious Americans not only shared a
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predominantly English heritage, they also ironically owed much of their justifications for
independence to British compatriots like Trenchard and Gordon. The duo’s works
“formed some of the most widely distributed political reading of the contemporary
American colonists,” and Americans of the founding generation “published, republished,
read, cited and even plagiarized these radical writings.”5
One can see why that might be the case when looking at how well the dynamic
pair propagated classical republican parlance. There is an unabashed appeal to a “pubick
justice,” “publick virtue,” “publick welfare,” and “publick good” throughout the Letters.6
That very appeal to the greater or “publick” good of society is pitted in direct opposition
to the evils of faction or party: “Let us exert a spirit worthy of Britons… whilst lesser
animosities seem to be laid aside, and most men are sick of party and party-leaders.”7
The “public spirit” stood directly opposed to the “spirit of party”—disinterestedness, the
mechanism for achieving public spirit over party spirit.8 The discontent with party is
palpable in Cato’s Letters. One could very easily employ the same statement at various
times in American history and especially in current discourse—where constituents seem

tradition, the authors sought to set themselves apart not only by way of a pseudonym but also by way of an
intentional disconnect from any party and deprecation of party itself. Gordon goes on to write, “The
pleasing or displeasing of any party were none of the ends of these letters, which, as a proof of their
impartiality, have pleased and displeased all parties; nor are any writers proper to do justice to every party,
but such as are attached to none.” Detachment from party was a clear objective of the duo, and their
writings provide quite a doctrine of disinterest.
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University Press, 2016), 467-68.Bernard Bailyn, The Origins of American Politics, ix, 40. Bailyn said the
pair was among “[t]he most effective writers” of the period. In seeking to understand the politics of the
eighteenth-century British colonies or pre-Revolutionary America, he also points out that the colonies must
be seen in light of “a more comprehensive British pattern and cannot be understood in isolation from that
larger system.” Thus, writers like Trenchard and Gordon, among a host of other British influences, should
be examined as important linkages in telling the story of early American politics.
6
John Trenchard and Thomas Gordon, Cato's Letters, Vol. 1, 11, 12, 18, 30.
7
John Trenchard and Thomas Gordon, Cato's Letters, Vol. 1, 85.
8
Sallust, The Works of Sallust, Translated into English with Political Discourses Upon that
Author. To which is added, a translation of Cicero’s Four Orations Against Catiline, edited by Thomas
Gordon, (London: R. Ware, 1744), 12, 44, 47.
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more polarized than ever before. What was the origin of this discontent that led to the
elevation of disinterestedness? The causes are ultimately linked to corruption. The
foundation of disinterestedness is vested in virtue, and it is a necessary component of any
legitimate government’s ability to maintain the general welfare. When corruption
intrudes, the pubic good is jeopardized by interested demagogues and parties.
In the immediate context, the cause of the discontent for Old Whigs or
Commonwealthmen like Trenchard and Gordon faced off against rival Tories who
advocated for divine right and a wealthy ruling class in both the church and state. Two
timely events likely influenced much of the journalistic campaign of the 1720s, namely
the Bangorian Controversy in the Church of England and the corrupt scheming of the
South Sea Company. Especially in the immediate context of the South Sea corruptions,
one could see a direct correlation to Gordon’s quip: “How naturally does the avaricious
man listen to any scheme for filling his coffers?”9 Targeting corruption and avaricious
behavior in the highest ranks of church and state cast the duo in a rather anticlerical and
antimonarchical tone.10 The works, however “Old-Whiggish” in nature they might be
classified, stand vehemently against the idea of any party (including the Whigs) or of
those whose character might adapt to self-interest whenever power was at stake.
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The connection between party and corrupt rulers, magistrates, and representatives
of the people, which at first might seem coincidental, hearkens back to the ancient
concept of the “courtier.” To Thomas Gordon, “the life of a courtier” had “no other care
than to get money for their supply, by begging, stealing, bribing, and other infamous
practices.” John Adams would later define courtier as “one who applies himself to the
Passions and Prejudices, the Follies and Vices of great Men in order to obtain their
Smiles, Esteem and Patronage and consequently their favours and Preferments.”11
Edward Gibbon places the title alongside descriptions of artful diversions of the public
mind, flattery toward disgraceful acts of emperors for personal gain, and behind-thescenes conniving to, in effect, rule by proxy.12 The courtier is contrasted as the exact
opposite of the disinterested representative, for as Gordon further notes, “Their offices
are more or less esteemed, according to the opportunities they afford for the exercise of
these virtues.” Interestingly, Gordon uses the word “virtue” to describe what readers
would readily equate with vice, but in the context, the courtier’s virtues are the
disinterested patriot’s vices. The courtier was known for flattery and lip service to the
ruler or ruling party; their aim was self-interest and self-promotion. The potential danger,
which Gordon and the founders would tap into, lay in the idea that once this symbiosis of
courtier and corruption exists in a republic, “nothing pure can come from it,” and the
door is opened for tyrannical rule—"[n]ot only matters of favour, but of justice too, will

John Adams, “The Diary of John Adams: 1772. Feby. 9. Sunday,” Founders Online, National
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be exposed to sale.”13 Courtiers represented conduits of corruption in a republican form
of government.
Both Wood and Pocock also contrast the vice of the courtier with the virtue of the
disinterested public servant in both ancient and English traditions. In The Creation of the
American Republic, Wood says that “Nothing was more despicable to a
Commonwealthman than a ‘Courtier,’” and he further iterates in The Radicalism of the
American Revolution: “Republican America would end the deceit and dissembling so
characteristic of courtiers and monarchies.” Wood counts the colonial disdain for
courtier culture amongst the leading grievances eventually employed against mother
England.14 Pocock buttresses the same belief: “Forces usually identified as those of
corruption—courtiers, placemen, exclusive trading companies—operate to maintain the
present system” because maintaining the status quo ensured maintaining positions of
power and influence—a central theme that Trenchard and Gordon targeted in Cato’s
Letters. Religious connections were ripe as well. Those corrupt courtiers might be
likened to their counterparts in the church, namely priests and monks. In a context where
church and state many times flowed in the same stream, the parallels between the
anticlerical and antimonarchical can be uncanny and helpful in establishing the sentiment
of the period writers.15 A contemporary of the English essayists, Benjamin Franklin, or
rather Silence Dogood, would later build on this idea: “For the Priests had combined with
the Ministers to cook up Tyranny, and suppress Truth and the Law.” Courtiers were
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nothing other than “the slaves of a party”—an intolerable attribute for a classical
republican.16
From the courtier comes the notion of a “Court” party which in English tradition
is contrasted with that of a “Country” Party. Pocock juxtaposes the two ideologies.
Central to the Country tradition was the idea that “real property and an ethos of civic life”
stand in “relation to a patria, res publica or common good;” this ideology was constantly
under threat from “corruption operating through private appetites and false
consciousness.” Thus, the Country paradigm’s “propertied independence” relied upon
civic virtue of which disinterestedness was a central component. Without a virtuous
citizenry, the common or public good might easily fall victim to corruption. The Court
tradition by contrast “stressed the ego’s pursuit of satisfaction and self-esteem” through
“credit as a measure of economic value.” Interestedness was a given, even a necessity, in
this tradition. The mechanism for control, though, was through a strong executive
power.17 In this instance, the Court philosophy relied upon the disinterestedness of the
central authority more so than that of the citizenry or the representatives of the people.
These two parties had eerily similar attributes to those of the Hamiltonian Federalists and
Jeffersonian Republicans to be discussed in the next chapter. For now, though, it is
necessary to see the continuity of classical republicanism’s disdain of party; the Court vs.
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Country connection contains a foundation from which to establish the detrimental
divisions parties tend toward, and this tradition traversed the Atlantic in the colonial
period. The Country Party ideology resonated with many of the founding generation.18
Any work of classical republican canon, which Cato’s Letters would certainly
become, could not espouse party above patriotism or promote partisanship above virtuous
republicanism. As Caroline Robbins pointed out in The Eighteenth-Century
Commonwealthman, “Cato maintained that parties in England varied and changed their
character just as they were in or out of power.”19 “Tories,” as Gordon says in a letter
entitled “Of Parties In England; How They Vary, And Interchange Characters, Just As
They Are In Power, Or Out Of It, Yet Still Keep Their Former Names,” “are often Whigs
without knowing it; and the Whigs are Tories without owning it.”20 Party was not to be
trusted; one must trust in the virtuous nature of both leaders and constituents to sacrifice
self-interest on the altar of public good—this was the idea inherent in the aforementioned
“public spirited Man.”21
For someone like Gordon, delving into the works of classical writers like Sallust,
Tacitus, and Cato afforded an opportunity to not only offer English audiences English
translations of the classics but also an avenue for contemporary political commentary.22
Party is a leitmotif in his writings. In his translation of Sallust, Gordon comments

18

Thomas L. Pangle, The Spirit of Modern Republicanism, 28.
Caroline Robbins, The Eighteenth-Century Commonwealthman, 116.
20
John Trenchard and Thomas Gordon, Cato’s Letters, or Essays on Liberty, Civil and Religious,
and Other Important Subjects, Vol. 3, edited by Ronald Hamowy (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1995), 137.
21
Publius Cornelius Tacitus, The Works of Tacitus in Four Volumes, Vol. 3, 197.
22
“Thomas Gordon on how the ‘Spirit of Party’ substitutes party principles for moral principles,
thus making it possible for the worst to get on top (1744),” Online Library of Liberty, Accessed July 12,
2021, https://oll.libertyfund.org/quote/thomas-gordon-on-how-the-spirit-of-party-substitutes-partyprinciples-for-moral-principles-thus-making-it-possible-for-the-worst-to-get-on-top-1744; Sallust, The
Works of Sallust, 11-12.
19

37

extensively on party. In fact, his opening discourse is entitled, “Of Factions and Parties.”
It is important to note that while modern readers and even some writers of the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries might distinguish between factions and parties, Gordon did not.
In this discourse of the interchangeable terms, one sees a litany of anti-party statements:
“Whatever Party conquered, still used their Victory with Violence and Inhumanity;”
“There is a sort of Witchcraft in Party, and in Party Cries, strangely wild and irresistible;”
“the epidemical Madness of Party!;” “they are praised, or condemned, not because they
are Right or Wrong, Beneficial or Hurtful, but because they come from this Party, or the
other;” “Party, as I have already said, always implies Anger, which is never a fair
Reasoner, nor a sure Guide;” “Each Party think themselves innocent as Angels, and the
other Party as black as Devils.”23 This only scratches the surface, but one gets an
immediate and repetitive negative characterization from Gordon’s writings, and it is
notable that these party characterizations remain relevant in modern discourse.
In Gordon’s more oft-cited and earlier writings, namely Cato’s Letters, one sees
the same distasteful assessment of parties. “‘Tis worth no man's time to serve a party,
unless he can now and then get good jobs by it.’” For parties have “all professed to have
in view only the publick good; yet every one shewed he only meant his own.”24 “No
candid man can defend any party in all particulars; because every party does, in some
particulars, things which cannot be defended; and therefore that man who goes blindly in
all the steps of his party, and vindicates all their proceedings, cannot vindicate himself.”25
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Party patronage stood in stark contrast to public good from the Commonwealthman’s
classical republican perspective, and again, these strongly worded anti-party cants could
easily be employed in today’s political discourse.
Cato’s Letters provide the essence of the disinterested patriot because to
Trenchard and Gordon, the real Cato represented the epitome of that character. Cato, the
definitive “honest and disinterested heart,” was “unbiassed by pique or favour to any
man,” was “upright and impartial,” “courted no man’s fortune,” and “dreaded no man’s
resentment.” Of Cato’s detractors, the pseudonymous pair claimed, “by making him of
every party, they shew him to be of none; as he has shewed himself to be of none.”26
Disinterestedness must be cast in contrasting colors from party interestedness. Cato, the
inspiration for essays bearing his name, exemplified this virtue to its fullest—one willing
to censure at risk of life and limb for the good of the community rather than for personal
passions or interests, or as Plutarch said, one who “employed their whole lives
perpetually in the service of their country.”27
The preeminent Roman citizen, Cato, also inspired Joseph Addison’s theatrical by
the same name—a play perhaps unrivaled in popularity among American colonists. It
was a medium in which the masses, regardless of class, might be exposed, nay
enlightened, with the virtues so foundational to popular forms of government, namely the
republic. The oft-cited piece was laden with quotable quips seen from Franklin’s early
writings to Mercy Otis Warren’s stab at playwrighting—from Patrick Henry’s most
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famous words to Washington and Hamilton’s correspondence and public addresses. It
even found prominence in Washington’s revered Farewell Address. Amid the dual
tragedy, Cato’s suicide and Rome’s departure from republicanism, the “drama offered a
ray of hope,” wrote Forrest McDonald, through pubic virtue and the example of the
character Juba—a man Washington aspired to emulate.28 Whether in the popular form of
a play or the mode of essay, Cato’s character clearly had a profound impact on early
eighteenth-century British Whigs and their American compatriots turned rebels by the
latter third of that momentous period.
Cato’s Letters, though originally fitted for a South Sea scandal among British
ministers and financiers, found its resurrection in the move toward independence, where
this study of disinterest begins to take form in terms of its impact on the founding
generation. The aforementioned Franklin may have been a key linkage between the
classical republican virtue championed in Cato’s Letters and the young American
revolutionaries he so often found prominence among for his sage wisdom and republican
roots.29 Carrying on the legacy of pseudonymous writing, “Silence Dogood” or Franklin,
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noted the work of Trenchard and Gordon from only a year earlier in his July 1722 article,
saying, “I shall conclude with a Paragraph or two from an ingenious Political Writer in
the London Journal.”30 Dogood and the English Cato contain some strikingly similar
themes.
The very nature of the Silence Dogood essays bear an uncanny resemblance to
those of Trenchard and Gordon—they both use the press to argue on behalf of
republicanism. However, this was perhaps due more to the circumstances of colonial
America in the summer of 1722 than an intentional thematic approach by Franklin. The
title of the abovementioned essay printed in the New-England Courant was “Corruptio
optimi est pessimal” (Corruption of the best becomes the worst); it was printed the same
month Franklin took over printing for his jailed brother, James. Interestingly, while
Franklin biographer Walter Isaacson notes the “rubs” against Massachusetts authorities
and the defense of free speech, a marked change in subject matter from other Dogood
essays, he fails to point out the clear connection to Trenchard and Gordon’s writings.
Though Isaacson acknowledges the quotations from “the English newspaper,” as he
vaguely calls it, he does not mention that the quotations came directly from Gordon’s
essay of February 1721, entitled “Of Freedom Of Speech: That The Same Is Inseparable
From Publick Liberty.”31 Franklin’s work provides an early entry point into viewing the
inspiration of Cato’s Letters in the American colonies and also serves as a precursor to
how the press might be used as a tool for spreading republican ideas. Later, and
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ironically, this medium becomes a major component of party machinery as examined in
next chapter.
Additionally, within the same decade Trenchard and Gordon released their 144
essays, a young Franklin wrote, “But what is Wit, or Wealth, or Form, or Learning when
compar’d with Virtue? ’Tis true, we love the handsome, we applaud the Learned, and we
fear the Rich and Powerful; but we even Worship and adore the Virtuous.” In this piece,
Franklin explores the original, Roman “Cato,” recognizing the value of virtue: “Virtue
alone is sufficient to make a Man Great, Glorious and Happy.”32 Clearly, both Franklin
and his European counterparts shared a common admiration of Cato’s work and virtue in
the Roman Republic and sought to apply those lessons to their respective republic,
England. The popularity of Trenchard and Gordon in the American colonies was most
definitely aided in the backing of one whom Isaacson has called “the most popular writer
in colonial America.”33 When Franklin quoted from Cato’s Letters, though, it is
important to note that he was acting as a British colonist, not an independent or
revolutionary American. However, as the colonies moved toward independence, the
essays held even more importance; now these writings could be employed in the defense
of revolution. Franklin may have been one of the earliest conduits of Cato’s Letters, but
he would certainly not be the last, nor would he be the most prominent.
One thing that resonates within the historiography of the early republic is the idea
that the American Revolution and republican experiment realized many of the ideals that
writers like Trenchard and Cato, as well as their numerous predecessors, inspirations, and
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contemporaries, sought: the fulfillment of classical republicanism. The colonial struggle
for independence, which led to the creation of the United States of America, brought their
work to fruition in a manner that England fell shamefully short of during the eighteenthcentury. Bailyn argued that what “would become the Revolutionary ideology, had
acquired in the mid-eighteenth-century colonies an importance in public life that they did
not then have, and never would have, in England itself.”34 From that assessment of
Revolutionary ideology came just that, revolution, which “was…more than any other
single event,” what Wood argues “made America into the most liberal, democratic, and
modern nation in the world.”35 Richard expressed it this way: “Such modern British
authors as Joseph Addison and Thomas Gordon engrafted onto the themes of Plutarch,
Tacitus, and the other ancient authors the English dialect essential to their vitality within
the British empire.” There was a clear application for these Commonwealthmen and their
classical republican models, “[b]ut the founders viewed America as the only land in
which classical ideals could be translated into reality.”36 Finally, Robbins says, “The
American constitution employs many of the devices which the Real Whigs vainly
besought Englishmen to adopt and in it must be found their abiding memorial.”37 That
“abiding memorial” is the subject of what follows, and one key component was the
fulfillment of the disinterested ideal.
Like Bailyn, one is likely intrigued by this notion that the American experience
offered an environment whereby English ideals, albeit sometimes quite radical, might be
more fully realized. Why is that? It at least borders on a notion of American
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exceptionalism; no doubt, for some historians it is the foundation of it. However,
historians who may have been influential in writing what Bailyn classified as a “heroic
interpretation” were not alone. 38 Those who participated and witnessed the radical and
revolutionary transition from colonies to country were ensconced in the same language—
the same exceptionalism—from the outset. From Thomas Paine’s famed linkage between
“the cause of America” with that “of all mankind” to Mercy Otis Warren’s comment that
“Providence has clearly pointed out the duties of the present generation, particularly the
paths which Americans ought to tread,” one sees the language of heroism and
exceptionalism.39 This was not merely the invention of unabashed American apologists
or “a centerpiece of consensus historians” generations later; it is an inherited tradition
that existed from the earliest days of the republic until now.40 While heroic
exceptionalism is not lost today, nor a matter of even later development, the concept of
disinterestedness requires revival in the modern mind. It carried over from the colonial
period into the Revolutionary era and even into the early republic, but it is nearly absent
in twenty-first-century discourse.
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On the eve of the Revolution and in the midst of the Stamp Act crisis, John
Adams commented, “Let us study the law of nature; search into the spirit of the British
constitution; read the histories of ancient ages; contemplate the great examples of Greece
and Rome” in order to discover that it was “[t]he hope of liberty for themselves and us
and ours, which conquered all discouragements, dangers and trials!”41 Like Gordon saw
early eighteenth-century England as a republic analogous to those of Greece and Rome,
so too did Adams and his contemporaries of the founding generation in America see their
cause duly linked with England and the ancients.42 For Adams the Revolution
represented the mechanism whereby the founders could fully realize their classical
republican ideals through independence. Dr. Joseph Warren encapsulated the sentiment
in his 1775 oration this way: “I must indulge a hope that Britain’s liberty, as well as ours,
will eventually be preserved by the virtue of America.”43
Within the Revolutionary struggle, though, one finds division among those who
wished to remain under the security and prosperity of England and those who sought
independence from the mother country, oftentimes classified as simply loyalists and
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patriots, or perhaps Tories and Whigs. It is important to recognize that although these
classifications are not necessarily indicative of political parties, their respective
allegiances had a definite bearing on the parties that first developed following
independence. “Farewell education, principles, love of our country, farewell; all are
become useless to the generality of us: he who governs himself according to what he calls
his principles, may be punished either by one party or the other, for those very
principles.” The sentiments of J. Hector St. John Crèvecoeur in his “Letters from an
American Farmer” shed some light on the growing division of interests in the period
leading to the Revolutionary War.
Crèvecoeur expressed concern for common rural interests despite, as Wilentz
points out, his elite status and mercantile connections.44 Still, his words resound with a
sense of already-growing divisiveness in the colonies that may have had more to do with
economic interests than political loyalties: “Whatever virtue, whatever merit and
disinterestedness we may exhibit in our secluded retreats, of what avail?” The
despondency is instructive. For Crèvecoeur, the struggle to reconcile “individual
independence with mutuality” within a larger community was real enough to render him
an American apologist before the war and a loathed loyalist during the affair.45 His
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writings suitably achieve a commentary upon both Revolutionary politics and the
complicated ideological trends that shaped the early republic.
In Crèvecoeur, one also sees a vastly different style of disinterestedness from that
of Adams, Madison, and the like. He equated the truly disinterested patriot with a
monarch, a view much more attuned to the ancient concept that one might find in the
symbolism of the original Cato or the writings of Aristotle.46 As Wood put it, “The
British king was the ultimate disinterested republican leader, the ‘sovereign umpire’ of
the realm,” and “[g]ood monarchists inevitably accepted, at least rhetorically, the civic
humanist ideals of disinterested public leadership.”47 Thus, Crèvecoeur could view the
American Revolution as based upon the motives of self-interested factions. Of those selfproclaimed patriots, he questioned, “Why permit the radiance of so many heavenly
attributes to be eclipsed by men who impiously affix to their new, fictitious zeal the
sacred name of liberty on purpose to blind the unwary, whilst, ignorant of Thee, they
worship no deity but self-interest, and to that idol sacrilegiously sacrifice so many
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virtues?”48 Crèvecoeur’s loyalty to England had as much to do with the advantages of
safety and security of an indomitable navy, the mutually assured markets of the empire,
and the independence enjoyed from the distance of English rule than anything else. Why
would someone in his circumstances question the ancien régime? As Wood pointed out,
“[t]he English thought they lived in a republicanized monarchy, and they were right.”49
Crèvecoeur boasted the benefits of one of the freest peoples of the eighteenth century;
this blend of English constitutional monarchy was naturally treasured by a great many
colonists who saw no reason for revolt.
Understanding Crèvecoeur’s perspective on the disinterested monarch also helps
explain a larger transition at play in Revolutionary America. Republicanism, once a
fruitful philosophy growing amidst monarchy, became a competitive and eventually
dominant weed, seeking to choke out the latter. Republicanism not fully achieved in the
British model, thus traversed the ocean where the United States offered fresh soil in
which the transplanted seed could grow and flourish in the freshly tilled postRevolutionary American landscape. The failure of the British monarchs and parliament
to embody disinterestedness led to a better model, one which could be wholly realized in
the United States. Failure to reform led to revolt, and the Revolution brought these
republican values to fruition.

J. Hector St. John de Crèvecoeur, Sketches of Eighteenth Century America: More “Letters from
an American Farmer,” edited by Henri Louis Bourdin, Stanley Thomas Williams, Michel Guillaume Jean
de Crèvecoeur, Ralph Henry Gabriel (United Kingdom: Yale University Press, 1925), 174, 237-38; Myra
Jehlen, “J. Hector St. John Crevecoeur: A Monarcho-Anarchist in Revolutionary America,” 218-19;
49
Gordon S. Wood, The Radicalism of the American Revolution, 98-109; Baron de Montesquieu
Charles de Secondat. The Spirit of the Laws, Vol. 1. (London: T. Evans, 1777), 102. Though no specific
designation is given in Montesquieu’s Spirit of the Laws, Wood identifies his statement as referring to
England, saying that “it may be justly called a republic disguised under the form of monarchy.”
48

48

Thus, one sees in the Declaration of Independence Lockean ideas surrounding the
relationship between a “prince” and “the people” more than a parliament and the people.
McDonald addresses the point in States Rights and the Union: Imperium in Imperio,
1776-1876: “In Locke’s scheme of things, the compact that establishes and legitimizes a
political society is…between the ruler and the ruled.” That same concept can easily be
traced through the language of the Declaration of Independence, but the adaptability of
such a theory to the reality of colonial society and then the United States under the
Articles of Confederation proved irrelevant and impractical. Their “hypothetical
compact,” as McDonald puts it, was not with a monarchy; it was at first one amongst
“sovereign states” and then evolved into “a compact among peoples of different political
societies…undreamed of in political philosophy.”50 The evolution which took place
precipitated another transition in terms of disinterestedness.
In what Wood appropriately calls “The Republicanization of Monarchy,” the
transition from monarchy’s coexistence with republicanism to monarchy in contention
with republicanism parallels the transition of familial parties to broader political parties.
Both monarchs and familial parties had a legacy of inherited and even divine right rule;
this hereditary elitism, fundamentally challenged by enlightened revolutionaries, made
coexistence impossible. Although Wood argues for republicanism’s radicalism, he
demonstrates and contextualizes how republicanism blended into the monarchies of
eighteenth-century Europe as well. As much as the colonies eventually sought a different
path than mother England, she still stood as the strongest model for all things government
in the new nation; the apple did not fall far from the tree. Thus, what Wood argues was
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an upending of the ancien régime in The Radicalism of the American Revolution, he
acknowledges was also an “Easy Transition to Republicanism” in The Creation of the
American Republic.51 What united the colonists of varying interests across the Atlantic
seaboard more than anything else was their disdain for corruption, and corruption was the
logical result of divine right and elite entitlement. The only cure for corruption—virtue.52
Jefferson called out the English monarchy’s propensity toward corruption, contrasting the
king’s depravity with the virtue of the American colonist: “Let those flatter, who fear: it
is not an American art. To give praise where it is not due, might be well from the venal,
but would ill beseem those who are asserting the rights of human nature.”53
Minister William Gordon admonished the Massachusetts House of
Representatives in their choice of members to the Continental Congress in 1775, urging
them to cling to the virtuous character of their ancestors who had first settled the
American shores in New England. In fiery Jeremiad fashion, the impassioned preacher
proclaimed, “And let but the several members of this honorable house of Representatives
exert themselves in their public legislative and private capacities, to bring back the
manners of the people to what they were originally, so that our children may be as
aforetime, virtuous, disinterested, patriotic and pious; and to extirpate those vices that
have crept in unawares among us.” Clarion calls for unity often presented the perfect
context for inserting the disinterested virtue. “The first settlers,” he advised, “were
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disinterested, were not actuated in the choice of Representatives or Counselors by low
selfish motives, a view to their own particular advantage, or the aggrandizing their own
relations…in a word, that next to the glory of God and the interest of religion, they
labored to serve the public, and not themselves of it.”54 In the minister’s mind, from both
a practical and providential point-of-view, this was the classical ideal the revolutionaries
would have to cling to in order to preserve liberty for future generations.
This kind of religious perspective animated many of the leading revolutionary
voices. There was a strong sense that the American colonies represented an opportunity
for a new Jerusalem—an opportunity for a contemporary chosen people of God to
prosper in a new promised land, namely America. That belief, neatly intertwined with
notions of American exceptionalism, persisted well into the early republic and even
beyond. As William Gordon saw it, “The earliest days of a state are generally the most
pure and religious.” There was a sense of urgency in his message; there was also a strong
sentiment that the revolutionaries had been afforded a unique historical and providential
opportunity to, as Wood stated, “be the agencies of revolution”—to realize
republicanism’s route of monarchy.55 That route, though, was based upon a version of
disinterested virtue quite different from that of Crèvecoeur.
The transition of disinterested virtue from trust in the honor of an impartial leader
to a concept which placed far more stock in the attributes of the people paralleled the
failure of the “natural aristocracy” so many political minds of the seventeenth and
eighteenth-centuries thought of as the best arbiters of popular government. Pocock noted
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the divergence, cited Cato’s Letters as a logical origin for the colonists-turnedrevolutionaries, and looked to Thomas Paine’s Common Sense as a decisive breaking
point.56 What once provided a model of disinterested virtue became nothing more than
pretentiousness and corruption. Cato’s Letters demonstrated the departure in the context
of public ministers scheming amongst both factions in a manner that merely preserved
power: “They will create parties in the commonwealth, or keep them up where they
already are; and, by playing them by turns upon each other, will rule both…they will
make themselves the mediums and balance between the two factions; and both factions,
in their turns, the props of their authority, and the instruments of their designs.”57 Paine
noted the problem in three points:
First.—The remains of monarchical tyranny in the person of the king.
Secondly.—The remains of aristocratical tyranny in the persons of the peers.
Thirdly.—The new republican materials, in the persons of the commons, on
whose virtue depends the freedom of England.58
The dual blight of monarchy and aristocracy prevented any pure disinterested view of
power in the English model. For Trenchard and Gordon, the situation may have appeared
hopelessly chimerical and destined to the fate of the ancient republics, but for Paine and
his colonial sympathizers, America offered an opportunity to institute “republican
materials” absent of the lethal mixtures of monarchy and aristocracy. The united colonies
could begin with the republican model based upon the virtue and sacrifice of the masses
rather than the preordained righteousness of a select few.
Even amidst the Harringtonians, perhaps the pinnacle of English republicanism
for that era, one merely sees the replacement of hereditary aristocracy with natural
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aristocracy, and in both cases, there was a clear reliance upon deference. Today’s sense
of corruption and patronage would vary greatly from a society reared in monarchy and
the expected public responsibilities: “Public institutions had private rights and private
persons had public obligations.” Deference, however, runs in two directions according to
the classical republican model; the many most obviously must defer to the few, but those
same few find themselves subject to the judgment of the many. Pocock noted this crucial
symbiosis, saying, “there is a point at which deference and virtue become very nearly
identical.” The departure, though, is made obvious when the few are overcome by
corruption, where the many claim virtuous consent as paramount, and where there
becomes “a threat to the concept of virtue itself.”59
Wood and Pocock concur that a classical republican model failed in establishing a
natural aristocracy, thus leading to a more liberal movement, one in which the virtue of
the many would be of more import in sustaining the republic than reliance on the
disinterested patriotism of a few. “[T]he most enlightened of that enlightened age,”
Wood claimed, “believed that the secret of good government and the protection of
popular liberty lay in ensuring that good men—men of character and disinterestedness—
wielded power.”60 Pocock added, “Men who were equal must practice virtue or become
corrupt.”61 The founding generation felt strongly that a republican form of government
was contingent upon disinterested character.
Comparing the ideas of deference and disinterestedness can be enlightening in
this context. In the classical sense, the deference of the majority relied upon the
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disinterest of a minority of leaders and vice versa, and the critical balance between these
two republican staples is what allowed for longevity in a popular form of government
such as a republic. But the balance began to tip in favor of the many over the few in
Cato’s Letters. As Gordon bluntly put it, “Besides, there are not such mighty talents
requisite for government, as some, who pretend to them without possessing them, would
make us believe,” and, “[g]reat abilities have, for the most part, if not always, been
employed to mislead the honest, but unwary, multitude, and to draw them out of the open
and plain paths of publick virtue and public good.” The distrust of the few and the belief
in a natural propensity toward corruption prompted American revolutionaries to look
toward trust in their fellow man more than their leaders by presumed birthright.
Deference and disinterest came to be viewed as virtues of the many: “they can serve no
end by faction; they have no interest, but the general interest” and “[t]he first principles
of power are in the people; and all the projects of men in power ought to refer to the
people, to aim solely at their good, and end in it.” Of the few, he warned:
The same can rarely be said of great men, who, to gratify private passion, often
bring down publick ruin; who, to fill their private purses with many thousands,
frequently load the people with many millions; who oppress for a mistress, and, to
save a favourite, destroy a nation; who too often make the publick sink and give
way to their private fortune; and, for a private pleasure, create a general
calamity…They have no notion of miseries which they do not feel.62
A disconnect between leaders and the masses was of primary concern, an anxiety not
taken lightly. While often cited as uniquely American ideas, these powerfully, even
revolutionary, notions came from Englishmen in the early eighteenth century; they would
find new impetus, though, in American colonists following the end of the French and
Indian War.
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The bent toward “public virtue” was not without immense challenge, though.
Wood notes the “enormous burden” citizens carried in their tremendous expectations.
“[T]o suppress their private wants and interests and develop disinterestedness—the term
the eighteenth century most often used as a synonym for civic virtue” was no small ask of
the citizenry; the transition from monarchical disinterestedness to the disinterest of the
people naturally made the republic much more delicate, even more “liable to corruption,”
and “demanded far more morally” from citizens than the conditions of historical
monarchies.63 Republicanism remained just as frail if not more fragile than monarchy;
there was nothing guaranteed about the durability of such a government, especially
amidst the pains of childbirth, namely the American Revolution.
That momentous break with mother England was also a break with the traditional
notion of disinterestedness. Though signs of the decline of monarchical and aristocratic
virtue arose in the early eighteenth-century from popular writings like Cato’s Letters,
Pocock recognized that the 1780s brought “an audible note of dismay in the American
writings”—one that necessitated civic virtue on a whole new level.64 Cries for liberty
must be met with civic dignity, and disinterestedness took center stage as a primary
mechanism for maintaining the crucial balance between personal autonomy and public
duty.
Before going further into the founding of the United States at the close of the
Revolution, there is an interesting connection and common thread between Trenchard and
Gordon’s Cato’s Letters and Paine’s Common Sense when it comes to a shared language
that should be acknowledged. The title track alone, “common sense,” is explicitly used
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ten times in volume one, thirteen times in volume two, ten in volume three, and twelve
times in volume four of Cato’s Letters—often in the context of “virtue,” “liberty,” and
“happiness.” The connections to Paine’s writings alone are uncanny, but when coupled
with Paine’s numerous contemporaries, references to the pervasive and powerful
arguments of the dynamic English duo become much more than coincidence and even
corroboration. Their prudent criticisms stand out as clearly as any other revolutionary
influence.
Versed in the criticisms of a century’s worth of radical Whig literature, Wood
perceptively noted that the infant republic was not full of “naïve utopians; they
were…realistic about human nature,” and one such reality was a popular form of
government’s propensity toward factional strife.65 Pocock lists faction amongst the worst
of the corruptive influences associated with government. As he put it, “government
figuring paradoxically as the principal source of corruption and operating through such
means as patronage, faction, standing armies…, established churches…, and the
promotion of a monied interest,” continually endangered a virtuous citizenry necessary to
republican societies.66
Under the Articles of Confederation, local and state interests wreaked havoc on
the loosely established nation. Once united in the common interest of ridding themselves
of English authority, the makeshift government now pitted state against state and one
regional concern against another. As Wood noted, “Republicanism was not supposed to
stimulate selfishness and private interests, but was to divert and control them;” however
factional interests flourished following independence, and the founding generation
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scrambled to shore up the excesses of liberty threatening to ruin the infant republic.67 In
the midst of this crisis, Americans turned once again to their leaders for what they hoped
would be a quick and decisive end to the various divisions crippling everything from the
economy to international image. “Central to this ideal of leadership was the quality of
disinterestedness—the term the Federalists most used as a synonym for the classic
conception of civic virtue: it better conveyed the increasing threats from interests that
virtue now faced.”68 Those threats precipitated the Philadelphia Convention of 1787.
It is in this context that Wood points out an important and common myth related
to Madison, the avowed “Father of the Constitution” and bookkeeper of that momentous
meeting:
Despite his hardheaded appreciation of the multiplicity of interests in American
society, he did not offer America a pluralist conception of politics. He did not see
public policy or the common good emerging from the give-and-take of hosts of
competing interests. Instead he hoped that these clashing interests and parties in
an enlarged national republic would neutralize themselves and thereby allow
liberally educated, rational men, ‘whose enlightened views and virtuous
sentiments render them superior to local prejudices, and to schemes of injustice,’
to promote the public good in a disinterested manner.69
Madison’s post-independence experiences as well as his studious pursuit of a republican
cure led him to such a reconciliation—one that presupposed the absence rather than the
presence of parties. As Gibson noted, “The constitutional reform program that Madison
developed before the Philadelphia Convention was the product of his political
experiences and intensive studies of ancient and modern confederacies,” and, “[a]s a man
between two political spheres—that of the state of Virginia, where he served as a
congressman, and that of the Confederation, where he served as a delegate”—Madison

Gordon S. Wood, “Interests and Disinterestedness in the Making of the Constitution,” 70.
Gordon S. Wood, “Interests and Disinterestedness in the Making of the Constitution,” 83-84.
69
Gordon S. Wood, “Interests and Disinterestedness in the Making of the Constitution,” 92.
67
68

57

was poised to see both pitfalls and potential in a more formal federation of states. His
political model was born out of both republican experience and republican ideology.70 It
would be hard to imagine a more complicated tension of interests. On the one hand,
Madison sought to please Virginians, arguably and perhaps logically the most influential
of all of the early states, and on the other hand, the dutiful delegate considered the
momentous opportunity at hand in the newly formed United States—a chance to stabilize
and realize a lasting republic. In this context, Madison’s theory of disinterest was put to
the test on a personal level.
The Constitutional Convention of 1787 revealed the fissures of faction. Beard
noted very early on that undeniably, “there was a deep-seated conflict between a popular
party based on paper money and agrarian interests, and a conservative party centered in
the towns and resting on financial, mercantile, and personal property interests
generally.”71 Beyond this assessment, one only need look to the economic factors at play
in Daniel Shays’ rebellion to see just how economic interest groups might pit one faction
against another in a quite violent manner. Those tumultuous events in Massachusetts
were fresh on the minds of the delegates, and popular unrest, no doubt, was a primary
motive behind the meeting. Wood, however, argued that republican ideology shaped the
decision-making more than pure economic interests. The federalists’ perception was
based around the stereotype that antifederalists merely targeted creditors and refused to
pay the debts they owed; antifederalists thought the federalists were simply pretentious
elites who sought to maintain aristocracy and their higher stations.72 Regardless of one’s
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interpretation—Beardian or republican, experience or ideology—federalists and antifederalists as they were loosely known, parted ways on a number of issues that intensified
in the first administration.
The framers of the Constitution—those 55 delegates from the member states of
the Confederation—did not want to walk away from their summer-long meeting, which
might have more appropriately been named the Constitutional Convection for both its
crucible of ideas and seasonably heated atmosphere, with permanent division and an
ultimate failure of their republican experiment. They wanted to see to fruition those
classical republican ideals they so banded around and asserted in the struggle for
independence.
Whether for the magnanimity or against the machinations of the Convention,
contemporaries held “diligently to study the histories of other countries” “as the best
method of obtaining…wisdom.” As the Pennsylvania Centinel article put it, “Happy are
the men, and happy the people, who grow wise by the misfortunes of others.”
Interestingly, this article represented an anti-federalist perspective, which contextually
took issue with the Convention for its secrecy and lack of a bill of rights that would
explicitly protect the freedom of the press.73 The failure of past republics had to have
been on the minds of both the leadership in Philadelphia as well as the citizens of the
states as they placed their hope in this Convention. They would be banking on
disinterestedness for a solution.
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Franklin’s closing remarks at the Constitutional Convention are noteworthy here.
Ever one to employ self-deprecation and humbly offer a rather plain, yet balanced and
disarming opinion of the newly forged document, Franklin said in disinterested form,
“The Opinions I have had of its Errors, I sacrifice to the Public Good.” This statement
captured the essence of the disinterested patriot—one willing to lay aside personal
opinions for the furtherance of a larger community. He further noted that “[m]uch of the
strength & efficiency of any Government in procuring and securing happiness to the
people, depends…on the general opinion of the goodness of the Government, as well as
well as of the wisdom and integrity of its Governors.”74 Disinterested virtue had not only
played a significant role in the formation of a new charter of government amidst the
various divergent interests of the thirteen states, it also would be an essential attribute of
the citizens and leaders of this new country and government moving forward.
As the elder Pennsylvania patriot, left the Convention, he is famously said to have
remarked to a restless resident regarding the style of the new government: “A republic,
madam, if you can keep it.” The Convention, though wrought out of the dissensions of
the young confederation at least provided hope in a new republican form of
government—one whereby, it was thought, disinterested patriots would place public good
above party interests. Franklin expressed that hope at the close of the three-month
session by saying that he had “the happiness to know that it is a rising and not a setting
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sun” which he had contemplated when looking at the sun on the back of Washington’s
chair at the Convention.75
Not all outlooks were so bright. In a letter to his mentor and fellow Virginian,
Jefferson, Madison anxiously opened with perhaps a silver lining to an otherwise
challenging delegation: “Adding to these considerations the natural diversity of human
opinions on all new and complicated subjects, it is impossible to consider the degree of
concord which ultimately prevailed as less than a miracle.” The Convention had
miraculously ended in a temporary settlement toward a stronger federal union, but it was
nowhere near the government Madison had envisioned. The only thing certain for
Madison was his uncertainty: “There are but few States on the spot here which will
survive the expiration of the federal year; and it is extremely uncertain when a Congress
will again be formed.” Madison’s apprehension centered on the federal government’s
lack of supremacy.76
This “evil,” as Madison saw it, was that “of imperia in imperio”—literally, "states
within the state.” That the federal government’s power was wanting was, of course, the
central issue behind the secretive meeting, but Madison feared it was still greatly lacking
in one major area, namely its ability to overrule any individual state’s prerogative when
deemed necessary to the efficacy of the union. He called it the “negative.” Most know it
today as veto power. Whereas states had sovereignty and near-complete autonomy under
the Articles of Confederation, the federation under the new Constitution was intended to
at least “subordinate” states to a central authority or “keep the States within their proper
limits” according to Madison and many of his fellow delegates. However, in Madison’s
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view, the lack of a federal “negative” was potentially a fatal flaw, one that he elaborated
on in detail in his lengthy correspondence to Jefferson.77
In true Madisonian brilliance and style, he laid out a multifaceted argument in
favor of the federal “negative.” Fully one-third of the seventeen-page monstrosity is
dedicated to the shrewd Virginian’s political views regarding this crucial component of
centralized control. Perhaps part of his longwindedness can be attributed to the fact that
Jefferson would take convincing; in previous correspondence, the elder statesman had
shot down the notion of a “negative,” writing in late June, “Primâ facie I do not like it. It
fails in an essential character, that the hole & the patch should be commensurate. But this
proposes to mend a small hole by covering the whole garment.” Jefferson’s garb
metaphor applied to the notion that most state concerns were by nature so local or
regional—so absolutely out-of-touch in terms of their need of national oversight or
influence—that a negative was overkill pure and simple. It was impractical at best and
tyrannical at worst: “This proposition then, in order to give them 1. degree of power
which they ought to have, gives them 99. more which they ought not to have, upon a
presumption that they will not exercise the 99.”78 Thus, Madison had some persuading to
do, so he went to work with his most adept method, namely thoughtful, argumentative
prose.
Madison’s delayed and detailed response is both intriguing and enlightening. The
correspondences in the interim appear to focus on the anxieties each felt—one in the
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middle of the heated debates of the Convention—the other hanging on every word from
his fellow Virginian as he waited anxiously in Paris, which itself was on the brink of
revolution. In July, Madison described his vow of silence as a delegate as
“mortification;” he was not at liberty to expound upon the details of the proceedings even
with his closest confidant, though he did consider a “Cypher” to relay the pressing
information to his friend. Jefferson responded in August with an update regarding
several European books Madison sought, no doubt, for his continued research and thirst
for the latest and greatest works of political philosophy—works that would give the
always studious Madison “a just idea of the wheels by which the machine of government
is worked here.”79
In September, one gets an explicit idea of Madison’s anxieties and uncertainties
regarding the Convention: “I hazard an opinion nevertheless that the plan should it be
adopted will neither effectually answer its national object nor prevent the local mischiefs
which every where excite disgusts agst the state governments.” The “national object” to
quiet the excitements of the previous winter when it appeared abundantly obvious that the
economic situation which impelled Daniel Shays and fellow farmers to rebellion in
Massachusetts was yet to be resolved. Related to those issues and compounding the
direness of the situation in the fragile union was the inability of states to bring about
domestic tranquility among a diversity of interests and in countless locales. Madison
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then foreshadowed the aforementioned lengthy dispatch of October 24: “The grounds of
this opinion will be the subject of a future letter.”
It was here that Madison not only gave Jefferson a rounded argument for the
federal negative, but as Gibson points out, the letter also provides key insights into the
Sage of Montpelier’s consistent belief in disinterested, impartial administration: “The
great desideratum in Government is, so to modify the sovereignty as that it may be
sufficiently neutral between different parts of the Society to controul one part from
invading the rights of another, and at the same time sufficiently controuled itself, from
setting up an interest adverse to that of the entire Society.”80 His use of “neutral” is
indicative the sort of disinterestedness the founders expected to inherit from the
Revolutionary transition, namely the move from the ideal of an impartial monarchy to an
impartial republic—from the disinterestedness of a “Prince” to that of a national
legislature:
In absolute monarchies, the Prince may be tolerably neutral towards different
classes of his subjects, but may sacrifice the happiness of all to his personal
ambition or avarice. In small republics, the sovereign will is controuled from
such a sacrifice of the entire Society, but it is not sufficiently neutral towards the
parts composing it. In the extended Republic of the United States, the General
Government would hold a pretty even balance between the parties of particular
States, and be at the same time sufficiently restrained by its dependence on the
community, from betraying its general interests.81
Madison’s theorizing hinged upon an “extended Republic,” a concept he had already
detailed at length in this letter. The republics of old, those classical models so prevalent
and so highly esteemed by the founding generation, were effectively dismantled by the
ruinous effects of faction in large part because of their small size, consequently lacking a
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diversity of interests. However, a large republic offered a cure through a variety of
interests and the division of sovereignty amongst national, state, and local authorities (i.e.
federalism). Madison elaborated on this notion:
If then there must be different interests and parties in Society; and a majority
when united by a common interest or passion can not be restrained from
oppressing the minority, what remedy can be found in a republican Government,
where the majority must ultimately decide, but that of giving such an extent to its
sphere, that no common interest or passion will be likely to unite a majority of the
whole number in an unjust pursuit. In a large Society, the people are broken into
so many interests and parties, that a common sentiment is less likely to be felt,
and the requisite concert less likely to be formed, by a majority of the whole.82
Knowing that such a variety could serve to create the opposite problem from a lack of
unity and cooperation, Madison proved keenly aware of the necessity of an appropriate
balance between the whole and its constituent parts. Gibson’s analysis is also instructive
here: “Equally important, Madison's principal concern — his 'Great Desideratum' — was
to ensure the reconciliation of popular sovereignty with the protection of private rights
and the impartial or disinterested promotion of public good.”83 The “reconciliation”
Gibson alludes to is the “pretty even balance” Madison hoped for. The goal, indeed the
“Great Desideratum” Madison sought for his beloved country, was disinterested
leadership founded upon this equilibrium.
In December of 1787, he wrote Jefferson of the state conventions held for the
purpose of ratification—the aftermath of the Convention which “engrosses almost the
whole political attention of America.” Madison also revealed the divisions amongst the
delegates, writing, “There are about 44 or 45, on the affirmative and about half that
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number on the opposite side; A considerable number of the Constitutional party as it was
called, having joined the other party in espousing the federal Constitution.” Here, one
gets a glimpse of the complexities of the Convention as well as the divisions within each
state. “My information leads me to suppose there must be three parties in Virginia,”
Madison continued.84 It was abundantly clear that differing interests and opinions
naturally led to a division of the young nation and individual locales into factions.
Madison also identified two-party tendencies in his communication. He revealed
an important coalition in the works: “A considerable number of the Constitutional party
as it was called, having joined the other party in espousing the federal Constitution,” had
emerged—origins of the federalists. He went on to note a second party, what would be
later referred to as the anti-federalists: “At the head of the 2d. party which urges
amendments are the Governor and Mr. Mason. These do not object to the substance of
the Government but contend for a few additional guards in favor of the Rights of the
States and of the people.” Perhaps a two-party system was not an established fact just
yet, though:
I am not able to enumerate the characters which fall in with their ideas, as
distinguished from those of a third Class, at the head of which is Mr. Henry. This
class concurs at present with the patrons of amendments, but will probably
contend for such as strike at the essence of the System, and must lead to an
adherence to the principle of the existing Confederation, which most thinking men
are convinced is a visionary one, or to a partition of the Union into several
Confederacies. Mr. Harrison the late Governor is with Mr. Henry. So are a
number of others. 85
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Madison’s “classes” or parties demonstrate a clear diversity of interests that would indeed
form the basis of the first-party system, but they were far from solidified in 1787. The
divisions did, however, enveloped the nation in significant debate through the ratification
stage.
“N. York is much divided”—a little statement with large implications. Madison’s
December update foreshadowed the deluge of essays he, alongside Alexander Hamilton
and John Jay, poured into New York newspapers in one of the earliest and most
important propaganda campaigns in US history, namely The Federalist Papers. He knew
first-hand the divisiveness in the pivotal and potential swing state; he wrote the
December letter from New York.86 Amid the frenzy of essay writing that targeted New
Yorkers, one sees perhaps the apex of application when it comes to Madison’s theory of
disinterestedness expressed in The Federalist, No. 10.
Before venturing into the intricacies of Federalist, No. 10, though, it is important
to see a few contextual factors surrounding all of The Federalist as well as acknowledge
the counterposing views of those who resisted ratification, namely the anti-federalists.
Though their work is lesser-known in popular American history, historians like Wood
and others have demonstrated how the Revolution’s final phases may very well have
been the delayed victories of the Jeffersonian movement of 1800 and the formalization of
the Anti-Federalists or Republicans established in their wake. He turns the assumption of
the founders’ federalist intentions on its head, arguing that the aristocratic remedy in
Philadelphia meant to put out the fires of excessive democracy plaguing the nation under
the Articles of Confederation—“Democracy was no solution to the problem; democracy
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was the problem”—were primarily the work of elite opportunists and would not stand the
more liberal ideals already taking hold in the early republic.87 Even Madison admitted
the possibility of such intrigues, writing to Washington in December of 1786 he indicated
that the proposed reforms “instead of calling forth the sanction of the wise & virtuous”
might “be a signal to interested men to redouble their efforts to get into the Legislature.”
He went further in his pessimism too: “The only hope that can be indulged is that of
moderating the fury,” and “I have strong apprehensions that the work may never be
systematically perfected for the reasons which you deduce from our form of
Government.”88
The exchanges of late 1786 and early 1787 between Madison and Washington, as
well as the two Virginians with Edmund Randolph and Henry Knox also demonstrate the
dire concern for disinterestedness in federal leadership. Madison’s fears of intrigue and
dutiful moderation through the process help explain two things: first, why the Father of
the Constitution played such a pivotal role in the outcomes and compromises of the
Convention; and secondly, how one can reconcile his push for the federal constitution,
especially his thoughtful contributions to The Federalist Papers, with his later break from
the Federalists and Hamilton. He was a man caught in the crossfire in many ways
because of his dedication to disinterestedness. Wood calls him “a very chastened
republican” following the turmoil of the 1780s, but he did not allow his idealism or his
experience to keep him from attempting to rudder the ship back on course.89
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Washington, too, is a prime example of the virtue at work in these months
preceding the Convention. He was pushed toward both attendance and leadership of a
meeting he explicitly doubted in terms its likeliness to succeed and perhaps even its
“legality” from all of the aforementioned names. He also felt the pressure of duty to his
country in crisis once again. Washington, like his fellow Virginian, Madison, appears to
have been genuinely torn between duty and maintaining disinterestedness.90 Randolph
appealed to Washington’s patriotism on December 6: “I freely then intreat you to accept
the Unanimous appointment of the General Assembly, to the Convention at Philadelphia.
For the gloomy prospect still admits one ray of hope, that those, who began, carried on &
consummated the revolution, can yet rescue America from the impending ruin.”91
Madison, though knowing Washington’s reservations about an appearance that
historically did not bode well—former general taking up the helm of a nation in
turmoil—also could not hold back his urgings: “it was the opinion of every judicious
friend whom I consulted that your name could not be spared from the Deputation to the
Meeting in May in Philada.”92
In February, as the drama of Shays’ Rebellion came to a close, an “anxious”
Washington wrote to his former brother-in-arms and successor to the head of the United
States army, Henry Knox. The letter reveals Washington’s own dutiful dilemma. Not
unlike Madison, the future first president contemplated the weightiness of his
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involvement and what might be publicly perceived as obvious interestedness. In this
correspondence between military confidants, Washington not only relays his interactions
with Virginia’s leadership regarding his attendance of the “the Convention, proposed to
be held at Philada in May next,” he also reiterates, “in confidence that at present I retain
my first intention—not to go.” Ironically, Washington’s best intentions of absence,
iterated no less than five times in this letter alone, seemed to have been replaced with a
higher sense of obligation by late Spring. His hesitancy is telling. Context gives the
observer quite the example of disinterestedness, and one can little doubt the sincerity of
his transparency to Knox: “My first wish is, to do for the best, and to act with
propriety.”93
Washington’s attention to intention is perhaps why he is so revered in popular
imagination. “He was continually anxious that he not be thought too ambitious or selfseeking; above all, he did not want to be thought greedy or ‘interested,’” wrote Wood of
Washington, whom he said was “compulsive about his disinterestedness.” The example
of an earlier dealing regarding a gift of shares in canal stock offered from the Virginia
Assembly in 1785 is instructive.94 During the affair, which Wood admitted “would be
comic if Washington had not been so deadly earnest,” the recently retired General said, “I
should be hurt, if by declining the acceptance of it, my refusal should be construed into
disrespect, or the smallest slight put upon the generous intention of the Country: or, that
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an ostentatious display of disinterestedness or public virtue, was the source of the
refusal.”95 To appear “interested” was always of concern, but perhaps it was worse to act
with pretentious disinterest—this would become central in the first party system and the
reputation of the Federalist Party as will later be examined.
Having more than done his homework in preparation for the upcoming
Convention, Madison demonstrated a remarkable ability to balance ideology with
experience—his, at times, lofty yet diligent research and education with the practical
needs on the ground. In the Spring of 1787, he published “Vices of the Political System
of the United States.” The previous Spring, not knowing what was soon to precipitate the
need for a complete overhaul of the Confederation government, Madison had published
“Notes on Ancient and Modern Confederacies.” Both of these works, along with the
numerous letters, appear to have been the logical rough drafts of much of what Madison
would later be most well-known for: the Virginian Plan, a great portion of the
Constitution, and the eventual Bill of Rights. The year of intense study is what editors of
his papers, Robert A. Rutland and William M. E. Rachal, refer to as “perhaps the most
creative and productive year of JM’s career as a political thinker.”96 One can easily
concur after perusing the amount of political theory Madison applies to the state of the
US in his correspondences with fellow founders.
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In the first of these two works, “Notes on Ancient and Modern Confederacies,” he
uses specific historical models to exemplify the difficulties of factions acting
independently for their own interests as well as the benefits of overcoming such
divisions. In the case of the Achaean Confederacy, Madison lamented that “Every City
was now engaged in a separate interest & no longer acted in concert.” He hails the
Helvetic Confederacy for its “congratulatory review of circumstances & events favorable
to their common interest—and exhortations to Union and patriotism.”97 In his study of
Madison, Lance Banning emphatically tied this preliminary work of past confederacies to
the theories fleshed out in Madison’s major portions of The Federalist. Agreeing with
Rutland and Rachal that Madison was better equipped for Philadelphia than any of his
contemporaries, Banning goes on to tie the Virginian’s preliminary work on
confederacies to both his written communications and the subsequent year’s work, “Vices
of the Political System of the United States.”98
“Vices of the Political System of the United States” offers an important apology
for overcoming the divisions amongst the states more than anything else, and that, of
course, is also the central concern of Federalist, No. 10. To understand the principles of
the latter, it is worth one’s time to add to a view of Madison’s correspondence an
examination of this important antecedent. Just a perusal of the list of vices gives one this
overall impression: “1. Failure of the States to comply with the Constitutional
requisitions;” “2. Encroachments by the States on the federal authority;” “4. Trespasses
of the States on the rights of each other;” “5. want of concert in matters where common
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interest requires it;” “6. want of Guaranty to the States of their Constitutions & laws
against internal violence;” “9. Multiplicity of laws in the several States.”99 These
explicit and numerous examples demonstrate the necessity of a “disinterested umpire,”
and the seamless connection between Madison’s theory exhibited from the Spring of
1786 through the late Fall of 1787—from “Notes on Ancient and Modern Confederacies”
to The Federalist, No. 10.100
The month preceding the Convention’s opening also offers a more hopeful
exchange between Madison and Washington. It is here that Madison discloses what he
envisioned from the new government in terms of dealing with the division of faction
through a disinterested medium of patriotic leaders that would become the central
argument of The Federalist, No. 10. In mid-April, Madison imparted to Washington,
“The great desideratum which has not yet been found for Republican Governments,
seems to be some disinterested & dispassionate umpire in disputes between different
passions & interests in the State.”101 Both did not simply look to classical republican
success stories; they knew full well the deficiencies of traditional republics—faction
topping the list of harmful, yet natural products of popular governments. Madison’s
solution involved disinterested leadership:
The majority who alone have the right of decision, have frequently an interest real
or supposed in abusing it. In Monarchies the sovereign is more neutral to the
interests and views of different parties; but unfortunately he too often forms
interests of his own repugnant to those of the whole. Might not the national
prerogative here suggested be found sufficiently disinterested for the decision of
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local questions of policy, whilst it would itself be sufficiently restrained from the
pursuit of interests adverse to those of the whole Society?102
Madison harkens back to constitutional monarchies, like those of England—those of
Trenchard and Gordon—for a point of reference. Reflecting on the theorizing that
Madison and others were so well-known for, Jefferson wrote, “The fact is, that at the
formation of our government, many had formed their political opinions on European
writings and practices, believing the experience of old countries, and especially of
England, abusive as it was, to be a safer guide than mere theory.”103 The role of
disinterested leadership, once solely the responsibility of an impartial monarch, was in
Madison’s eyes, more fully realized in an impartial legislature. Whereas the former
model would, no doubt, have been distasteful, indeed unacceptable to the founding
generation, the latter offered a logical and beneficial solution to the issue at hand, namely
the excesses of majority interests and factions. This is the premise of The Federalist, No.
10.
More ink has been spilled on this one essay of 85 total than countless other
seminal documents of American history. But that was not always the case. Beard’s
breakthrough work of the early twentieth century placed a spotlight on Madison’s longforgotten treatise on faction and caused historians to question founding motives in ways
that remain potent today.104 Beard’s purposes, as already discussed, were driven by
economic factors, but historians following his example and examining this particular
essay have unearthed significant political developments and theories that match, if not
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exceed, the groundbreaking work of An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of
the United States.
If the Convention proved that post-revolution political unity had faded to a certain
degree by way of the emerging federalist and anti-federalist sentiments, then the
ratification stage would prove even more challenging in bringing the nation together. In
the debates that arose from the Constitutional Convention, factions and political
opposition produced cause for concern. One major obstacle had been overcome in
Philadelphia, but more challenges were on the horizon. Factions’ known capacity to
yield immediate and permanent rifts among the people became the focus of Madison’s
Federalist, No. 10 and Federalist, No. 51, as well as a topic of concern for Federalist
leaders like Fisher Ames in their arguments for ratification of the Constitution.
In Federalist, No. 10, Madison asserted the Constitution’s unique ability to “break
and control the violence of faction,” beginning his essay with an admission of the known
historical havoc factions tended to exhibit and building off of his latest research and
political theorizing of the year-and-a-half preceding the push for ratification.105 He
theorized that factional strife would face the sobering effects of a vast and diverse
constituency. The size of the United States and scope of its regional differences, he
argued, would naturally control any one faction from becoming too powerful. The
Virginian also, and perhaps more importantly, pointed to elected officials’ ability to look
toward a national interest, saying, “whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of
their country, and whose patriotism and love of justice, will be least likely to sacrifice it
to temporary or partial considerations.”106 Gibson pointed out that in this theorizing,
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Madison presumed that “representatives would share a common understanding of the
public good and a common conception of the rights that should be protected” and also
clarifies the key balance of the disinterested representatives with an educated citizenry—
one that would recognize their “true” or “permanent” interests aligned to a notion of the
public good.107
Madison also emphasized the idea of national unity in Federalist, No. 51,
claiming that, “more powerful factions or parties [will] be gradually induced by a like
motive, to wish for a government which will protect all parties, the weaker as well as the
more powerful.”108 Finally, Fisher Ames, the Federalist leader from Massachusetts,
argued for longer terms of service for offices at the federal level to keep some
consistency and order, prohibiting the factious inclinations of the people to propel the
republic into a perpetual cycle of power grabs and party changes: “Faction and
enthusiasm are the instruments by which popular governments are destroyed.”109
Perhaps there is no stronger example of the masterful application of Madison’s
republican theory on breaking and controlling the violence of factions than observing the
very principles seen to fruition by the disinterested wishes of the delegates in
Philadelphia. Amidst the sweltering heat of 1787 and the equally urgent matters that
precipitated such a meeting, what Washington likened to “a house on fire,” patriotism
outweighed the individual state interests.110 Much was lost in terms of state sovereignty,
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but much was gained in the maintenance of the union for posterity. This first and
significant test of Madison’s theory would surely not be the last—disinterestedness was
perhaps more easily attained when the nation faced a common enemy or crisis.111 In the
Revolution, interest was overcome by a thirst for independence; in the Convention,
interest was overcome by the insatiable yearning for a continuance in liberty that the
delegates knew was only possible through a synergistic government, perhaps best
illustrated in the Latin, “E pluribus unum.”112
As it turned out, Jefferson did not receive Madison’s communications from July,
September, and the all-important October letter until December, as he noted in his
response dated December 20. When he finally offered his reactions to the proposed
overhaul of the federal government, Jefferson had both unequivocal concerns and hopeful
optimism for the fledgling nation. Topping the list of disapprovals was the absence of a
bill of rights, something the champion of liberty and independence felt “no just
government should refuse, or rest on inference.” Jefferson also had much to say about
what he feared would lead to a permanent, despotic executive; the lack of “the necessity
of rotation in office” was something he admitted was a “feature I dislike, and greatly
dislike.” Though he detailed his criticisms, revealing a system of government far from
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perfection, the Sage of Monticello concluded, “After all, it is my principle that the will of
the Majority should always prevail. If they approve the proposed Convention in all its
parts, I shall concur in it chearfully, in hopes that they will amend it whenever they shall
find it work wrong.” His final thoughts hint at one of the key ingredients: “I think our
governments will remain virtuous for many centuries.”113 Virtue was a necessity, and the
thoughts of Gordon’s Roman inspiration were sure to be tried in the immediate months
ahead—whether or not “[t]his sort of constitutional Virtue” would come to fruition in a
truly “public spirited Man; even an honest and disinterested heart.”114
A year later, in December of 1788, electors met for the first time to put forth their
selections for the first president of the United States. Though divisions were showing,
the young nation had united around the quintessential disinterested leader, the “Great
Cincinnatus,” George Washington. What better representative of the republican ideal?
What better mechanism for ensuring the virtue Jefferson and so many others of the
founding generation knew to be the glue that would hold a less-than-perfect union
together? Washington not only brought the nation together, but he also wrote several
influential pieces on the dangers of party, and he perhaps most importantly left a legacy
of disinterestedness in his parting words and the manner of his resignation from the
presidency. On the other hand, the theory of disinterestedness was yet to be tested under
the new Constitution; formal parties were far from formalized. That was all about to
change. Looking at the dynamic at play in the formulation of the Constitution from the
1830s, Tocqueville offers a fitting assessment:
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It was the wish of one party to convert the Union into a league of independent
States, or a sort of congress, at which the representatives of the several peoples
would meet to discuss certain points of their common interests. The other party
desired to unite the inhabitants of the American colonies into one sole nation, and
to establish a Government which should act as the sole representative of the
nation, as far as the limited sphere of its authority would permit. The practical
consequences of these two theories were exceedingly different.115
Those “exceedingly different” “theories” form the basis for the discussion and analysis
that follows.
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CHAPTER III

THE PRACTICE OF DISINTERESTEDNESS

Here, perhaps, I ought to stop. But a solicitude for your welfare, which cannot end
but with my life, and the apprehension of danger, natural to that solicitude, urge
me, on an occasion like the present, to offer to your solemn contemplation, and to
recommend to your frequent review, some sentiments which are the result of
much reflection, of no inconsiderable observation, and which appear to me allimportant to the permanency of your felicity as a people. These will be offered to
you with the more freedom, as you can only see in them the disinterested
warnings of a parting friend, who can possibly have no personal motive to bias his
counsel. Nor can I forget, as an encouragement to it, your indulgent reception of
my sentiments on a former and not dissimilar occasion.1
Washington’s parting prose reveals his attempts to fulfill the notion of a “public spirited
Man; even an honest and disinterested heart”—from Thomas Gordon’s translation of
Tacitus.2 Having witnessed the first test of the new government’s ability to maintain
classical republican theories, his self-proclaimed, “disinterested warnings of a parting
friend” were, in his mind, essential to the future longevity, success, and security of the
young nation, as well as indispensable to the happiness and prosperity of posterity. The
first eight years of constitutional government witnessed the trials associated with the
transition from theory to practice; Washington felt the weight of passing the torch to men
staunchly divided. The seeds of the first party system were taking root.
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His parting reference to a welcome “reception” must have conjured up the
“sentiments” of his first attempt at retirement—1783, at the official close of the War for
Independence and the Paris Peace Treaty of that same year. After reading his brief, 339word resignation address to Congress in December of that momentous year, one cannot
help but concur with Edward J. Larson that, “it was less what he said than what he did.”3
And so it was nearly thirteen years later—his actions spoke volumes more than even the
much larger Farewell Address, which clocked in at 6,088 words.4
Indeed, his final actions have inspired countless volumes and continue to stand
apart, as he so often did even amongst his contemporaries, as admirable actions to be
applied to leaders both then and today. It should come as no surprise then, that even the
last decade has seen renewed vigor to enshrine the first president—to use his words and
actions as both inspiration and warning. In John Avlon’s Washington’s Farewell: The
Founding Father’s Warning to Future Generations, for example, one sees the explicit
relation: “Today, we need only take the Farewell Address down from the shelf,” for, “[i]t
can still achieve Washington’s aim by helping us to reunite our nation and re-center our
politics.”5 What was it about that message attracts even a modern audience? The “recentering” and “reunification” Avlon notes center around the first president’s
disinterestedness.
Washington’s first farewell, his retirement following the Peace of Paris in 1783,
had already proven him among the most disinterested patriots to ever hold such power
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and promise. Even his former king is said to have remarked upon hearing the rumor of
Washington’s retirement, “If he does that, he will be the greatest man in the world.”6
Many, including a man who ironically also bore his first name, King George III, fully
expected the other George to take the reigns of military premier after victory at
Yorktown. This was common practice; this was historical precedent. What Washington
did, though, not only broke with expectation and tradition, it ultimately demonstrated his
disinterested spirit as a leader—a legacy he, no doubt, wanted to leave the infant nation
upon his resignation.7
The meaning of such a departure of station did not go unnoticed. Writing to
Washington in August of 1783, before Washington’s official communications regarding
his retirement, François-Jean de Beauvoir, marquis de Chastellux expressed the already
popular designation: “I wish heartily that instead of travelling on by land, I might embark
at this place and proceed to Virginy, where I am told, your excellency is retired like an
other Cincinnatus.” However, Chastellux may not have seen Washington’s departure as
permanent. He continued, “the moment of your independency should be the sunset of the
british glory and splendor, but there is no sunset for great Washington’s fame; and your
making a pause to fighting and commanding is a [ ] not a sundown. may the american
star [ ] all the astronomical rules, and proceed from west to east!”8 Though the title,
“Cincinnatus,” was fitting and highly esteemed, the practicality of such a life was soon to
be challenged.
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In response, Washington wrote the Frenchman of his anticipation of a return to
the solitude of Mount Vernon saying, “it being my axious [sic] desire to quit the walks of
public life, & under the shadow of my own vine, and my own Fig-tree, to seek those
enjoyments, & that relaxation, which a mind that has been constantly upon the stretch for
more than eight years, stands so much in need of.”9 Washington embraced the notion of
being another Cincinnatus, and after so much of what he and others of the founding
generation considered providential, his classical republican parallel likely felt quite
natural and fitting. Cincinnatus was a model of disinterested virtue, something
Washington had aspired to, and something he could embody in retirement. In February,
following the official resignation of both the British by way of the Treaty of Paris and
Washington in his message to Congress, the latter wrote once again to Chastellux:
I am at length become a private citizen of America, on the banks of the
Potowmac; where under my own Vine & my own Fig tree—free from the bustle
of a camp & the intrigues of a Court, I shall view the busy world, “in the calm
lights of mild philosophy”—& with that serenity of mind which the Soldier in his
pursuit of glory, & the Statesman of fame, have not time to enjoy. I am not only
retired from all public employments; but I am retireing within myself & shall
tread the private walks of life with heartfelt satisfaction.10
It was a sincere correspondence, one in which the reader can grasp just how attracted to
and comfortable with retirement the General had become. It makes the call back to
public service all the more surprising, demonstrating that it would take an extreme set of
circumstances to bring about a reversal of intentions for Washington. When he wrote in

George Washington, “From George Washington to François-Jean de Beauvoir, marquis de
Chastellux, 12 October 1783,” Founders Online (Accessed October 7, 2021)
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/ 99-01-02-11929.
9

George Washington, “From George Washington to François-Jean de Beauvoir, marquis de
Chastellux, 1 February 1784,” Founders Online (Accessed October 7, 2021),
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/ Washington/04-01-02-0062.
10

83

February of 1787 to General Knox—nearly three years later to the day—“ I shall be
surprized at nothing; for if three years ago, any person had told me that at this day, I
should see such a formidable rebellion against the laws & constitutions of our own
making as now appears I should have thought him a bedlamite—a fit subject for a mad
house,” one sees that he meant just that by way of his own pen.11
Thus, the Great Cincinnatus dutifully, yet reluctantly took the helm once again in
1789.12 Washington’s profound sense of obligation and the one interest he placed above
all others, namely that of the country he had sacrificed life and limb to help create, called
him back into service with the task of preserving the union’s future. His hesitancy to
leave the solitude of the farm was obvious through the aforementioned tumult of 1786
and 1787, but so was his palpable concern for the wellbeing of the nation.
Washington’s return from a short-lived retirement was the unifying factor that
eased factional tensions, at least temporarily, following the Convention. His presence in
Philadelphia and eventual candidacy for the newly established executive branch under the
Constitution brought back the pomp of independence and circumstance of a unified
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nation. As Robertson says, “Washington had become for his countrymen the
antimonarchical monarch.”13 Washington’s inauguration seemed to stem the tide of
factional fracturing that surfaced in the late 1780s, as Americans enthusiastically replaced
the old King George III with a new, rather kingly George Washington. James Roger
Sharp says he had “popularity that transcended sectionalism.”14 However, this factional
hiatus soon gave way to permanent political parties, for it was within the first president’s
administration that factions found an enduring habitation in United States’ politics.
The presidency proved vulnerable to the workings of faction. Richard Buel, Jr.
says, “Though in practice it was not long before the electoral college succumbed to
political pressure as the contest for the presidency became the focus of the first party
system, it is clear that the framers had never intended this to happen.” This was a distinct
transition from the theoretical to the practical. “They had made extraordinary efforts to
keep presidential elections free of party influence.” Despite explicit efforts, though,
parties did take hold. The electoral college, oftentimes maligned for its obscurities was a
system designed to discourage party influences—such party persuasion was thought more
likely if the choice of the nation’s executive were placed in the hands of a federal
congress, state legislatures, or the people’s direct vote. Ironically, though, this very
system surfaced as a staple of both the first and second-party systems.15
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The Electoral College developed when disinterestedness still held sway in the
early republic. Today, this system is unimaginable without them, as it has been adapted
to accommodate them. That the founding generation did not see how the Electoral
College lent itself naturally to two parties based on the constituencies of two popular
candidates is hard to fathom. The numerical breakdown of majority victory assumes as
much. However, the seemingly obscure system does illustrate a convenient case study of
the transition at work from classical republicanism to modern republicanism. The
movement from the previously discussed disinterested monarch to what the founders
envisioned for the presidency demonstrates the differences in theory and practice under
the Constitution. In theory, the president, by way of election from a group of electors or
what Holton calls “leading Americans,” would “make it harder for a popular majority to
elect a president” unfit, interested, or “irresponsible”—the exact type of majority tyranny
Madison feared in The Federalist, No. 10.16 An executive with a certain autonomy
independent from Congress would also, in theory, be less attached to any party
machinations within the legislative bodies.
In practice, though, not only could these two separate branches work in tandem,
they actually fueled party allegiances. What the founders failed to grasp was just how
quickly the president would become the leader of a party rather than the disinterested,
disconnected executive they envisioned or perhaps naïvely assumed would logically
result from a nostalgic view of classical republicanism. Washington, perhaps the
exception to the rule in more ways than one, was the only president to overtly avoid
direct party affiliation and probably the loudest voice in speaking out against their
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destructive nature. This, in context though, should come as no surprise, as the
Washington administration was a test for the new Constitution in many ways, and the
first president served as arbiter over the transition to a formal republic under the newly
adopted government. Once Washington’s term ended, though, the first party system was
in the works, albeit far from the full-fledged party machines that developed in the early
nineteenth century. Still, they show some early intentions to utilize collective interests in
order to secure the White House.
The first president’s administration served as a microcosm of the larger political
fracturing taking shape in the United States in the waning years of the eighteenth century.
It started in the cabinet, rippled outward toward Congress, and finally took hold
throughout the entire constituency by 1800. Following independence, a once congenial
and collaborative relationship between John Adams and Thomas Jefferson, a friendship
that Jefferson considered “constant” and Adams described as “an affection that can never
die,” started to deteriorate.17 These men, of course, would serve in the Washington
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considered the consensus analysis on this point. Having looked to the colonial years already, it is clear that
what emerged in Washington’s administration may have been unique to the young nation, as was the case
with many political developments in the republican experiment, but it is equally clear that the
distinguishing marks of each of the first two parties hearkened back to classical, Anglican, and colonial
divisions. Thus, it is the argument of this study that although there is a clear evolution to the first-party
system, the groundwork was already well-established prior to Washington’s term. This aligns with a view
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so also did Jefferson note in his latter years that a group “now call themselves republicans. but the name
alone is changed, the principles are the same. for in truth the parties of Whig and Tory are those of nature.”
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administration—Adams as vice-president and Jefferson as the first secretary of state. The
war with England, having almost been lost by way of an impotent central authority, led
Adams down a path that sought stronger central authority, while Jefferson maintained his
firm beliefs in limiting federal power at all costs.18 Their ideological differences, forged
in the revolution, now cooled into different political beliefs in the 1780s. These two men
eventually led the country from the executive branch as the leaders of two antithetical
parties, the Federalists under Adams from 1797-1801—the Republicans under Jefferson
from 1801-1809.
Alexander Hamilton, Federalist Party leader, also found himself amid the AdamsJefferson saga during Washington’s presidency. Hamilton, as secretary of the treasury,
was constantly and naturally pitted against Jefferson when it came to both domestic and
foreign issues that arose during Washington’s terms in office. In late 1793, Jefferson
resigned his post as secretary of state, feeling slighted and “[w]orn down,” as he felt that
Washington’s policies tended to gravitate toward the Hamiltonian camp.19
It is important to acknowledge, however, that the early leaders did not see their
guidance of the respective parties as interested. Their divergent nationalisms—their
opposing visions of republicanism—led leaders like Hamilton, Jefferson, Adams, and
their early successors to view themselves as disinterested patriots with fundamentally
different ideas of how best to govern a republic. It appears rather incongruous to a
modern audience, but it was almost as if the parties found them, not the other way
around. Perhaps also, today’s perspectives on parties vary to such a degree that explains
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why this might be the case.
Two situations illustrate the point well. First, fiscal policy, the foremost domestic
issue to confront the nation, prompted the emergence of party interests and animosities.
However, Buel contends, stabilizing and securing the republic more than “money
matters” were the primary issues that pitted Hamilton firmly against Jefferson and
Madison. Still, “money matters” became the cornerstone of the first Secretary of the
Treasury’s scheme to achieve his vision for the new nation. In this light, fiscal policy
merely served as one arena whereby party allegiances might arise.20 Either way, though,
it is clear that the stage was set for whether or not leaders might be able to maintain
disinterested character in the midst of a variety of contentious issues the young nation
was to confront in the first administration.
Hamilton and Madison, having worked closely through the ratification stage, soon
emerged as leaders of two opposing interests in the new constitutional government.
Hamilton took the helm of federalists, quite consistent with his leanings toward stronger
central authority, while Madison took up the lead of a yet unnamed opposition party as
the nation’s first speaker of the house of representatives. Hofstadter saw this as a key
miscalculation by Madison and other political theorists of the early republic; while the
new government was intended to be “a constitution against parties,” it quickly took up
national issues that practically required “the business of conciliation and compromise
among…a hodgepodge of various and conflicting interests.” Madison’s pluralism,
articulated in his correspondences and his essays, failed to foresee how a “natural
diversity of human opinions” in his extended republican model might coalesce into two
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considerable coalitions, competing with one another for control of the majority or by way
of the majority.21
Hamilton’s “Report on Public Credit” was the spark that “caused a rupture in the
national leadership and set a pattern for the opposing alignments that were to dominate
national politics for the next twenty-five years.”22 Fiscal factions arose first after
Philadelphia, and their respective sides formed the beginning stages of what eventually
formalized the first-party system. The theory of disinterestedness faced its greatest test to
date.
There was a clear geographical component to these early divisions. What most
referred to at the time as “sectional” in nature constituted a conflict of competing
economic interests based on what was termed “eastern” or “southern” for the moment.
Hamilton’s plan for the nation’s economy encamped the Secretary of the Treasury with
eastern interests when it came to proposals on assumption of the nation’s Revolutionary
War debt and the creation of a national bank. To southern stakeholders, these proposals
would unduly burden states who had already taken large strides to eliminate their own
debts with states who had not. That Hamilton was a New Yorker, east of the Potomac,
undoubtedly made his plan highly suspect to charges of selfish interest.23
What Madison had articulated in The Federalist, No. 10 was now directly
challenged: “that our governments are too unstable; that the public good is disregarded in

Richard Hofstadter, The Idea of a Party System, 72; James Madison, “From James Madison to
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interests as well as proof positive of Jefferson’s aforementioned hindsight, namely that “the parties of Whig
and Tory are those of nature.”
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the conflicts of rival parties; and that measures are too often decided, not according to the
rules of justice, and the rights of the minor party; but by the superior force of an
interested and overbearing majority.”24 Hamilton’s ability to maintain disinterested
character was now called into question, but Madison’s (and Jefferson’s) response also
revealed a decided break with the classical notion of disinterested virtue. This was not a
break in the sense that these opposition leaders abandoned the virtue but rather that their
respective views regarding public good would require them to form alliances, choose
sides, and ultimately involve themselves in the interests of what they considered to be
essential to securing the promises of the Revolution and ensuring the longevity of the
republic. Looking back on the division, Jefferson wrote, “To recover, therefore, in
practice, the powers which the nation had refused, and to warp to their own wishes those
actually given, was the steady object of the federal party. Ours, on the contrary, was to
maintain the will of the majority of the convention and of the people themselves.”25 Both
sides saw themselves as patriotic saviors rather than interested pundits entangled in the
private pursuits of factional disputes; each would-be party was respectively preventing
“either monarchy or anarchy,” but they avoided the stigma of calling themselves a
“party” or intentionally organizing as such.26 Disinterestedness was not dead; it was
perhaps more necessary in this context.

Madison, “The Federalist No. 10,” 121.
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Outside of the domestic arena, foreign policy also sharpened party lines. In the
wake of the French Revolution, which began the year Washington took office, Jefferson
encouraged the President to side with former revolutionary allies—both in their pursuit of
overthrowing monarchy and in combatting their common enemy, namely the British who
declared war on France in 1793. Hamilton not only discouraged such an alliance, but he
was also instrumental in the signing of the Jay Treaty (a pro-British treaty) that many
historians have said, “may have done more to create permanent political parties, the
Federalists and Republicans, than any other event.”27 Hamilton’s involvement at the
highest levels of politics through the early 1800s proved pivotal in the political
animosities that developed among Federalists and Republicans.
Jeffersonian and Madisonian opposition to British conciliation came as no
surprise. “The leaders of the young republic believed foreign influence was a much
greater threat to popular government than to monarchies.” The domestic issues
surrounding fiscal policy may have demonstrated clear divisions, but their impact on the
solidification of the first parties paled in comparison to those of foreign affairs.
Madison’s early strivings in the First Congress demonstrated his intentions to favor
France and diminish dependence on English trade. His argument—“the belief that
Britain’s need for American trade was greater than America’s need for British trade”—
hearkened back to Paine’s arguments in Common Sense. 28 As Paine put it, “The
commerce, by which she hath enriched herself are the necessaries of life, and will always
have a market while eating is the custom of Europe.” The Americans had a clear
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advantage in this relationship—with time and growth, the fledgling nation would soon
reap the benefits of both its resources and the manufacture and dispersion of those
resources abroad.29
The divisions arising from either Anglophilia or Francophilia also had a
geographic attachment. Northern merchants tended to be more dependent upon British
manufacturers, whereas southern planters found markets anywhere “eating” was “the
custom,” as Paine had written. Additionally, northerners were not granted the same
favorably lengthy credit terms from the French that they enjoyed with the British. There
was a logical concern, too, that the French Revolution threatened the long-term nature of
an alliance with a monarchy in turmoil. Thus, Hamiltonian allegiances gravitated toward
British interests. Southern sentiments fell more in line with policies of the
Confederation—“Commercial needs did not permit total isolation, but commercial
treaties need no lead to political association,” as Buel put it.30
Some Americans feared that the unrestrained violence initiated in revolutionary
France might spread to the United States if the fraternal relationship continued. The
execution of King Louis XVI and the subsequent reign of terror only gave credence to the
notion that too much democracy would result in a lack of law and order, mob rule, or
anarchy—what Federalists feared most dangerous to the future of the young republic.
These critics, President Washington among them, saw the “excesses as a betrayal of
republicanism rather than its logical outcome.” Unsurprisingly, those who condemned
the French Revolution’s extremist tendencies were among an elite class of Americans,
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seeing the attack on “men of property” in France as one of the most dangerous threats to
their own station in the States. Jefferson and Madison, on the contrary, saw the end of
monarchy in France and the movements toward republicanism as a more kindred
partnership between the two republican powers. The real impact of these circumstances
upon the administration and eventual parties, though, came when France entered into
open conflict with Great Britain—now sides had to be chosen, and they were.31
“Hostilities having commenced between France & England,” Washington wrote
to Hamilton in early April of 1793, “it is incumbent on the Government of the United
States to prevent, as far as in it lies, all interferences of our Citizens in them; and
immediate precautionary measures ought, I conceive, to be taken for that purpose.” The
president’s worry was not unwarranted: “I have reason to believe (from some things I
have heard) that many vessels in different parts of the Union are designated for Privateers
& are preparing accordingly.” Support for the French came in the form of festivals,
protests, port access, and privateering. It was reciprocity many felt the logical result of
French support during the American War for Independence. However, Washington,
Hamilton, and others worried what these overt actions might do to place the United States
in the realm of belligerency or aggression. The president planned to navigate between
the potential storms abroad and at home: “The means to prevent it, and for the United
States to maintain a strict neutrality between the Powers at war, I wish to have seriously
thought of, that I may as soon as I arrive at the Seat of the Government, take such steps,
Richard Buel, Jr., Securing the Revolution, 37-9. “As time went on, Americans began to divide
their opinions on events in France. The cabinet shows the general trend in microcosm.” Buel details the
worries Hamilton had regarding the French Revolution—anxieties that Washington began to share to a
certain degree, especially after some tense interactions with the French ambassador, Genêt. Jefferson, on
the other hand, having spent a good portion of the post-Revolutionary years as the US ambassador to
France, tended to see the French movements as consistent with those of the American colonists during the
American Revolution.
31
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tending to these ends, as shall be deemed proper & effectual.” Washington’s “steps”
involved a formal “Neutrality Proclamation” issued ten days later.32
To add to the drama, the newly appointed French ambassador under the recently
created French Republic, Edmond Charles Genêt, had arrived in the US and was rallying
support from sympathetic Americans as well as seeking recompense for debts owed to
France from the American War for Independence. During this divisive match between
England and France, Washington did (or at least attempted) what one might expect from
someone so interested in maintaining disinterestedness. “My anxious desire to keep this
Country in Peace—and the delicacy of my situation renders a circumspect conduct
indispensably necessary on my part.”33 Neutrality was a policy born out of Washington’s
desire to keep the young nation out of another embroilment with European powers that
might threaten not only the political condition but also the economic independence that
choosing a side would ultimately threaten. Neutrality, though, was compromised from
the outset. The Franco-American Treaties of 1778, which promised the support and
defense of the US when it came to French West Indian possessions as well as the
availability of American ports to French naval prizes, placed the US in a pickle from the
beginning. Additionally, the sentiment that the renewed hostilities between the French
and British was merely “an extension of the struggle” for American independence as well
as a staunch Anglophobia left over from the American Revolution, far from alleviated by
the early 1790s, led many Americans to place their allegiances firmly behind the French.
Richard Buel, Jr., Securing the Revolution, 40; George Washington, “From George Washington
to Alexander Hamilton, 12 April 1793,” Founders Online (Accessed October 13, 2021),
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Of course, the perception for many Americans was that Great Britain had not just waged
war on its historical rival across the English Channel but on republicanism itself; it was
as if the British supported monarchy at home and abroad—a clear threat to American
security.34
Amid this Francophilia, then, Hamilton, Jay, and Washington himself strove to
steer a course that would not unnecessarily provoke the British to acts of aggression
against American neutrality—neutrality teetering on the edge of being blatantly proFrench in nature. Washington made neutrality official policy in the Spring of 1793,
saying, “the duty and interest of the United States require” a neutral position and “that
they should with sincerity and good faith adopt and pursue a conduct friendly and
impartial toward the belligerent powers.” Worried about the public outcry for French
support, he sought “to exhort and warn the citizens of the United States carefully to avoid
all acts and proceedings whatsoever, which may in any manner tend to contravene such
disposition.” This neutrality was seen by many, including then-Secretary of State,
Jefferson, as a betrayal of the treaty with France. For one, it disavowed American
allegiance to a treaty now compromised by way of a complete restructuring of the French
government as well as a new state of war between two US interests. Secondly, the
president’s proclamation explicitly annulled parts of the former Treaty of Alliance with
France (1778).35
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To assuage the animosities generated from Jefferson, Madison, and their growing
base of opposition, Hamilton went to work behind the scenes with his “Pacificus” letters.
Latin for “peacemaker,” his intent was clear: to back the president’s policies and mollify
public opinion. However, Hamilton’s measures had an unintended effect too: the
appearance of an independent executive in matters of foreign policy—dangerous to the
longevity of liberty in a republic. In Pacificus’s first polemic, he asserted, “The inquiry
then is—what department of the Government of the UStates is the prop[er] one to make a
declaration of Neutrality in the cases in which the engagements [of] the Nation permit
and its interests require such a declaration.” This question of the constitutional separation
of powers was most definitely on the minds of opponents of the proclamation. Hamilton
felt strongly that the power was the president’s: “A correct and well informed mind will
discern at once that it can belong neit[her] to the Legislative nor Judicial Department and
of course must belong to the Executive.” The opposition felt otherwise.36
Hamilton’s former essayist ally, James Madison, took up the pen to combat the
hazardous Hamilton. Under the pseudonym “Helvidius,” a Roman patriot opposed to
Emperor Nero’s “imperial aggrandizement without resorting to treason or conspiracy,”
the Speaker of the House was urged to do what he knew best, namely take up his pen to
articulate a sound and convincing argument. Dreading that Hamilton would be lent not
only the president’s ear but also the public’s, Jefferson wrote to his friend and confidant:
“Nobody answers him, and his doctrine will therefore be taken for confessed. For god’s
sake, my dear Sir, take up your pen, select the most striking heresies, and cut him to

criticism and censure of the public and even his own administration in a manner he had yet to experience to
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peices in the face of the public. There is nobody else who can and will enter the lists with
him.”37 The rivalry was just beginning.
From Cato’s Letters to Silence Dogood to Publius’s essays (The Federalist) to the
Pacificus-Helvidius debates, pseudonymous writing permeated not only eighteenthcentury political discourse but also sheds light on a tradition of disinterestedness. True to
the Whig tradition of classical nom de plumes, the founding generation oftentimes drew
upon the popular republican heroes of old to gain public trust and attention. Most
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historians of the period touch on the origins of the pseudonyms but rarely focus on the
motives behind such names. Eran Shalev’s analysis of classical pseudonyms in the
Revolution and early republic acknowledges what most historians pass over: “Antiquity
provided the rhetorical high ground in an argument; it imbued writings with a classical air
of disinterestedness that rose above particular interests.”38 The very notion of a pen
name shows at least an attachment to classical disinterestedness, otherwise the use of an
alias makes little sense. Over time, especially paralleling the rising legitimacy of party
politics, use of the pseudonym remained in place more as a formality or method of paying
homage to the heroes of both the classical and founding generations.39
Newspapers afforded the best way to disseminate political thought and garner
public support in the eighteenth century. As Jeffrey L. Pasley says, “journalists once
were politicians.” Their pens and pen names served to propagate political aims in a
manner that hearkened back to their classical heroes as well as their classical ideologies.
Interestingly, though, it was the symbiotic relationship of the press and the parties which
would eventually make the notion of disinterestedness as well as pseudonyms less
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prominent. The 1790s press, however, remained a platform by which political pundits
might approach the public in a manner that at least gave the appearance of disinterest
even if it was anything but driven by political interests in deed. Tocqueville noted, “In
America there is scarcely a hamlet which has not its own newspaper… All the political
journals of the United States are indeed arrayed on the side of the administration or
against it; but they attack and defend in a thousand different ways.” Tocqueville’s oftcited excursion took place in the early 1830s, but Pasley’s work demonstrates that the
Frenchmen’s assessment was merely an extension and expansion of a newspaper and
print culture that predominated in the American colonies just as much as in the early
republic.40
In the midst of the wedge working its way through Washington’s administration,
newspapers served as conduits for both the Federalist-leaning government and its
emergent opposition. At first, the structure of newspaper circulation was highly
decentralized and thrived not off of the abhorrent “government-controlled ‘court press,’”
but through “newspaper networks…allowing almost any single editor, writer, or event
anywhere to command a national audience.” Much like the unforeseen nature of political
parties, Pasley points out that the first government did not anticipate how significant and
partisan the press would become. John Fenno’s Gazette of the United States was the first
attempt at a pro-Federalist, pro-Administration, and pro-Constitution paper with the
purpose of backing and defending the legitimacy of the new government. On the surface,
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the paper Fenno envisioned appeared disinterested and disconnected from commercial
concerns or community ties because he avoided advertising solicitation—a primary
method for raising revenue in the newspaper industry: “Just as legitimate public debate
could only take place in a pseudonymous arena that was empty of specific persons, so a
national public sphere had to be cleansed of specificity with regard to the place where it
was published.” However, as Pasley points out, Fenno’s disinterested appearances were
more a lack of business savvy than impartial printing; he was hoping that this newspaper
venture would lead to retirement by way of close connections and contracts with the
gentlemen in control of the government and the Federalist party.41
Philip Freneau’s editorship of a rival paper to Fenno’s pro-Federalist publication
inaugurated a new era in partisanship and demonstrated that disinterestedness was
perhaps waning. The gradually polarized press emerged from two developing forms of
nationalism inherent in the names of these papers and an increasingly obvious need to
shape public opinion by both infant parties. Pasley insightfully noted the transition: “as
the antipathy between Hamilton and Jefferson blossomed into the development of
political parties, both leaders became convinced that newspapers were critical to their
respective causes.” Interestingly, though, the two adversaries had to do so in a manner of
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disguised disinterestedness. Controlling the press from a position in government was
unthinkable amongst the Revolutionary generation, so they approached the nascent
political machinery indirectly through “[p]rinting contracts, subscriptions, the availability
of financing, access to information sources, and even advertising.”42
The impetus for such a competition originated in the financial and foreign policies
of Washington’s administration. The paper provided the arena for two cabinet members,
gradually representing different polarities on the nature and meaning of the Revolution,
to battle over the best policies in securing longevity for the young republic. “Though
they shared the political culture’s profound disdain for parties, they understood that the
creation of a party was what they were contemplating.” Yet they could not do so overtly.
Solicitation and organization were not an option in the 1790s, so political leaders worked
behind the scenes to shape public opinion.43
True to the disinterestedness of his day, Madison published an anonymous article
in the National Gazette in March of 1792. In his list of six criticisms of Hamiltonian
Federalists (though those words are never stated), the Speaker of the House anonymously
targeted the financial policies of the Washington administration. His closing reproach
reveals the perceived severity of the problem when he rhetorically asked who the real
friends of the union are: “Not those, in a word, who would force on the people the
melancholy duty of chusing between the loss of the Union, and the loss of what the union
was meant to secure.” Instead, “The real Friends of the Union are those…who are
friends to that republican policy throughout, which is the only cement for the Union of a
republican people; in opposition to a spirit of usurpation and monarchy, which is the
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menstruum most capable of dissolving it.” The dichotomy Madison establishes between
the “real friends” and its adversaries hinted at the groundwork for what was explicitly
labeled in April of 1792.44
In another anonymous article, the National Gazette outlined the “two parties.”
For the first time, the Federalists were defined in opposition to the Republicans, though
the respective designations had yet to be established: “Time and events have decided the
controversy between these two sets of politicians; and the public voice seems to be
pronouncing the decision.” The article provided the grounds for the division on several
positions, but paramount to the partition was interpretation as well as ideology:
Again, one party have advocated the widest constructions of the constitution, so
as to carry the powers of the government far beyond the obvious intent and
meaning thereof, and therefore, beyond the grant of the people. The other have
been of a different temper, and contended for a regular observance of the
constitution, equally where it limits as where it grants powers, and for carrying it
into execution in a republican spirit and manner.45
The well-known issue of constructionism between the Hamiltonian and Jeffersonian
interpretations of the Constitution were mere extensions of the ideological differences
growing more apparent as the first administration faced both domestic and foreign
challenges. “It appears, that the schemes for throwing magnificent wealth into the
undeserving hands of a favorite few, and for undermining the great republican barriers
erected by the constitution, have opened the eyes of the people.” From the republican
perspective the age-old arguments against aristocracy and monarchism came to the fore,
and whilst their opponents claimed that “‘Two things are clear—that the people adopted,
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and that they support the present government,’” “the friends of equal rights of
constitutional authority and republican measures” found that the additional acquisitions
of power on the part of the central government threatened the long-term goals of the
Revolution.46
Washington’s cabinet, albeit stacked with political brains and revolutionary
brawn, was also a partisan maelstrom in the making; that partisan bent was perhaps the
chief oversight or perhaps greatest underestimation the founders “failed to anticipate.”47
By the 1790s, two dynamic and symmetrical nationalisms emerged, fulfilling the political
opposition revolutionaries seemed to thrive upon as well as what Andrew W. Robertson
calls a certain “binary” balance between the Federalists and Republicans that lasted
through the War of 1812.48 The chief component of their partisan preferences and
factional discord stemmed from incongruent foreign policies.
Expectedly, Washington’s eventual departure from office, arguably his most
disinterested decision, was driven at least partially by the disdain of many regarding the
Jay Treaty and the first president’s apparent Anglophilia in dealing with foreign policy
concerns. Though the accusations were capitalized upon by the opposition Madisonians
and Jeffersonians, they demonstrate the difficulties of disinterestedness and the growing
divisiveness that fully blossomed in the election of 1796. Washington’s farewell from
the presidency conjured up similar sentiments to his resignation from the Continental
Army in 1783, but it also was laden with disinterested words backed up by the ultimate
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disinterested action, namely giving up the seat of power. Unsurprisingly, the very issues
that played decisive roles in dividing the first administration into factional rivalries,
namely fiscal and foreign policies, figured largely into Washington’s parting message to
the nation. Perhaps Washington’s departure signaled a departure from disinterestedness
as a practical political stance—his successors certainly did not heed much of his warnings
in regards to party attachments, and maybe only in terms of their two-term presidencies
did they embody at all the disinterest that Washington seemed to aspire to.
An additional cross-examining of Washington’s words of warning regarding
faction side-by-side with Thomas Gordon’s translation of Sallust reveals the reach of
classical republican thought by the end of the eighteenth century and the close of the first
American presidency. The consistency between these two documents borders on what
Wood referred to as plagiarism upon close examination. Expounding on Sallust’s
comment, “Whatever Party conquered, still used their Victory with Violence and
Inhumanity,” Gordon’s opening discourse proceeds to lambast party in ways that must
have been employed by Washington in the Farewell Address. First, one has to recognize
the common language of the “Spirit of Party.” Gordon used the exact phrase four times;
Washington employed it four times as well, once referring to it as “party spirit.”
Washington refers to that same “party spirit” as simply “spirit” an additional three times,
and one can see an exceedingly larger number of more generic references in Gordon.
These parallels, though, are not nearly as conclusive as the more idiosyncratic similarities
between the two pieces.49
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Gordon refers to the spirit as “this baneful and pestilent Spirit of Party;”
Washington speaks of “the baneful effects of the spirit of party generally.” The notion of
what to eighteenth-century writers might be phrased as party “prejudice”—to modern
readers, the idea of partisanship—was evil.50 Even conceding party as a necessary evil
may have made someone like Thomas Gordon uncomfortable.
Perhaps the most specific parallel and illustrative warning issued by both Gordon
and Washington is in regards to the ushering in of a tyrant by way of party allegiances.
Gordon says:
A great Man amongst them, perhaps, happened to be cried up for his fine Actions,
or fine Qualities, both often overrated; and became presently their Idol, and they
trusted him without Reserve: For their Love, like their Hate, is generally
immoderate; nor from a Man who has done them, or can do them, much Good,
have they any Apprehension of Evil; till some Rival for their Affection appear
superior to their first Favourite in Art or Fortune; one who persuades them, that
the other has abused them, and seeks their Ruin.51
His statement bears an uncanny resemblance to Washington’s own words:
But this leads at length to a more formal and permanent despotism. The disorders
and miseries which result gradually incline the minds of men to seek security and
repose in the absolute power of an individual; and sooner or later the chief of
some prevailing faction, more able or more fortunate than his competitors, turns
this disposition to the purposes of his own elevation, on the ruins of public
liberty.52
Gordon’s “great Man” was Washington’s tyrant—one whose ascension and status were
established through trust “without reserve,” and of promises that speak to a populous’
desires for peace and prosperity. This party leader then uses their “absolute power” at the
expense of “public liberty.”53 The two statements are clearly more than coincidental
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semblance. More than that, though, they both deliver demonstrative statements against
the dangers of faction and by doing so simultaneously convey a defense of
disinterestedness.
Gordon says of party, “Both pretend the public Good, both obstruct it, and rend
the Public between them. Nay, one Party will risque all, sacrifice the State, and
themselves with it, rather than miss Revenge upon the other.” Amid his warnings against
foreign influences, Washington noted a similar pretension:
a passionate attachment of one nation for another produces a variety of
evils…And it gives to ambitious, corrupted, or deluded citizens (who devote
themselves to the favorite nation), facility to betray or sacrifice the interests of
their own country, without odium, sometimes even with popularity; gilding, with
the appearances of a virtuous sense of obligation, a commendable deference for
public opinion, or a laudable zeal for public good, the base or foolish compliances
of ambition, corruption, or infatuation.54
The fraternal Franco-American friendship deteriorated under the Washington and Adams
administrations into a near-clash of the once Atlantic allies. During the former’s
administration, the United States’ neutrality constantly faced the pressures of foreign
influence as the French Revolution escalated. Washington frankly forewarned of such
outside influences in his farewell, saying, “It opens the door to foreign influence and
corruption, which finds a facilitated access to the government itself through the channels
of party passions. Thus, the policy and the will of one country are subjected to the policy
and will of another.”55 What do the parallels, indeed plagiarism, tell us? They signal at
least a fading attachment to disinterestedness.
Washington’s final and perhaps greatest act—an act of clear, classical
disinterest—was relinquishing the reigns of an office he could have easily retained
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despite any tumult during his eight years in office. However, by the end of his
presidency, two things were clear: one, the theory of classical disinterestedness remained
prevalent in the republic, and two, the practice of disinterestedness would be increasingly
difficult to adhere to in the emerging party conflicts on the horizon. Federalist leader
Fisher Ames predicted that Washington’s speech “will serve as a signal, like dropping a
hat, for the party racers to start, and I expect a great deal of noise, whipping, and
spurring; money, it is very probable will be spent, some virtue and more tranquility lost;
but I hope public order will be saved.”56 As it turned out, his predictions were spot-on
and his apprehensions were not misplaced.
Madison was even less impressed by Washington’s parting words and warnings.
Having had his own hand in crafting parts of the Farewell Address, Madison must have
been frustrated with what he knew to be edited by Hamilton’s hand: “It shews that he [is]
compleatly in the snares of the British faction; and in pursuance of their views is laboring
totis viribus, [to] rear every obstruction as well as to remove every facility to an
improvement of our commercial relations with France.” To combat such obvious
intentions, the Republicans would have to put all of their might behind an equally
deliberate operation to secure the presidency lest their fears of a complete Federalist
takeover come to fruition.57
At issue was whether or not resistance was “legitimate opposition” as
Hofstadter’s analysis investigated or simply partisanship at play. Was the opposing party
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development based upon “responsible constitutional” concerns, or was it self-serving,
interested politics at play?58 In a reflective correspondence from 1823, the elder
statesman, Jefferson, wrote to Justice William Johnson about the latter’s pro-Republican
history of parties, saying of the Federalists: “They do not themselves believe what they
endeavor to inculcate: that we were an opposition party, not on principle, but merely
seeking for office.”59 Jefferson was keenly aware of the idea of legitimate opposition,
and he, true to the interest in legacy of his generation, exhibited a concern for the manner
in which the first opposition party might be framed for posterity.
Secondarily, can these two motives intersect in a republic and still maintain a
level of disinterestedness and classical republican virtue? Or put another way, need
private and public interests be mutually exclusive? If the two might be complementary at
times in a republic, then who was best to ensure their mutuality, the pundits or the
people? Holton, in discussing the misconceptions many historians hold today in regards
to the Constitution and its framing, notes Madison’s shift—from viewing the nation’s
disinterested leadership as the arbiters of public good to eschewing its constituents as
more likely to ensure its “safety and happiness.”60 Jefferson concurred: “I never thought
of questioning the free exercise of the right of my fellow citizens to marshall those whom
they call into their service according to their fitnesses; nor ever presumed that they were
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not the best judges of these.”61 There was, no doubt, a tension between early leaders’
disinterested longings and service to their country even if it meant representing an
opposition party.
It was in this context and amid this tension that one sees the development of
parties—not as the positive end the founders were seeking but as a necessary evil to
achieve their visions for the longevity and security of the republic. As Hofstadter
succinctly stated, “both sides spoke ill of parties,” and yet they came. In the opposing
viewpoints, there existed divergent understandings of the nature of the union centered
around the question, “We the states or we the people?” Was the republic one in which,
as Hamilton espoused and sought to create, a stable “blend [of] the advantages of a
monarchy and republic” where Congress is “vested with full power to preserve the
republic from harm,” or one Jefferson envisioned, namely “an energetic republic, turning
in all its points on the pivot of free and frequent elect[ions]”? This core concern divided
the founding generation as they sought to create a “more perfect union” in order to
“secure the blessings of liberty” to “posterity.”62 Party banners ultimately flew in regards
to where each side fell on this issue.
Hamilton suggested early on that Jefferson and his allies were divisive, calling
into question the legitimacy of the opposition forces at work in the first administration.

Thomas Jefferson, “From Thomas Jefferson to James Sullivan, 9 February 1797,” Founders
Online. (Accessed October 21, 2021), https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-29-02-0231.
62
Thomas Jefferson, “From Thomas Jefferson to James Sullivan, 9 February 1797;” Richard
Hofstadter, The Idea of a Party System, 2; Christopher Childers, The Webster-Hayne Debate: Defining
Nationhood in the Early American Republic, (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2018), 3; James
Madison, et al, “Constitution of the United States: Preamble,” Avalon Project, Yale University Law School,
2008 (Accessed October 20, 2021), https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/preamble.asp#:
~:text=We%2C%20the%20people%20of%20the,for%20 the%20United%20States%20of; Alexander
Hamilton, “From Alexander Hamilton to James Duane, 3 September 1780,” Founders Online (Accessed
October 21, 2021), https://founders.archives.gov/documents/ Hamilton/01-02-02-0838.
61

110

Writing in pseudonymous fashion once again, Hamilton purported, “Aristides complains
that the American has charged Mr. Jefferson with being the patron and promoter of
national disunion, national insignificance, public disorder and discredit. The American
however, has only affirmed, that ‘the real or pretended political tenets of that gentleman
tend’ to those points.” Most any criticism was met with disdain:
If Mr. Jefferson’s opposition to the funding system, to the bank, and to the other
measures which are connected with the administration of the national finances
had ceased, when those measures had received the sanction of law; nothing more
could have been said, than, that he had transgressed the rules of official decorum,
in entering the lists against the head of another department (between whom and
himself, there was a reciprocal duty to cultivate harmony) that he had been
culpable in pursuing a line of conduct, which was calculated to sow the seeds of
discord in the executive branch of the government, in the infancy of its existence.
But when his opposition extended beyond that point; when it was apparent, that
he wished to render odious, and of course to subvert (for in a popular government
these are convertible terms) all those deliberate and solemn acts of the legislature,
which had become the pillars of the public credit, his conduct deserved to be
regarded with a still severer eye.63
Hamilton viewed Jefferson’s opposition at illegitimate. In the former’s eyes, if an
opposed measure made it through the constitutional processes, duly sanctioned by both
the executive and legislative powers, then it deserved the support of the various
stakeholders—constituents and pundits alike. In Hamilton’s view, it was Jefferson’s
duty—especially as a leader in government—to support such a measure, even if he
disagreed with the policy. Once overruled by the prevailing opinion, there was no higher
principle or duty than to submit to and support the administration. Continuing in what
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the Secretary of the Treasury saw as obstinance rather than opposition was not only
distasteful but also subversive.
Jefferson saw his opposition not only as legitimate but wholly natural to a
republican form of government. Writing to fellow republican James Sullivan of the
allegiances of each respective party, the newly elected Vice President explained:
Where a constitution, like ours, wears a mixed aspect of monarchy and
republicanism, it’s citizens will naturally divide into two classes of sentiment,
according as their tone of body or mind, their habits, connections, and callings
induce them to wish to strengthen either the monarchical or the republican
features of the constitution. Some will consider it as an elective monarchy which
had better be made hereditary, and therefore endeavor to lead towards that all the
forms and principles of it’s administration. Others will [view it] as an energetic
republic, turning in all it’s points on the pivot of free and frequent elect[ions].
The great body of our native citizens are unquestionably of the republican
sentiment.64
One gets a sense of Jefferson’s view of the union—a mixture of the English model and
the classical republic—from this letter, but there is also a clear effort to distinguish
between the two developing parties and acknowledge where he stood on such issues. To
Jefferson, legitimate opposition was “an energetic republic” at work, not factional discord
for the express purpose of disunity as Hamilton saw it.
The contest of 1796 showcased a remarkably different condition than both
previous presidential contests. The battle for the presidency was the arena in which the
infant parties vied for public opinion and attempted to uphold their respective versions of
the public good, but the move to do so came rather late in 1796, as it was not until midSeptember that the President made news of his retirement official and delivered his
Farewell Address to the press. It seems fitting that such a momentous resignation took
place in the very arena Washington tended to abhor and his successors would utilize with
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greatest efforts to manipulate for their respective agendas.65 During the Adams
administration, foreign policy once again entrenched both sides in a battle over the nature
of the Revolution and the future of the republic. “In popular politics, the winning
argument for the Constitution had been the promise that greater stability would bring
prosperity.”66
This was, no doubt, the fear of Federalist Party leaders in both the contests of
1796 and 1800. Whether a perceived fear or a mere tool of partisan politicking, the view
that French influence could undermine the early republic was cause for concern by the
first contest. During the Adams administration, Jeffersonians or Republicans became the
equivalent of “Jacobins,” the French revolutionaries responsible for the bloody events of
the Reign of Terror. Federalists feared that the Jacobin Reign of Terror in France would
similarly result in what Fisher Ames said would be a Jeffersonian “reign of rigor and
agitation” in the United States.67 They worried that Jefferson was the fulfillment of
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Washington’s warning, claiming, “When a man is the favorer, and the favorite of a
nation, which has heaped injuries on the head of his country, he is the last man to whom
his fellow-citizens should entrust the government.”68 The Federalist Party increasingly
viewed France as a foe, and by 1800, anyone seen as a close friend of France was
consequently deemed an enemy and traitor to the United States. This line of thinking and
policy, however, would ironically create more enemies within the United States than
without. Even famed Federalist founder, Alexander Hamilton recognized a policy taken
too far, saying in 1800, “It is in regard to our foreign relations, that the public measures
of Mr. Adams first attract criticism.”69
It was apparent by 1796 that factions could be logical vehicles for asserting one’s
political goals. Charles O. Lerche, Jr. points out that public office paved the way to
assert a party’s power: “power to advance one’s own interests and to destroy those of
one’s adversary.”70 Republicans or “Jacobins,” dependent upon the context, assumed the
role of growing popular opposition to their Federalist rivals. Federalists became the party
of order, Republicans the party of freedom. As Jefferson put it, “The cherishment of the
people, then, was our principle, the fear and distrust of them that of the other party.”71
Federalists played upon the fear of “Jacobin” anarchy, while Republicans pointed to the
“Tory” tendencies of near-monarchy under Federalist control.72 Thus, the groundwork
for a two-party system resulted from the tensions within the Washington administration,
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and that administration’s conflicts would swiftly find their way into the electoral debacle
that resulted from the election of 1796.
The pairing together of political opponents, Adams and Jefferson, in 1796 was but
a prequel to the crisis of 1800. In this contest, Adams saw himself as the natural heir to
Washington and a clear candidate for maintaining order and stability in the midst of what
he perceived to be democratization. On the other hand, a reluctant Jefferson felt called
out of his retirement to come to the rescue of the nation once again in a manner not unlike
that of the Revolution two decades prior.73 Jefferson, as always, was shrewdly calculated
in his bid for the presidency in 1800, though. Like Washington and many of the founding
generation, he was concerned with his image and legacy. He had even gone so far as to
identify the two competing interests and parties, saying of them, “one which fears the
people most, the other the government.” Jefferson’s own fears of an “Anglican and
monarchical…party” roused him from retirement to challenge Federalist control of all
three branches of the federal government and what he foresaw as the creation of a true
New England, a mirror image of Mother England. According to John Ferling, however,
Jefferson’s real worries stemmed not from Adams’s inclinations as much as from those
extreme Federalists within the party, namely the Hamiltonians whom Jefferson grew ever
anxious of in mid-1796.74
In what would strike modern voters as bizarre, the campaign for the presidency
that followed Washington’s September 1796 Farewell Address was anything but a
campaign. Three of the four frontrunners, Adams, Jefferson, and Charles Pinckney of
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South Carolina, as Ferling points out, thought “voters should come to them” (Aaron Burr
did openly campaign). While political factions gave way to political parties by 1800, in
1796 these parties were hardly organized and solidified enough to coordinate a fullfledged campaign for the presidency. Nevertheless, though primitive in organization, the
two divergent party ideologies were quite potent. For some, it was about electing a likeminded statesman, but for most, it was about protecting the presidency from the potential
peril that might come with the election of one’s political opponent. Ultimately, Adams
narrowly defeated Jefferson in the Electoral College vote, but more importantly, these
two rivals found themselves antagonists within the same administration for the next four
years. The lack of a coordinated campaign was partially to blame, and the consequences
of such a faux pas would ultimately cement the crises of 1800, as well as underline the
sectional tendencies or “geographical discriminations” of each party as Washington had
so aptly predicted.75
Under Adams, Federalists added fuel to the factional fires. By keeping
Washington’s cabinet intact, Adams invited the Hamiltonians and the more extreme
Federalist wing to help direct policies from the executive branch once again. Rather than
assuage the fears of their Republican counterparts, they built upon the pro-monarchical
tendencies their political rivals exploited in the press. Jefferson conceived the idea for a
second revolution during his tenure as vice president as it became gradually clearer how
much of a Hamiltonian revolution had taken place since independence.76 The XYZ
Affair and the Alien and Sedition Acts provided plenty of political fodder for the
Jeffersonian camp, namely the fight over the constitutional principle of federalism. Did
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states retain more power than the federal government or vice versa? That question led
Republicans to assert states’ rights in the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions as well as
pave the way for talk of nullification and potentially secession when the federal
government appeared to be overstepping its constitutional authority by way of the Tenth
Amendment.77
When the French snubbed the U.S. delegation in what later was known as the
XYZ Affair, Adams’s political popularity soared in tandem with a new nationalistic
wave. Riding this wave, Federalists took aim at Jefferson and his prized partisan press all
in the name of national security in the Alien and Sedition Acts. Unfortunately for Adams
but fortunately for Jefferson, the Federalists rode this wave too far, taking measures even
beyond what Hamilton thought acceptable and seizing what the extreme faction of the
Federalist Party saw as “a glorious opportunity to destroy [the Republican] faction.”78
This attempt to silence Republican voices eventually backfired on the Federalists, whose
fear-mongering ironically started to resemble their once-feared rivals, the “Jacobin”
radicals. This signaled the implosion of the Federalist Party, as Hamilton himself turned
on the President, producing one of the most damning caricatures of Adams on the eve of
the election of 1800.79
It is one thing to be criticized by the opposing party; it is quite another to become
the target of what Sharp fittingly described as “vitriolic and venomous” ridicule from
your own party’s leader. When it became clear that leaders in the Federalist Party would
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not endorse Adams, Alexander Hamilton became the President’s chief adversary. Adams
levied blame against Hamilton for transpiring against the President, and Adams’s lateterm cabinet overhaul was largely a result of what he found to be sabotage by Hamilton’s
henchmen.80
In late October of 1800, the Federalist leader responded.81 A Letter from
Alexander Hamilton, Concerning the Public Conduct and Character of John Adams
claimed that “Occurrences which have either happened or come to light since the election
of Mr. Adams to the Presidency, confirming my unfavorable forebodings of his character,
have given new and decisive energy, in my mind, to the sentiment of his unfitness for the
station.” This was just one overarching statement of many claims Hamilton’s letter
revealed. Elsewhere, Hamilton spoke of the President’s propensity toward “jealousy,”
his “ungovernable temper” and “paroxysms of anger that deprive him of self
command”—a man whose “gusts of passion” have left many leaders of government
“humiliated by the effect.”82 To Hamilton, Adams was the leader of the Federalist
faction bound to destroy the progress made under Washington. In response to the pointed
assaults, Adams attacked Hamilton for leading a pro-British faction.83 Ironically, despite
the sharp criticism, Hamilton did not fall victim to the Sedition Act for his disparaging
remarks, though some called for just that.84 However, the remarks most definitely
emboldened Republican leaders and foreshadowed the role that the factional strife
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working within the Federalist Party might play in the presidential crisis looming on the
horizon.85
The election of 1800 was perhaps the truest test of whether or not the young
United States republic could survive “the baneful effects of the spirit of party” better than
its republican ancestors had—whether or not the virtue of disinterestedness would falter
in the face of factional conflict and practical party allegiances.86 Though the transition to
Adams had come with its own difficulties, the election of 1800 stands out as a clear
political crisis for the young nation. This is the occasion upon which partisanship would
cement itself in the early republic, but its origins stemmed from the revolutionary
government of 1776.
The election of 1800 was a three-fold crisis. Its origins stemmed from one of the
founding generation’s greatest fears, namely factions, which by this point had matured
into powerful political parties and were poised to wreak havoc in the young republic as
they had in so many republics of the past. Sharp asserts that the election of 1800 was one
of the most critical elections in American history, second only to that of 1860, which
resulted in the Civil War.87 The election of 1800 also signaled that parties were
becoming permanent fixtures of the political landscape of the early republic—what
surfaced in 1796 following Washington’s departure looked all the more secure in 1800,
namely party politics. Disinterestedness appeared on the decline—a virtue less
practicable for the emerging politics of the period. From the electoral debacle in the tie
for the presidency to the potential for conflict after the sweeping Jeffersonian Revolution
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and the resulting Supreme Court decision in Marbury v. Madison, no branch of
government escaped the effects of the election. What began as sectional and factional
strife in the late 1780s developed into a full-fledged “partisan inferno” by 1800.88
Unlike the almost absent campaign for the presidency in 1796, the push for the
presidency in 1800 started early, developed into vile scandalmongering, and laid the
foundation for future election cycles.89 The partisan press went to work, elevating their
political views and party leaders, while also implementing a no holds barred approach in
targeting their political adversaries. Tocqueville again noted the potency of the press:
“The two chief weapons which parties use in order to ensure success are the public press
and the formation of associations.”90 While both Federalists and Republicans had plenty
of newspapers and pamphleteers at their disposal in order to reach their various
constituents, the Republicans had a clear advantage, having recently and successfully
utilized the press to leverage their voice during the Adams administration’s Alien and
Sedition Acts.91
Voter turnout was an obvious sign of the political polarization and galvanization
that had transpired between Washington and Jefferson. Whereas 35 percent was typical
through the 1790s, as many as 70 percent of constituents of several states exercised their
civic duties in 1800.92 When constituents cast their votes, they voted according to party.
So fine-tuned was the partisanship, that by 1800 an exact tie emerged between the two
Republican candidates, Thomas Jefferson and Aaron Burr.93 One elector’s vote could
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have changed the entire election in favor of either Jefferson or Burr, but instead, this
unforeseen “straight ticket” vote would have to be decided in the House of
Representatives, per Article II of the Constitution. The issue there was, of course, a
Federalist-controlled Congress—now presented with a tempting opportunity for political
sabotage among their Republican rivals. It took thirty-five rounds of voting in the House
to gain a majority of states and determine Jefferson’s victory. This later led to the
Twelfth Amendment, preventing such a political conundrum from recurrence; however,
this presidential debacle was just one of many potentially precarious situations that arose
from the election of 1800.94
The election of 1800 highlighted “opposing visions of the proper role of the
people in a republic.”95 The right of legitimate, popular opposition, while a
commonplace component of modern politics, was unknown and untested in 1800.96
Because the election of 1796 did not see a major shift in terms of party power, and the
fact that Jefferson graciously accepted his narrow defeat, the election of 1800 was in
many ways the proving ground for popular opposition.97 This was thought to be as a
second revolution in 1796—the bloodless Jeffersonian Revolution to historians—one in
which Jefferson could not remain on the sidelines. Not only did the Republicans
eventually gain the executive branch after a secondary crisis in the Federalist-controlled
House of Representatives, they also gained majorities in both houses of Congress,
something they had failed to do despite Jefferson’s predictions in 1796.98 Yet, to
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discount the idea of bloodshed in the context of the heated contest would be a
misunderstanding, to say the least.
On the domestic front, where citizens had taken to the streets in protests
resembling those of the 1770s, the situation appeared volatile. A tie in the Electoral
College as well as the sweeping changes already taking place in the legislature only
exacerbated the situation. On the international front, continued European conflicts only
prompted rumors of what might occur with the four potential candidates still in the
running for the newly completed White House. 99 Events in revolutionary France had a
sobering effect on the young American republic, with a toppled French monarchy only to
be replaced by a dictatorship with the rise of Napoleon Bonaparte in the fall of 1799.100
The French dream of a sister republic fell victim to the violence of faction just as the
many historical examples Americans of the revolutionary generation were all too familiar
with—the potential for bloodshed was no imagined fear.
Finally, in Federalists’ final attempt to assert federal authority in the wake of
losing both the executive and legislative branches, John Adams signed into law the
Judiciary Act of 1801, otherwise known as the “Midnight Judges Act” for its lateness into
the Adams’ term. This attempt to stack the federal courts with Federalist-leaning judges
was another sign of partisan politicking and just how pivotal the election of 1800 was in
terms of the future direction of the early republic. The act led to a battle involving all
three branches of government and a crisis over federal authority as well as the principle
of checks and balances. Marbury v. Madison simultaneously and ironically halted the
executive branch’s last-ditch effort to stack the courts, overturned part of the legislative
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branch’s Judiciary Act of 1789, and arguably created the judicial branch’s greatest power.
This landmark case and showdown of federal authority fundamentally changed the
United States’ system of government.
The resolution reached in the House of Representatives that elevated Jefferson to
the executive office was not a solution to the animosity and tensions felt by a society that
had grown “dangerously polarized.”101 It did, however, signal a successful and peaceful
transfer of power from one political party to another. A certain party paradox existed in
that while people hoped for the long endurance of the republic, they also had grown
increasingly hostile toward those of dissenting beliefs.102
Much had changed from the inauguration of Washington to that of Jefferson. The
inaugural festivities alone reveal an obvious divergence from a once united republic to
one on the verge of yet another revolution. People across the United States lined the
streets to celebrate Washington’s elevation to the executive; protests and partisan press
accompanied Jefferson’s rise twelve years later. To conciliate his rivals in his inaugural
address, Jefferson said, “We are all Federalists; we are all Republicans”—an obvious
statement of disinterest.103 However, as John Ferling writes, “Jefferson’s protests of
disinterest always had a hollow ring.”104 The actions of both parties and the outcomes of
the election reflected anything but disinterested leaders above the fray of factional
politics; instead, this would be the new norm in terms of elections following the election
of 1800.
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Although the election was resolved in the House of Representatives, Jefferson’s
fears of losing to his intended “running mate” abated, and the republic seemingly on
stable ground. By 1804, though, there was still unfinished business between Aaron Burr
and Alexander Hamilton—business stemming directly from the animosities created in the
struggle for the executive branch in 1800. Perhaps the bloodless revolution of 1800
would have at least one victim.105
Charles Lerche suitably labeled Hamilton’s endorsement of Jefferson over Burr,
in the tie broken by a Federalist House majority, the “final irony” among the complicated
and chaotic events of 1800.106 Amid the electoral tie, Hamilton wrote to fellow
Federalists in the House of Representatives in an attempt to sway them toward an
elevation of Jefferson in December of 1800. With such phrases as, “By no means, my
Dear Sir, let the Federalists be responsible for his Elevation – In a choice of Evils let
them take the least – Jefferson is in every view less dangerous than Burr,” Hamilton not
only asserted his still-prevalent influence in the highest levels of government but also
solidified a permanent grudge with Mr. Burr, one that would end in the dueling death of
Alexander Hamilton in 1804.107 Four years after the election’s outcome, partisanship still
played a patent role. The presidential battle between Adams and Jefferson went well
beyond each president, demonstrating far-reaching factional effects.
In many ways, the relationship between Adams and Jefferson was a microcosm of
American society in the late eighteenth century. The American Revolution brought
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together those from very different geographic, economic, and political spheres. It
brought thirteen separate colonies together to fight a common enemy. It brought together
a Massachusetts-born John Adams, who came from rather humble beginnings, with a
wealthy Virginia native, Thomas Jefferson, to write a declaration and help lead the
colonies in their push for independence. The aftermath of the Revolution, though, saw
sectional differences begin to cement themselves once more. As political infighting
began to chip away at revolutionary unity, Adams and Jefferson too, found themselves
drifting apart. Looking back on the origin of their disagreements, Adams wrote, “The
first time that you and I differed in opinion on any material question was after your
arrival from Europe; and that point was the French Revolution.”108 Then, forced into an
administration for four tense years by way of an early Electoral College gaffe, the Adams
administration seemed a pointed example of the growing party polarization all over the
United States. This was the context of the election of 1800; this was the foundation for
the United States’ second revolution.
The election of 1800 signaled the solidification of the first-party system, a twoparty contest that lasted until the end of the Era of Good Feelings when the more potent
and permanent second-party system usurped the perceived peaceful unity that appeared to
many staunchly Jeffersonian and Republican. By the close of the War of 1812,
Washington’s admonishments, “the disinterested warnings of a parting friend,” seemed to
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have fallen on deaf ears.109 Martin Van Buren wrote, “The return of peace naturally
revived rival aspirations for political distinction which had been in some degree
suspended, on the Republican side, by engrossing cares and responsibilities of the
War.”110 Like the aftermath of the Revolution, cooling tensions from the War of 1812
shifted focus from the common enemy of Great Britain to renewed domestic rivalries.
The notion of Gordon’s “public spirited Man,” was changing, indeed it had already
undergone significant transformation. The ability to maintain “an honest and
disinterested heart” had become increasingly difficult and perhaps impractical.111
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CHAPTER IV

THE EVOLUTION OF DISINTERESTEDNESS

In this predicament, to retreat is impossible; for a people cannot restore the
vivacity of its earlier times, any more than a man can return to the innocence and
the bloom of childhood; such things may be regretted, but they cannot be
renewed. The only thing, then, which remains to be done is to proceed, and to
accelerate the union of private with public interests, since the period of
disinterested patriotism is gone by forever.1
Alexi de Tocqueville’s perception of party provides a practical yet yielding disposition
toward the diminished influence of disinterested politics; something had perceptibly
changed. Though a laudable attribute, he seemingly admits its defeat in the wake of an
increasingly overwhelming partisan political culture. The context of the mid-nineteenth
century, a time when the second party system had firmly taken root, provided the logical
impetus for such a characterization of the political status of the United States. It is of
little surprise, then, that in the era known to many historians as the “Age of Jackson,”
party allegiance and discipline emerged as indispensable to both Democrats and Whigs—
each party began to see the notion of disinterestedness as disconnected from the political
realities of the day. What Tocqueville observed was an evolution more than an abolition,
though. Both Gordon’s “public-spirited man” as well as Washington’s “disinterested
warnings of a parting friend” still held sway among even the most partisan pundits of the
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second party system. Just as the republic had grown more democratic with maturity, so
too did classical virtues such as disinterestedness evolve alongside these major political
forces. For a fleeting moment following the War of 1812 and prior to the inauguration of
the second party system, though, it looked as though classical disinterestedness was
mounting a significant comeback in the political culture of the day.
The famed headline, “ERA OF GOOD FEELINGS,” now enshrined in American
memory as a unique historical period, was at first a commentary on the momentary pause
in party division. Benjamin Russell’s July 12, 1817, Columbia Centinel’s brief but
influential article opened with these words: “During the late Presidential Jubilee many
persons have met at festive boards, in pleasant-converse, whom party politics had long
severed.”2 The proclamation came from a known Federalist paper, proving the
authenticity of the remarks, in the wake of yet another anti-Federalist president.
By 1817, Jeffersonian Republicans had controlled the federal government for
nearly two decades—their reign seemed impenetrable and the union appeared secure.
But to assume that there were no signs of dissension dismisses either the limited nature of
post-war unity or the dynamic and diverse currents of factional interests alive and at
work—if temporarily taciturn. The Era of Good Feelings, ushered in at the close of the
War of 1812 and the inauguration of the United States’ fifth president brought the first
party system to a close, but by President James Monroe’s second term, a new, spirited
second party system took its place. Jefferson reflected on such misplaced feelings or
perhaps the misnomer itself in his correspondence: “for you are not to believe that these
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two parties are amalgamated, that the lion & the lamb are lying down together, the
Hartford Convention, the victory of Orleans, the peace of Ghent prostrated the name of
Federalism.”3 Factional discord may have recoiled, but it would return with resilience
following the decline of the Federalist Party, the onset of the Panic of 1819, and the
discordant Missouri crisis of 1820.
As President Monroe took office in March of 1817, just a few months before the
headline that hallowed his presidency in immortal glee and title a chapter in American
history, the sentiments of good feeling emerged. “[M]y fellow-citizens have given
me…their confidence in calling me to the high office,” Monroe began, and “my attention
is naturally drawn to the great causes which have contributed in a principal degree to
produce the present happy condition of the United States.”4 In fact, Monroe makes
mention of the nation’s happiness, prosperity, and felicity over a dozen times in the
course of his first message to Congress and the American people, charting a clear
trajectory for his upcoming sixteen-week summer tour of the country when the famed
phrase was coined after a stop in New England. His purpose was clear: national unity.5
The New England stops were particularly important in attaining this mission. In
an early nineteenth-century reach across the aisle, Monroe intentionally sought to mend
the Republican relationship with their Federalist foes. Feelings were mutual among
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Federalist leaders. Former Governor of Massachusetts and United States Senator,
Christopher Gore, who related to fellow Senator Rufus King, “It is said to be necessary to
show all party spirit done away, & to attain the favour of the Gov’t,” displayed a candid
willingness to embrace the new president despite the impediment of past party
allegiances. King was Monroe’s opposition to the presidency in the bid for 1816.6 It
appeared as if Jefferson’s words from two decades earlier were coming to pass; “We are
all Republicans; we are all Federalists.”7
The trip, however, also drew criticism. Monroe noted such unwelcome feelings
to Madison, “It has been charg’d on me, to hav⟨e⟩ reard them up, & my trip to the
Eastward, more particularly, has been alledged as the cause. But in what mode? Both
parties, met me embodied together, & I receivd them with civility & kindness.” The
detractors felt that Monroe was engaged in a sort of appeasement that would eventually
ruin the Republican stronghold by integrating Federalists into their ranks. Monroe’s
defense against what he considered to be baseless criticism was one of disinterestedness.
Rather than promoting dangerous amalgamation and lack of party discipline, Monroe felt
he had done just what was necessary at the time, as he reflected, “No allurment has been
offerd to the federalists, to calm them down, into a state of tranquility. None of them
have been appointed to high offices, & very few to the lowest. Their misconduct in the
late war, & the success of that war broke them as a party.” Rather than mollify the
Federalists, he had all but eliminated the opposition party, laying the groundwork for
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something he dreamt of, namely a republic free of party strife—something the world had
never known, but which he believed the US capable of modeling for the future.8
Political parties, known to the founding generation as “baneful” and “dangerous
vice,” slowly developed into political reality.9 They may have begun “unintentionally,”
as Michael Wallace claimed, but political utility led to “party competition as a fixture of
political life,” one eventually deemed “eminently desirable.”10 By the end of the 1820s—
with the emergence of the second party system—factions, in many ways, had moved
from necessary evil to positive good. However, Monroe’s near-unanimous electoral
victory in 1820 seemed to be a reversal of the reality and perhaps a glimpse into what the
founders envisioned, namely a political leadership above interests and party allegiances.
Louis Hartz fittingly remarked of the relapse in rivalry, “American politics was a
romance in which the quarrel preceded the kiss.” Monroe comes in a close second to
Washington’s perceived unanimity and ability to overcome various divisions within the
Union. Perhaps historians such as Ralph Ketcham are correct in asserting the lapse in
factional strife—at least to the point of acknowledging what Hartz insightfully perceived
as Americans lack of “a cause” with which to attach much political and philosophical
development. Relative to movements of the sort in England, Hartz proposed that it was
perhaps industrialization that brought many of the political thoughts and reforms in
Europe.11 In America, though, there was something remarkably stale about the period.
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Even though the period’s title might be viewed as a misnomer in many ways, the label
“Era of Good Feelings” is not completely without merit.
It would have been a fitting accomplishment for Monroe, himself a relic from the
Revolution and the last of the Virginia dynasty, what Ketcham called “the last of the
cocked hats.” As he neared the conclusion of his first message to Congress, Monroe saw
the possibilities associated with the apparent camaraderie. “Equally gratifying is it to
witness the increased harmony of opinion which pervades our Union. Discord does not
belong to our system.”12 This too would pass. For the time, though, Monroe and other
Republican leaders looked to the clear advantages laid before them. In ironic fashion,
General Jackson wrote to the presumed President-elect Monroe in November of 1816,
By selecting characters conspicuous for their probity, virtue, capacity and
firmness, without any regard to party, you will go far to, if not entirely, eradicate
those feelings which, on former occasions, threw so many obstacles in the way of
government; and, perhaps, have the pleasure and honor of uniting a people
heretofore politically divided. The chief magistrate of a great and powerful nation
should never indulge in party feelings. His conduct should be liberal and
disinterested, always bearing in mind that he acts for the whole, and not a part of
the community.13
One is likely to be struck first by the sardonic—if only Jackson, king of the “Kitchen
Cabinet,” had followed his own disinterested advice. However, to assume his words
were insincere would be an egregious error. How could someone eventually tagged with
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partisan leadership maintain such disinterested thinking, referring to himself as “an
undissembled patriot?” Hofstadter offers some insight: “as it turned out, Jackson
appointed more former Federalists to office than all his Republican predecessors
combined.” Thus, he lived up to the very request he made of Monroe. That said, Jackson
also oversaw the inauguration of the so-called “spoils system,” a scheme that some
leaders believed “would put a premium on the skills of unscrupulous party politicians
rather than wise statesmen, and make government an affair of party organization and jobs
rather than policies or principles.”14 It demonstrates a complicated record and the
transmission associated with disinterestedness.
Monroe concurred with Jackson’s thoughts to a degree, though as Hofstadter also
points out, he would have a different method for ridding the nation of factional strife once
and for all. Rather than conciliation by way of cabinet positions, the President-elect
wished “to give them a series of ceremonial occasions to confirm their loyalty”—much
the same way he conducted his aforementioned New England tour thereafter.15 “I agree
with you, decidedly, in the principle that the chief magistrate of the country ought not to
be the head of a party, but of the nation itself.” He went on to describe his method for
integrating Federalists who had offered “proofs of patriotism and attachment to free
government;” the president did not want to perpetuate the “contest between the two
parties [that] never ceased,” rather he wished to avoid awarding appointments to anyone
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formerly or presently connected to the Federalists. That might give the impression “of
compromise with them.” Monroe’s method was to advocate “a spirit of moderation” in
order “to bring the whole into the republican fold, as quietly as possible.” His letter
reveals two points of import. First, he was less confident as to the end of party
animosities in personal correspondence as he had been in public declarations of unity and
jubilee; second, he was unwilling to placate his partisan adversaries to the extent that his
successor John Quincy Adams would.16
“Many men, very distinguished for their talents, are of the opinion that the
existence of the federal party is necessary to keep union and order in republican ranks:
that is, that free government cannot exist without parties. This is not my opinion.”
Monroe went on to relay to Jackson what Hofstadter labels “utopian” and unabashed
“American exceptionalism.”17 This is a fitting assessment in many ways. Monroe
continued with an appeal to classical republicanism:
That the ancient republics were always divided into parties; that the English
government is maintained by an opposition, that is, by the existence of a party in
opposition to the ministry—I well know. But, I think that the cause of these
divisions is to be found in certain defects of those governments, rather than in
human nature; and that we have happily avoided those defects in our system.18
From here, the president-elect laid out his methodology. First, he sought to keep his
fellow Republicans in his good graces by awarding them the appointments Jackson had
suggested be given to Federalists in part. Second, he wanted “to prevent the
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reorganization and revival of the federal party” by way of integrating these wayward
Republicans back into the fold because as Monroe saw it, “the great body of the federal
party are republican.” This two-pronged strategy was later referred to critically as a
“Fusion Policy” or “amalgamation” by Van Buren and others.19 Monroe, acutely aware
of such criticism responded to Madison, “the charge of amalgamation, is not correctly
levelled at me,” for the former felt that he had done everything in his control to empower
Republicans while simultaneously extending an olive branch to Federalists—the latter not
gaining an adequate foothold for any resurgence but rather confined to positions of
minimal influence.20 In the Little Magician’s eyes, Monroe merely opened the door for
Federalist infiltration by way of a lack of party discipline rather than usher in a partyless
polity.
Jackson’s reply showed respectful support as well as comity in nearly all facets.
He detailed the measure of a man’s patriotism over partisanship based upon the
experiences of war, where he made a clear distinction between the “monarchists and
traitors” at the Hartford Convention who claimed to be “federalists.” Recounting a time
when Old Hickory himself was branded a “federalist,” favoring Monroe over Madison’s
nomination as Jefferson’s heir, Jackson ended his correspondence with classical
republican language: “my whole letter was intended to put you on your guard against
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American Sempronius’s.”21 It was a fitting closing; Jackson offered a tribute to
Addison’s Cato.
Though jubilation was sincere for some, nationalism was on the assent, and party
animosities may have significantly subsided in 1817—if ever temporary—the era was not
simply “good feelings.” C. Edward Skeen foreshadows the rift, closing his 1816:
America Rising with this statement: “Like a change in the weather, the nation was on the
cusp of political, economic, and social change, looking toward the emergence of a
modern political system.”22 The winds of change Skeen predicted ultimately dashed any
hopes of a prolonged period of political harmony. Wilentz has gone so far as to label
Monroe’s second term an “Era of Bad Feelings.”23 Monroe’s proposed policies for
pursuing national unity and continued prosperity laid out in the second half of his
inaugural message quickly diminished through political and economic hemorrhages.
Chief amongst those ruptures was the slow-metastasizing issue of slavery. Working in
the background of “Madison’s neo-Federalism,” its perceived dormancy since 1787
showed up in both subtle and powerful ways three decades later, laying the groundwork
for an eventual national crisis three decades following Monroe’s tenure.24
The decline of the Federalists precipitated a factional vacuum amongst the
Democratic-Republicans that eventually divided this hybrid party into both the
Democratic and Republican parties and largely along sectional lines, hardened by the
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issue of slavery.25 One wing of the seemingly united party, as Skeen notes, gravitated
toward nationalist policies previously held by Federalists, while the other faction forged a
path toward states’ rights.26 The rift evident in 1787 was perhaps bridged, but the void
was not filled. Federalism fundamentally remained a primary cause of factional
infighting.
“Peace is the best time for improvement and preparation of every kind,” Monroe
observed in his first inaugural, “it is in peace that our commerce flourishes most, that
taxes are most easily paid, and that the revenue is most productive.”27 Economically, the
United States was poised to turn inward following the War of 1812. However, the
postwar rise of “King Cotton” created an over-speculative land boom as the United States
expanded west, and that westward expansion triggered a congressional crisis and
economic showdown over the ever-present issue of slavery.28 After a year in office,
Monroe knew the potential volatility of the situation, remarking, “The public lands are a
public stock, which ought to be disposed of to the best advantage for the nation…Great
capitalists will derive the benefit incident to their superior wealth under any mode of sale
which may be adopted…the profit will accrue to them and not to the public.”29
Westward expansion opened two frontiers: one of potential prosperity, the other of
political conflict. The addition of four western states in Monroe’s first term created
numerous opportunities for economic expansion, but growth came with division. Monroe
recognized the potential for class conflicts, but he may not have foreseen the
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interconnectedness of expansion and the explosiveness of slavery. Wilentz put it
succinctly: “The major difference among the western state constitutions concerned
slavery.”30 Before slavery could take center stage, though, western lands proved
problematic in another way.
The postwar economic catastrophe, known as the Panic of 1819, dealt a
considerable blow to the idea of “Good Feelings,” as Americans entered into one of their
deepest depressions to date. The Panic resulted from numerous convergent causes, from
international to internal and from economic to environmental issues; however, key to the
collapse was an over-speculative land boom. Monroe, in Wilentz’s words, was “an
unlikely promoter of vigorous postwar economic expansion and improvement,” having
drifted from his Jeffersonian roots during and after the War of 1812, but in his second
inaugural address, months before the economic bubble burst, Monroe appeared optimistic
in regards to the expansion unfolding: “The sale of the public lands during the year has
also greatly exceeded, both in quantity and price, that of any former year, and there is just
reason to expect a progressive improvement in that source of revenue.”31 In 1820, on the
other hand, with the advantage of hindsight, Monroe admitted the connection of the
ensuing panic with the over-speculation in public lands: “It is known that the purchases
were made when the price of every article had risen to its greatest height, and the
installments are becoming due at a period of great depression.”32 The president’s
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optimism was either misplaced, or he chose to deny the economic downturn that was
already underway.
By December of 1819, Monroe’s optimistic tone had at least shifted to a
recognition of the economic realities the nation faced: “I regret to have to state that
several of our principal cities have suffered by sickness.” As he opened his third annual
message to Congress, the President appeared aware of the panic’s implications,
admitting, “that an unusual drought has prevailed in the Middle and Western States, and
that a derangement has been felt in some of our moneyed institutions which has
proportionably affected their credit.” He quickly reverted, though, “I am happy,
however, to have it in my power to assure you that the health of our cities is now
completely restored.”33 Clearly, the next few months would prove just how much
Monroe overstated the recovery and underestimated the economic fallout.
Perhaps more than anything, though, the Panic resulted in a resumption of the
Jeffersonian and anti-Federalist arguments against a national bank, reopening the fissures
of faction over fiscal policy. The Second Bank of the United States, ironically
resurrected under Madison, had Monroe’s backing. While banking operations ran
smoothly up until 1817, its actions amid the Panic proved disastrous and appeared
interested and self-serving—the same accusations Jefferson had made a generation
before.34 What became the “monster” in the Jacksonian years mutated during Monroe’s
presidency—from national necessity and economic expedient to an institution in the
hands of corrupt elites. That sort of interestedness was a primary fear of those theorists
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who had helped construct the republic with disinterested leadership in mind. In
expectation of Monroe’s 1817 victory and Washington-style prose, Jackson referred to
parties as the monster: "Now is the time to exterminate that monster called party spirit.”35
The second national bank provided the impetus for a second party system and the
resumption of party politics. The two were inextricably linked in the minds of
Jeffersonians and Jacksonians. Now the monster of party spirit Jackson referenced had a
face. While reigning in the “lavish lending,” the national bank righted its own situation
at the expense of smaller banks, businesses, and average citizens.36 This economic
problem had deep political implications.
Old Republicans now had a target, indeed a faction, on which to affix the blame
for the economy, namely the National Republicans. Monroe, though on the surface
above reproach based on the outcome of the 1820 election, was at the helm of these
nationalistic policies. The lone electoral vote cast against the incumbent President was
not out of reverence for Washington as popular myths have perpetuated but because of
the perceived overreach of the national government. As Lynn W. Turner maintains, “One
of the erroneous assumptions about the ‘Era of Good Feelings’ is that the near unanimity
of the 1820 election indicated an equally wide-spread popular approval of Monroe's
administration.”37 The lone elector was not alone in his sentiments. Old Republicans,
like John Randolph, had growing concerns about what they considered an indifferent
political climate rather than one of acquiescence. Tocqueville painted a vivid picture of
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the events:
It sometimes happens in a people amongst which various opinions prevail that the
balance of the several parties is lost, and one of them obtains an irresistible
preponderance, overpowers all obstacles, harasses its opponents, and appropriates
all the resources of society to its own purposes. The vanquished citizens despair
of success and they conceal their dissatisfaction in silence and in general apathy.
The nation seems to be governed by a single principle, and the prevailing party
assumes the credit of having restored peace and unanimity to the country. But this
apparent unanimity is merely a cloak to alarming dissensions and perpetual
opposition.38
One gets a glimpse into not only the superficial indifference but also the latent opposition
of the period from the Frenchman’s astute observations. It was just a matter of time or
perhaps opportunity before opposition latency became party potency, for “[n]ext to hating
their enemies, men are most inclined to flatter them.”39
The perceived party apathy rapidly subsided in 1820 when those same Old
Republicans found themselves in the “anti” camp once again. Reminiscent of Jefferson’s
anti-Federalists and strict constructionists, Republican anti-Restrictionists rose to the
occasion at the close of Monroe’s first term to combat nationalist policies that threatened
the peculiar institution of slavery. Historians Richard H. Brown and Michael Wallace
both point out that the Old Republicans were not isolated—a new bisectional coalition
was in the works in Monroe’s second term that brought together Van Buren’s northern
Albany Regency with southern Old Republicans, laying the foundations for the
Democratic Party. “[T]he party of the whole nation,” Brown asserts, could not remain
responsive to the unique and delicate issues of local and regional constituencies,
especially those of the South. Further, as Wallace contends, party competition was
essential to the emerging second party system, one that thrived off of mutual political
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antagonism. Party rivalry prompted party discipline, unity, and energy—quelling the
apathy Randolph disdained.40 As the Missouri crisis ensued, it became clear that the
issue of slavery was more than enough to overcome political apathy and call into question
the notions of unity so frequently flaunted around the purported Era of Good Feelings.
Thus, once again, “legitimate opposition” showed a new generation the benefits
of party politics. For many, disinterestedness was seen as an excuse for inaction rather
than seeking the public good by avoiding party affiliations. Some had always believed,
like Machiavelli, in the theory that parties might provide a positive good. A Renaissance
theorist many of the founding and subsequent generation read, the Florentine noted, “that
in every republic there are two parties, that of the nobles and that of the people; and all
the laws that are favorable to liberty result from the opposition of these parties to each
other.”41 According to this line of thinking, opposition, competition, rivalry could yield
positive results, not just divisive factionalism that ended in the violence feared in writings
like The Federalist, No. 10 or what Hamilton feared in a short piece he wrote in 1793
entitled “On the Rise of a War Party.” The Federalist founder wrote, “Every new
political occurrence renders it more and more apparent, that there is a description of men
in this country, continually on the Watch to defame and if possible to convulse the
Government of the UStates.”42 The testing of these theories through a variety of
convulsions—from the fiscal and foreign policy battles of the 1790s to the crises of
transferring power from one party to another in 1800 to the tumult of the War of 1812.
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To some, the emergence of political rivalry became a safeguard more than a corruption—
a vehicle for sustaining republican virtue more than a vice to be vehemently guarded
against.
In his uniquely dense prose, Van Buren offered a sort of party apology: “But
knowing, as all men of sense know, that political parties are inseparable from free
governments, and that in many and material respects they are highly useful to the
country, I could never bring myself for party purposes to deprecate their existence.”
Admitting that “divisions” are “sometimes carryed to excess & made to produce a
virulence & malignity which all good men must deplore, they are notwithstanding
productive of much national good.”43 It was the Little Magician’s belief that parties were
natural checks upon the mankind’s “disposition to abuse power”—that they ought to be
recognized, nay legitimized for their usefulness and serve as conduits of the peoples’
interests and principles. His thinking viewed parties not so much as separate interests
among the people as interests that might differ from those of power and authority in
governance. 44
In other ways, an attachment to founding notions of disinterestedness remained.
Van Buren was against what he might have considered baseless partisanship, calling out
Federalists he accused of “preferring the Interests of party to those of those of their
country.”45 He was wholly against the type of interested party politics that one finds in
the Bank of the United States. “The fact that the Bank obtained its charter thro’ the most
daring and unscrupulous bribery practiced upon various persons, occupying different
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positions in the public service, is undeniable.”46 This was the worst type of corruption—
to Van Buren, pure interestedness.
He was someone torn between the view that parties were vice and a time that
demonstrated their potential virtue. The so-called Era of Good Feelings, a time that many
historians find to be lacking in partisanship, had opened up, in Van Buren’s eyes, a
“[r]elaxation of the rigors of party discipline and acts of amnesty in favor of vanquished
federalists”—a path for Federalist infiltration because of a lack of party discipline. It was
the party, specifically the Jeffersonian Republican Party, that held the key to checking the
power of the “splendid schemes” Federalists had long been associated with according to
Van Buren and his Albany Regency. Hofstadter intuitively commented that “[t]he
phenomenon of party amalgamation in the Era of Good Feelings raised the question in
many minds on both sides whether the new unanimity was being achieved on Republican
or Federalist terms.” That apparent apathy was of major concern to Van Buren because it
opened the door for a reversal of anti-federalist, Jeffersonian accomplishments.47
Though historically recognized as the preeminent party “archetype” and apologist,
Van Buren employed the virtue of disinterestedness with some frequency himself,
illustrating that the virtue was not wholly lost but rather adapted to the realm of partisan
politics. He was keenly aware that politicians might be viewed rather negatively when
“making a game of politicks, and playing it to serve…personal purposes.”48 In
unabashed self-reflection, Little Van remarked, “I well remember the satisfaction…that I
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had not fallen into the error so prevalent in both parties—that of looking upon the
measure with eyes chiefly directed to its political bearings.” When speaking of his
support of political rival DeWitt Clinton’s Erie Canal project, Van Buren adamantly
proposed that he “supported with fidelity and zeal every measure calculated to advance
its Canal policy, and opposed as zealously, every attempt to prostitute that great interest
to party purposes.” He lauded the “disinterestedness of…motives,” a virtue of clear
admiration in describing Vice President Daniel D. Tompkins as a “most disinterested and
self-denying” man. In 1820, when dealing with the Missouri Question in New York, the
Red Fox of Kinderhook withheld his consent to oppose Governor Clinton’s resolution on
the matter stating, “because they bore on their face the stamp of political and partisan
designs.”49
Van Buren also employed the use of a pseudonym from time to time,
demonstrating his awareness that disinterestedness was also not lost among his
constituents and that the founding generation’s practices of anonymous civil discourse
had not fallen completely out of favor. Writing under the pseudonym, “Amicus Juris
consultus,” he took up concerns related to the payment of the militia and encouraging of
privateering during the War of 1812.50 Such disinterested designations and efforts
sometimes proved frivolous. In another instance, the Red Fox wrote under the alias, “A
Member of the Legislature.” Van Buren admits that “A Member of the Legislature” was
“generally understood, and not denied to come from me,” and this could have costly
effects on one’s political record. In this instance, Van Buren laments, “[t]he part I took in
the affair was a stereotyped charge against me for the remainder of my political career,
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brought forward by different parties and factions in turn as the shifting phases of party
politics made it their cue to lay hold of the subject.”51 Pretentious disinterestedness
continued to vex the virtue’s resilience in the ever-changing republican experiment.
Thus, two competing versions of republicanism—or divergent nationalisms
previously discussed—remained intact as the nation navigated the “Era of Good
Feelings” and the 1820s. Turner accurately assessed the period: “With the country
gripped in the throes of a panic and Congress locked in deadly debate over slavery in
Missouri, good feelings were often not discernible.”52 The Panic of 1819 and subsequent
Missouri crisis, though separate and significant events both in terms of their blows to the
Era of Good Feelings and the resultant factional discord over how to resolve them, held
obvious and intricate ties, yoked together by westward expansion and territorial trials.
The notable Mason-Dixon line foreshadowed much more than the extension of the United
States into the Louisiana Territory; it augured and established a permanent fracture in
American politics. The Thomas Proviso, which generated the infamous 36°30′ division,
signified a fault line more than a latitudinal line.53
Despite the obvious fracture, Monroe could not help but feel the effects of an
electoral landslide in 1821, seeing himself “rather as the instrument than the cause of the
union which has prevailed in the late election.” He went on to claim, “In
surmounting…the difficulties which so often produce division in like occurrences, it is
obvious that other powerful causes, indicating the great strength and stability of our
Union, have essentially contributed to draw you together.” While admitting the

51

Martin Van Buren, The Autobiography of Martin Van Buren, 101.
Lynn W. Turner, “The Electoral Vote against Monroe,” 254.
53
Richard H. Brown, “The Missouri Crisis,” 59.
52

146

divisiveness of the Missouri crisis, Monroe saw his election as closure to a temporary
setback in the harmony associated with his administration and the good feelings to boot.
The President’s references to classical republicanism, though, hint at the plague of party
politics well known and frequently alluded to amongst the founding generation: “In our
whole system, national and State, we have shunned all the defects which unceasingly
preyed on the vitals and destroyed the ancient Republics.”54 Having witnessed the
factional discord surrounding the admission of Missouri into the union, Monroe’s
comments attempted to allay what had become increasingly apparent during his first
term, namely renewed partisanship.
Fear seemed to be the compelling factor of all factions in the Missouri crisis of
1820. Southerners faced the dual fears of the strict constructionism of restrictionists and
what that might mean for the peculiar institution as well as the fear of slave revolts with
the gradual democratization of the population, capitalized on in the aftermath of the
Vesey conspiracy. Restrictionists feared detachment from what they considered a
constitutional and moral blight, one that rejected the Revolutionary creed. Finally, the
moderates feared that sectional discord would halt the American nationalism they sought
to use as a unifying force toward future expansion and prosperity. The moderates may
have brokered compromise, but they were soon outnumbered by sectional hard-liners.55
Those sections would harden for the next three decades with ever-increasing
intensity as the United States realized its “manifest destiny” and extended its influence
across the continent. The nullification crisis of 1828 opened with a resolution calling for
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the limit of the sale of public lands. The Mexican-American War was bookended with
the potentially volatile political prospects of what would become the American
southwest. Finally, the coming of the Civil War was hastened by each of these territorial
extensions, which precipitated violent contests over the issue of slavery and the nature of
the union. This final episode demonstrates the “violence of faction” Madison alluded to
in The Federalist, 10—the type of violence responsible for destroying former republics.56
As President Monroe gave his final message to Congress in 1824, his words rang
with the sounds of unity and fraternity as he addressed “a population devoted to our
happy system of government and cherishing the bond of union with internal affection.”
He boasted the sectional symbiosis and electoral equilibrium the nation had achieved:
“What one portion wants the other may supply; and this will be most sensibly felt by the
parts most distant from each other, forming thereby a domestic market and an active
intercourse between the extremes and throughout every portion of our Union,” and
“causes which might otherwise lead to dismemberment operate powerfully to draw us
closer together.57 One cannot help but note the ironies of such statements, not just
through historical hindsight, but also in light of the powerful political partisanship at
work in the mid-1820s that created the second party system. Perhaps Monroe was
acquiescing to the notion that parties might hold the republic in a delicate balance.
The Era of Good Feelings opened with a headline, but like most eye-catching,
memorable headlines, the context reveals a more complicated story. Good feelings
eventually faded, and while unity temporarily reigned, factional discord remained.
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Shattered by the founders’ fundamental political divisions, economic downturn, and the
double-edged sword of expansion, Monroe’s tenure tells a much more dynamic story than
just “Good Feelings.” As he concluded his final message to Congress, the President
appealed to national unity once more, illustrating the impact that powerful party forces
had exerted during his administration: “let a generous spirit and national views and
feelings be indulged, and let every part recollect that by cherishing that spirit…the
general interest will not only be promoted, but the local advantage be reciprocated by
all.”58 The national spirit and “general interest” he spoke of was intended to combat the
ever-present spirit of party by way of disinterested patriots seeking the public good more
than the aims factions. The federal government’s power in regulating the economy
through internal improvements or infernal institutions recommenced political divisions
dormant but not dead.
Writing to his presidential predecessor, fellow Virginian, and long-time friend,
James Madison in the Spring of 1822, Monroe remarked, “We have undoubtedly reachd a
new epoch in our political career, which has been formd by the destruction of the federal
party, so far at least not to be felt in the movment of the general govt., & especially in
Congress; by the general peace, & the entire absence, of all cause, as to public measures,
for great political excit’ment; & in truth, by the real prosperity of the union.” In his
second term, the fifth president boasted the luxury of a seemingly unbreakable
Republican reign, having now lasted over two decades. Monroe admitted, “In such a
state of things, it might have been presumd, that the mov’ment would have been tranquil,
marked by a common effort to promote the public good,” but he had witnessed something
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other than peace and progress in a seemingly partisan-free presidency. In fact, he
described the so-called “Era of Good Feelings” as a “restless & disturbed state of the
commonwealth, like the rolling of the waves after a storm, tho’ worse than the storm
itself.” Still, he expected that the post-war “storms” would “subside, & leave the ship in
perfect security,” and he asserted that “Public opinion will react on this body, & keep it
right. Surely our govt. may get on, & prosper, without the existence of parties. I have
always considerd their existence as the curse of the country.” It was Monroe’s persistent
belief that disinterestedness was still preferable and even attainable in the republic.
“Parties have now calmd down, or rather have disappeard from this great theatre, and we
are about to make the experiment, whether there is sufficient virtue in the people to
support our free republican system of govt. My confidence is still as strong as ever in the
result, but still that must be aided by all who can contribute to its support.” Monore
seemed to believe that the US was exceptionally poised for partyless unity, not having the
“distinct orders…that exist in other countries” and breed such political division.59
In the same letter, though, the President expressed marked anxieties: “I have
never known such a state of things, as has existed here, during the late Session, nor have I
personally ever experiencd so much embarrassment, & mortification.” What was the
cause of “embarrassment, & mortification?” The upcoming election of 1824—the
transition of power from Monroe to a successor yet unknown—was what troubled the
President. Though squabbles had existed in the transitions from Jefferson to Madison,
and to a lesser degree from Madison to Monroe, in terms of presidential succession
amongst the Republican party, the leading pundits had yet to experience anything like the
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drama that was to unfold in the election of 1824. “The approaching election, tho’ distant,
is a circumstance, that excites greatest interest in both houses, & whose effect, already
sensibly felt, is still much to be dreaded. There being three avowed candidates in the
admn., is a circumstance, which increases the embarrassment.” Cabinet conflict
reminiscent of Washington’s administration was brewing anew. In the running for the
presidency: Secretary of State John Quincy Adams, Secretary of the Treasury William H.
Crawford, and Secretary of War John C. Calhoun. Yet to enter the race was another
Monroe ally, General Andrew Jackson. “The friends of each, endeavour to annoy the
others, as you have doubtless seen by the public prints. In many cases, the attacks are
personal, directed against the individual.”60 One catches a glimpse of a new page in party
politics, though not altogether unfamiliar when considering the personal attacks leading
to the election of 1800. Still, no one would argue against the fact that 1824 ushered in a
new era of less “Good Feelings” and of more party conflict. It laid the groundwork for
the second party system.
The issue was internal division. The party was splintering, nay splitting into two
distinct factions. “Where there is an open contest with a foreign enemy, or with an
internal party, in which you are supported, by just principles, the course is plain & you
have something to chear & animate you to action.” Rather than the external competition
of legitimate opposition known throughout the 1790s and the first party system—
Tocqueville’s “great parties”—this new rivalry was from within. “But we are now
blessed with peace, & the success of the late war, has overwhelmed, the federal party, so
that there is no division of that kind, to rally any persons, together, in support of the
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admn.”61 The blessing had become a curse. With no common political rival, the party
turned to inward conflict.
Madison’s response is also enlightening. “The only effect of a political rivalship
among the members of the Cabinet which I anticipated, and which I believe I mentioned
once in conversation with you, was an increased disposition in each to cultivate the good
will of the President.” Another irony surfaced. Not only was the Republican party on the
brink of factional division because of decades of little to no rivalry for the presidency—
the victims of victory—but the very party that developed at least partially over a fear of
executive succession was now facing the prospect of what they condemned of former
Federalists. Though the elder Virginian hoped “The late effects of such a rivalship” were
but “a peculiarity and combination of circumstances not likely often to recur in our
annals,” Madison was less “sanguine” of Monroe’s “inferences from the absence here of
causes which have most engendered and embittered the spirit of party in former times &
in other Countries.” Always a mind of reason, Madison, acknowledged the problem he
had always felt natural to free societies. His words, “There seems to be a propensity in
free Govts. which will always find or make subjects, on which human opinions &
passions may be thrown into conflict,” should strike students of Madison as reminiscent
of his assessment of factions in The Federalist, No. 10: “The diversity in the faculties of
men, from which the rights of property originate, is not less an insuperable obstacle to a
uniformity of interests… The latent causes of faction are thus sown in the nature of man;
and we see them everywhere brought into different degrees of activity, according to the
different circumstances of civil society.” Though less “sanguine,” he hoped that “party
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contests” would “be either so slight or so transient, as not to threaten any permanent or
dangerous consequences to the character and prosperity of the Republic.”62 In Madison’s
view, a partyless republic was unrealistic, thus disinterested leadership was still very
much a mitigating agent for the destructiveness and divisiveness of faction.
Jefferson weighed in on the subject in the Fall of 1822, writing to Albert Gallatin,
then Minister to France. Feeling “the weight of 80” and the pain of arthritis, the aged
Jefferson chose “write as little as possible,” and yet he still made time to weigh in on a
subject that he had dedicated a lifetime to achieve, namely the health and happiness of the
Union. He put it simply, “I will confine my self to our own affairs.” The upcoming
election of 1824 was on his mind, though he felt it was unnecessarily early to be
concerned with the transition: “you have seen in our papers how prematurely they are
agitating the question of the next President.” From his thoughts on the subject, he did not
have much confidence in the proposed nominees, saying, “the misfortune is that the
persons most looked to as successors in the government, are of the President’s Cabinet; &
their partisans in Congress are making a handle of these things to help or hurt those for or
against whom they are.” The interests of each of the candidates inspired Jefferson to
provide his own take on the plague of partisanship now threatening to destroy the
Republican party he had worked so long and hard to establish.63
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If Madison was less “sanguine” than Monroe, then Jefferson was even less so:
“you are told indeed that there are no longer parties among us. that they are all now
amalgamated, the lion & the lamb lie down together in peace. do not believe a word of it.
the same parties exist now as ever did.” Jefferson saw the Federalists as having emerged
under a new name, only giving up overt desires for “monarchism” but still advocating for
“consolidated government.” His anxieties revolved around “many, calling themselves
republicans, and preaching the rankest doctrines of the old federalists,” and what had to
have eaten at him was the mention that “one of the prominent candidates is presumed to
be of this party.” A Federalist in Republican clothing was enough to cause the ailing and
aching Jefferson to take up his pen once again. Like Washington before him, Jefferson
acknowledged the tendency of the Union to be divided along geographical lines, saying
that the three candidates would be “reduced to two, a Northern & Southern one,” and
further, “if the Missouri principle mixes itself in the question, it will go one way.” The
Missouri Compromise foreshadowed the kind of strict sectionalism that might eventually
plague any notion of disinterestedness.64
Despite the clear symptoms of partisanship working through Monroe’s
administration, many have contended that he was the pinnacle of the disinterested patriot
president from the founding generation, second only to Washington. Monroe’s
successors, though, would be anything but. The election of 1824 came with yet another
constitutional crisis reminiscent of 1800. Another presidential election resulted in the
failure of the Electoral College to confirm the nation’s executive office, and yet again a
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divided House of Representatives would determine the outcome—but not before a new
chapter of partisan drama unfolded.65
Jefferson, once again put aside pain to pick up his pen in late 1823: “Two
dislocated wrists and crippled fingers have rendered writing so slow and laborious as to
oblige me to withdraw from nearly all correspondence. not however from yours.” His
recipient, the French Patriot, the Marquis de Lafayette; his reason for writing, the
continued concern over the election of 1824. “[W]ho is to be the next President is the
topic here of every conversation. my opinion on that subject is what I expressed to you in
my last letter.” In the previous letter, Jefferson proposed, “many candidates are named:
but they will be reduced to two, Adams & Crawford.” Like he had written to Gallatin in
1822, Jefferson told Lafayette, “for you are not to believe that these two parties are
amalgamated, that the lion & the lamb are lying down together,” and he further iterated
that the Federalists still existed, though cloaked in Republican garb: “it’s votaries
abandoned it thro’ shame and mortification; and now call themselves republicans. but the
name alone is changed, the principles are the same.” Jefferson’s concern: “like the fox
pursued by the dogs, they take shelter in the midst of the sheep.” Nothing threatened
republicanism more than this sort of infiltration.66
Jefferson alluded to the geographical tensions threatening the Union to Gallatin
the previous year, and now he went one step further in blaming former Federalists for
manipulating this division in order to return to power once again:
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On the eclipse of federalism, with us, altho’ not it’s extinction, it’s leaders got up
the Missouri question, under the false front of lessening the measure of slavery,
but with the real view of producing a geographical division of parties, which
might ensure them the next president, the people of the North went blindfold into
the snare, followed their leaders for a while, with a zeal truly moral and laudable,
until they became sensible that they were injuring instead of aiding the real
interests of the slaves, that they had been used merely as tools for electioneering
purposes; and that trick of hypocrisy then fell as quickly as it had been got up.67
In Jefferson’s estimation, the Missouri Compromise offered Federalists an entry point. In
true party interest rather than patriotic motives, Federalists or what he called “new
republicans” had manipulated through a sort of “metamorphosis” Northerners in order to
gain the power of the presidency—using, of all things, slavery to garner support from
those wishing to contain the peculiar institution. However, Jefferson saw the
geographical divisions as paling in comparison to the now apparent rift over what he
termed “states’ rights” and “consolidated government.”68
The cabinet “chicanery,” as Ketcham calls it, was openly hostile to the notion of
disinterested politics. Looking ahead to the presidency, the candidates placed their
personal ambitions for the executive office ahead of the more pressing issues of the day.
The premature agitations Jefferson noted in newspapers was nothing less than the
development of the modern campaign—foreign to many in the founding generation, at
least in overt forms, because such maneuvers were amongst the most frowned upon. Like
many things in the political arena, though, the election of 1824 was reshaping partisan
politics, from necessary evil to positive good. Monroe was convinced even more by
these cabinet antics of the negative effects of partisanship, and yet these workings tended
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to place the president’s ideology in a sphere inconsistent and perhaps incompatible with
the emerging political norms of the 1820s.69
Thus, an anti-party president like John Quincy Adams would prove even more
incompatible as the tide changed toward a view that placed presidents at the helm of
parties rather than opposed to factions altogether. Being what William J. Cooper
considered The Lost Founding Father, Adams was a man between two worlds—that of
the founding generation, and that of the new political atmosphere of the 1820s. Such
tensions typically do not bode well for policy and progress, and Adams found himself
stymied in his presidential aspirations for the nation in many ways.70 Rivalry became
reality. One needed to either embrace parties or be politically emasculated by them.
Much like the elder Adams, John Quincy Adams presided over a divided
administration—only the younger Adams had the cloud of the so-called “Corrupt
Bargain” with Secretary of State Henry Clay hanging over the entirety of his presidency
as well as a new, more vigorous party system working against him.
The election of 1824 inaugurated the second party system, and as Wilentz says,
Adams “perfectly exemplifies the transition from the Federalists’ elitist, deferential
republic to the mass-based, democratic republic of the Democrats and Whigs.” Adams,
literally a life-long political leader, is in many ways an enigma on the surface unless one
matches his apparent contradictions with the changing context of the American political
system. He began his career prior to the development of the first party system, and he
adapted perhaps reluctantly at times to what eventually emerged as the second party
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system. “In electoral politics, issues concerning economic justice and inequality
exploded with a force that matched that of the 1790s.” Wilentz defines the second party
system in the following manner:
The “one-party” system controlled by Jeffersonian Republicans shattered in the
mid-1820s, and two competing parties emerged: one, which coalesced under the
leadership of Andrew Jackson, took the name Democrats; the other, a shifting
alliance of Jackson’s opponents, was known initially as the National Republicans
and then as the Whigs. The parties fought bitterly over issues of economics and
national development. Strikingly, however, they both honored the egalitarian
tradition, albeit in sharply opposed versions.71
The Jeffersonians and Jacksonians share some remarkable parallels in terms of their
opposition origins, their relation to each of the two-party systems, and even many of the
same fiscal and foreign policy stances.72 Like a weed once cut that comes back with
resilience, the second party system would prove much more potent and robust.
Jefferson had a take on the emerging second party system as well. In his letter to
Lafayette, he wrote the following evaluation:
To that is now succeeding a distinction, which, like that of republican and federal,
or whig and tory, being equally intermixed through every state, threatens none of
those geographical schisms which go immediately to a separation. the line of
division now is the preservation of state rights as reserved in the constitution, or
by strained constructions of that instrument, to merge all into a consolidated
government. the tories are for strengthening the Executive and General
government; the whigs cherish the representative branch, and the rights reserved
by the states as the bulwark against consolidation, which must immediately
generate Monarchy. and altho’ this division excites, as yet, no warmth; yet it
71
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exists, is well understood, & will be a principle of voting, at the ensuing election,
with the reflecting men of both parties.73
The much older statesman, nearly three years before his seemingly providential passing,
related an observation not unlike the positions he held for most of his lengthy political
career. Jefferson still saw the two party distinctions as centered on the two versions of
republicanism present from the 1790s forward, namely the respective views on
consolidated federal power as compared to the states and the people.
Tocqueville’s work dedicated an entire chapter to parties. “Parties are a necessary
evil in free governments; but they have not at all times the same character and the same
propensities.” As the Frenchman applied conventional wisdom regarding party politics to
the situation in the United States he distinguished between “great parties” and “minor
parties”—the former of nobler cause, generally tied to some sort of revolutionary
upheaval; the latter of divisive agitation, usually indicative of the lethargy in times of
peace where infighting usurps struggles over principles and demagogues replace
ideology. According to Tocqueville, America had passed from the time of great parties
to a period of minor parties, and his valuation builds from this premise. Of the earlier
parties, he said,
When the War of Independence was terminated, and the foundations of the new
Government were to be laid down, the nation was divided between two
opinions—two opinions which are as old as the world, and which are perpetually
to be met with under all the forms and all the names which have ever obtained in
free communities— the one tending to limit, the other to extend indefinitely, the
power of the people.74
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A common enemy, as previously discussed, brought the varied interests of the thirteen
colonies together for the noble cause of independence founded upon the classical
republican principles and Enlightenment philosophies that culminated in the Constitution.
Their unity around “essential points…moral principles of a higher order, such as the love
of equality and of independence” kept the first two parties from agitating toward
violence. Tocqueville noted the close of this first party system: “America has already
lost the great parties which once divided the nation; and if her happiness is considerably
increased, her morality has suffered by their extinction.”75
He then proceeds in an examination of the second party system. “The parties by
which the Union is menaced do not rest upon abstract principles, but upon temporal
interests. These interests, disseminated in the provinces of so vast an empire, may be said
to constitute rival nations rather than parties.” Strikingly, the division into two parties
resembling two nations, North and South, was already quite apparent to an outside
observer in the mid-1830s. Critical of the second party system more than the first,
Tocqueville claimed, “In the absence of great parties, the United States abound with
lesser controversies; and public opinion is divided into a thousand minute shades of
difference upon questions of very little moment.” Furthermore, the danger of demagogy
emerged in this system: “ambitious men are interested in the creation of parties, since it is
difficult to eject a person from authority upon the mere ground that his place is coveted
by others.”76 This note on the rise of career politicians is a significant observation.
Whereas retirement offered the genteel man freedom from interests and wisdom
enough to govern justly in the theorizing of the founding generation, paid career
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politicians emerged by the end of the early republic, and perhaps this truly signals the end
of the idea of disinterestedness as a virtue in public service.77 Van Buren biographer
Robert V. Remini opened his work with the various sentiments Van Buren garnered.
Quoting from Davie Crockett, one gets a bit of insight into the disdain contemporaries
still held for career politicians: “Office and money have been the gods of his idolatry.”
The 1820s ushered in a new breed of politician—no longer would the disinterested
heroics of statesmen wealthy enough to retire into public service mark the positions of
government. Van Buren offers a case study of such a politician. Though quite different
than the founding generation, Remini maintains that Van Buren undoubtedly fulfills the
title of statesman.78
Perhaps more than anything else, human nature might explain why and how
parties became preferable and practicable more than vile and avoidable. “Observers” of
Van Buren, Remini noted, “commented on is great knowledge and understanding of
human nature.” Tocqueville, also one to note the role of human nature, since his interest
in the American republican experiment certainly derived from an application to European
societies, observed that the United States was not uniquely equipped with exceptional
people or circumstances, “But upon examining the state of society more attentively,” he
instead noted, “I speedily discovered that the Americans had made great and successful
efforts to counteract these imperfections of human nature, and to correct the natural
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defects of democracy.” It was not the individuals but the institutions that had created
such laudable liberty and relative success in such a short time.79
Still, individuals were seen to be intriguing against such institutions. The second
party system was marked by a new breed of politician:
The skill of the actors in the political world lies therefore in the art of creating
parties. A political aspirant in the United States begins by discriminating his own
interest, and by calculating upon those interests which may be collected around
and amalgamated with it; he then contrives to discover some doctrine or some
principle which may suit the purposes of this new association, and which he
adopts in order to bring forward his party and to secure his popularity.80
Tocqueville once again offered his observations as to the developments of the second
party system. The amalgamation noted here is exactly how Van Buren helped
manufacture the Democratic Party in the 1820s. Despite the distinctiveness of the minor
parties present in the second party system, Tocqueville also noted the consistency of
concerns which have always animated parties: “that the greater part of them are more or
less connected with one or the other of those two divisions which have always existed in
free communities.”81 And finally, “I affirm that aristocratic or democratic passions may
easily be detected at the bottom of all parties, and that, although they escape a superficial
observation, they are the main point and the very soul of every faction in the United
States.” The more things changed, the more they seemed to stay the same.
Jefferson had offered strikingly similar comments in 1823. For the elder
statesman, the two-party system had always existed under various designations and was

79

Robert V. Remini, Martin Van Buren and the Making of the Democratic Party, 2; Alan Ryan,
On Politics: A History of Political Thought, From Herodotus to the Present, (New York: W. W. Norton &
Company, Inc., 2012), 734, 741; Alexi de Tocqueville. Democracy in America, Vol. 1. Ryan
contextualizes Tocqueville, noting his and other Frenchmen’s interest in the American experiment because
of the obvious failures of the French to achieve a preferable end to their own revolution in 1789, but Ryan
says definitively that “Tocqueville was not a republican.”
80
Alexi de Tocqueville. Democracy in America, Vol. 1.
81
Alexi de Tocqueville. Democracy in America, Vol. 1.

162

wholly consistent with those of the second-party system. He wrote to Lafayette, “they
exist in all countries, whether called by these names, or by those of Aristocrats and
democrats, coté droite or coté gauche, Ultras or Radicals, Serviles or Liberals. the sickly
weakly, timid man fears the people, and is a tory by nature. the healthy strong and bold
cherishes them, and is formed a whig by nature.” True to his Whiggish tendencies,
Jefferson continued to see the Tory-ridden enemies of his own generation as consistent
with the enemies of the people.82
The rematch of Jackson and Adams was an election that solidified the second
party system. In 1828, Jackson emerged victorious and vindicated. Adams’s failed bid at
reelection, though, was not simply a reaction to the “Corrupt Bargain;” he had presided
over a fundamental transition in American politics. His courtship with republican virtue
would not suffice when the new democratic dame entered the equation. The disinterested
patriot was no longer as compelling as the professional politician. As Cooper notes, Van
Buren’s political management and shrewd strategies were just as much responsible for
Adams’s one-term presidency as any other faux pas that might have inhibited his success.
The Red Fox of Kinderhook worked tirelessly to revive republicanism that bridged
sectional animosities and undid any sort of dangerous amalgamation leftover from
Monroe’s attempts to rid the country of parties.83
The contest of 1828 left a permanent mark on American politics; it was decidedly
partisan. In late 1827, Monroe told Madison, “I concluded…to preserve a state of perfect
neutrality between the Candidates.” The former president did not wish to align himself
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with either of the emergent parties. Madison replied with equal impartiality: “I meant to
keep aloof from the political agitations of the period, and as a further safeguard… with
my determination not to be enlisted in a party service.” True to their classical republican
roots, neither founder sought direct affiliation with any party. Madison continued, “I
have a letter from Genl Fayette of Ocr. 21. in which he mourns over the spirit & style of
our partizan Gazettes, as wounding our Republican character, and causing exultation to
the foes of liberty.”84 The election had garnered lament from abroad as well; its decided
partisanship appeared symptomatic of the disease that so often plagued republics of the
past.
Writing to Madison in early 1828, Monroe’s retired but politically persuasive
voice related his belief that former presidents maintain disinterestedness: “I state
explicitly, that I can take no position, which may, by inference, arrange me, on the side of
either of the candidates, against the other.” He went even further:
if they became partisans in elections, to the chief office, they could have weight
only with the party, with which they arrangd themselves: that they could have
none with the other[.] I shall of course state, that I hope, no such event will ever
occur, but that it is better, that persons who have so long servd, shod. remain
tranquil spectators of the mov’ment, than embark in it.85
The exchange between former presidents was in regards to their participation as electors
for the state of Virginia. Madison also intimated that he wished to have his name
withdrawn from the ticket—what he classified as “a plea of neutrality” knowing the
“delicacy” of the attempt to “control the feelings of party.”86 For the elder generation,
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those who participated in the Revolution directly, party was still but a necessary evil—
disinterestedness still very much a virtue. They were a dying breed, though.
Just as Hamilton’s death signaled the beginning of the end of the first party
system, so too did the timely deaths of both Jefferson and Adams signal the solidification
of a second party system. Their passing on July 4, 1776, proved to be both the closing of
an era and the opening of another—the end of the founding generation’s obsession with
classical republicanism and the beginning of subsequent generations’ belief in a better,
more modern take on republicanism. In this context, disinterestedness remained but
underwent significant adaptations. Conversely, party became more laudable than
loathed.
Buel correctly concluded that “Americans felt obliged to rationalize what could
not be prevented. If they had believed there was any choice, no one would have urged
that parties be formed as a positive advantage.”87 This line of thinking does at least help
make sense of the about-face one sees in the views related to disinterestedness.
Expediency and practicality, in the end, made disinterestedness a vestige more than a
virtue. Perhaps it was the result of the “frailty of human nature,” as Van Buren wrote—a
subject many of the early republic tended to focus on.88
Americans still live betwixt a classical landscape, formed by numerous towns,
cities, and natural features bearing classical names, and an abundance of public
buildings ornated with massive marble colonnades and Latin epigrams. The
reappearance of the revered ancients in the wake of republican uncertainties to
guide the Founders during the creation of the Republic seems to us, still, so
natural.89
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Landscape is much like language in this light—the classical republican semantics and
sentiments of the founders remain traceable but not nearly as compelling as they once
were.
Is it possible to “restore the vivacity of its earlier times,” that Tocqueville argued
to the contrary? Is there only the option “to proceed, and to accelerate the union of
private with public interests?” Is “the period of disinterested patriotism is gone by
forever.”90 Tocqueville’s analysis was correct at least to the degree that partisanship is
valued above disinterestedness by the people and pundits alike. Disinterestedness may
not be dead, but it is at minimum, unfamiliar and unpopular. Decline, though, does not
dictate a death, but rather a departure. If that much is true, then the hope still exists that a
generation might revive classical republican thought—just as Trenchard and Gordon did
for England and numerous members of the founding generation did for the early republic.
There is certain merit to the fact that the republic has lasted two-and-a-half
centuries thus far, despite the development of a resilient two-party system. Was this in
spite of partisanship or because of it? Writing in the introduction to Tocqueville’s
Democracy in America, Senator John J. Ingalls related, “The violence of party spirit has
been mitigated, and the judgment of the wise is not subordinated to the prejudices of the
ignorant.”91 Answering whether or not partisanship was central to the longevity of liberty
in the republic tends to be where the historiography focuses today. Certainly, many
prominent historians from Hofstadter to Wilentz fall firmly in the camp of party’s vitality
and even ironically, virtue, in maintaining a free society and checking the opposition
party from attaining too much power, but perhaps there are signs of deterioration on the

90
91

Alexi de Tocqueville. Democracy in America, Vol. 1.
Alexi de Tocqueville. Democracy in America, Vol. 1.

166

horizon. Perhaps the vices of ambition, avarice, and corruption have plagued the nation
to the brink of another crisis and made classical republicanism worthy of reexamination
and esteem once again—just maybe the lessons of today are leading many to consider
whether or not disinterestedness might still be a virtue worth pursuing.
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CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION
It is an unpleasing part of history, when “corruption begins to prevail, when
degeneracy marks the manners of the people, and weakens the sinews of the
state.” If this should ever become the deplorable situation of the United States, let
some unborn historian, in a far distant day, detail the lapse, and hold up the
contrast between a simple, virtuous, and free people, and a degenerate, servile
race of beings, corrupted by wealth, effeminated by luxury, impoverished by
licentiousness, and become the automatons of intoxicated ambition.1
In each subsequent generation of Americans, one hopes that Mercy Otis Warren’s words
remain irrelevant, that the fragility of republics is both recognized and adequate measures
taken to reinforce those attributes that sustain their success, that the lessons of history
continue to warn and inspire future generations of the dangers of partisanship and the
blessings of disinterestedness. “While a few ‘old republicans’ sought political or
constitutional remedies for the disease ailing the body politic, Warren turned to the word,
for historical narrative had the power to redeem.”2 Paine knew, just as Warren that,
“When we are planning for posterity, we ought to remember, that virtue is not
hereditary.”3 While it may be true that, as Gibson says, “the primary lesson that we may

1
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draw from historical knowledge is the distinctiveness of the past” and “the future is
novel…past patterns may not apply,” what drives—what animates this historical work is
the very notion Warren, Paine, and innumerable other students of history have
discovered, namely that the past is not merely static and nostalgic but alive and
instructive to those who prudently seek its lessons.4
Disinterestedness today means something entirely different than it meant to the
founding generation. Its primary meaning no longer connotes virtue but rather an
apathetic approach to the political realm. There is a certain and fitting irony in this
transmission over time—one which weighed heavily on the founding generation: a
republic would be difficult to keep. Franklin and many others looked to the past for
precedence; the classical republics of Greece and Rome, as well as the English
experience, taught them, nay warned them that all republics tended to eventually default
back to a state of tyranny and despotic rule. This transformation or transmission of
language to be quite telling. The linguistic transmission has led to a disenchanted or
uninterested population, and an uninterested electorate allows for a fully interested
leadership, whereas an attentive (interested) constituency calls for a disinterested
government. Wood discusses the complete erasure of this term's meaning—another issue
of the separation of several generations—but the transmission of the word is a significant
cultural transformation that parallels the evolution of this thesis.5
What was the cause of this transmission? This study has only examined the
colonial period through the early republic—maybe the first third of American history.
What of the current status of disinterestedness? Richard Beeman captures part of the
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issue: “Tens of millions of Americans have been turned-off by the corrupting effects of
money on the political system. Bombarded with negative advertising about their
candidates, they express their feelings of alienation by staying home on election day.”6
The “turning off” that Beeman references is not unique to contemporary Americans; that
same notion was at the heart of Thomas Gordon’s thoughts in the eighteenth-century.
When Gordon commented that “[t]he love of money and of power are violent passions,”
his words applied to his generation, the ancients he commented on, the founding
generation in the United States, and the modern reader as well.7
Beeman went on to say, “If there is a lesson in all of this it is that our Constitution
is neither a self-actuating nor a self-correcting document. It requires the constant
attention and devotion of all citizens.”8 Finally, “There is a story, often told,” Beeman
writes:
that upon exiting the Constitutional Convention Benjamin Franklin was
approached by a group of citizens asking what sort of government the delegates
had created. His answer was: “A republic, if you can keep it.” The brevity of that
response should not cause us to under-value its essential meaning: democratic
republics are not merely founded upon the consent of the people, they are also
absolutely dependent upon the active and informed involvement of the people for
their continued good health.9
The fragility of the republic was and is a well-known fact among those who know their
history. As Wilentz put it, “Democratic successes are never irreversible.”10 Popular
forms of government naturally rely upon popular participation and a strong sense of what
eighteenth-century political thinkers called the “publick good.” Too much interestedness
Richard R. Beeman, “Perspectives on the Constitution: A Republic, If You Can Keep It,”
National Constitution Center (Accessed July 29, 2021), https://constitutioncenter.org/ learn/educationalresources/historical-documents/perspectives-on-the-constitution-a-republic-if-you-can-keep-it.
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or the onset of uninterestedness equally plague popular governments, rendering them
unpopular and oppressive.
This study affords the same application to a modern audience that Cato’s Letters
provided for the founding generation. Drawing upon the lessons of their English
counterparts, whom themselves had drawn upon their Roman antecedents, the founding
generation now sits in a similar position to twenty-first-century citizens of the US: an
occasion to view the brilliance of philosophers, orators, and ordinary citizens of the
distant past as a message to the present reader. Part of the curiosity of this study has also
been about grappling with the continued contradictions of American history. The
transformation from celebrated disinterestedness to unabashed interestedness is difficult
to reconcile, but its exploration is an attempt to more fully understand the distant past and
simultaneously inform the present concerns that might have some relevance or overlap
with that venerated generation. W. J. Rorabaugh concluded his intriguing study of the
early republic with this applicable statement: “Today we Americans see too clearly and
too painfully the contradictions between what we are and what we believe we ought to
be.”11 An attachment to classical republicanism and a determination that historical
models can always be improved upon might inspire the thinking Rorabaugh alludes to.
Is it possible that the very political principles that made the United States a model
republic could be the same ideologies that lead to its decline? “In like manner does the
republican government exist in America, without contention or opposition; without
proofs and arguments, by a tacit agreement, a sort of consensus universalis. It is,
however, my opinion that by changing their administrative forms as often as they do, the
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inhabitants of the United States compromise the future stability of their government.”
Tocqueville’s comments bear resemblance to Washington’s parting warning about the
“alternate domination of one faction over another.” Washington noted that this frequency
of changes in the administration of government, “sharpened by the spirit of revenge,
natural to party dissension, which in different ages and countries has perpetrated the most
horrid enormities, is itself a frightful despotism.”12 The first president and the renowned
French observer both noted the danger of reversion. In his concluding comments on
party in the United States, the latter related, “this apparent unanimity is merely a cloak to
alarming dissensions and perpetual opposition…If the maladministration of the
democracy ever brings about a revolutionary crisis, and if monarchical institutions ever
become practicable in the United States, the truth of what I advance will become
obvious.”13 The “obvious…truth” the Frenchman cautioned against was a relapse into
the throes of despotism—a loss of liberty—a failure of the republican experiment.
The closing to Volume 1 of Democracy in America offers a prudent piece to
readers of Tocqueville: “Montesquieu remarked, that nothing is more absolute than the
authority of a prince who immediately succeeds a republic, since the powers which had
fearlessly been intrusted to an elected magistrate are then transferred to a hereditary
sovereign. This is true in general, but it is more peculiarly applicable to a democratic
republic.” Montesquieu’s assessment of Rome’s rapid retreat from republic to tyrannical
rule is poignant: “What a strange system of tyranny! A tyranny carried on by men who
had obtained the political and military power merely from their knowledge in civil
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affairs…Cæsar’s bloody garment flung Rome again into slavery.”14 Tocqueville
proceeds to apply the principle to the American experiment:
In the United States, the magistrates are not elected by a particular class of
citizens, but by the majority of the nation; they are the immediate representatives
of the passions of the multitude; and as they are wholly dependent upon its
pleasure, they excite neither hatred nor fear: hence, as I have already shown, very
little care has been taken to limit their influence, and they are left in possession of
a vast deal of arbitrary power.15
The irony of the situation that Montesquieu, Tocqueville, Washington, and countless
other students of the classics cautioned against was the fact that the despot comes to
power by way of popular mechanisms, namely the majority vote.
Perhaps Wood was right—the idea of disinterest has lost its meaning in the later
American republic, and the term has fallen out of popular use—replaced by uninterest.16
How long does it take for the people of a republic to trade virtue for vice? The historical
shelf life of republics offers mixed results. In his work, The End of Kings: A History of
Republics and Republicans, William R. Everdell says that “Rome lasted almost five
centuries. The United States, now a democracy as well, continues to show vigor after
two. But the French Republic lasted only seven years.” Everdell goes on to conclude his
narrative with the moral precepts of republicans—they serve the republic and put it ahead
of their own interests. “So much is required of a republic’s citizens that all of the
republics of the past have explicitly demanded citizen awareness and participation.”
Alan Ryan says, “The animating spirit of a republic is virtue, of a monarchy honor, and
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of a despotism fear.”17 These qualities are contingencies on the longevity of popular
governments.
To be sure, as the saying goes, Rome was not built in a day, but neither did it
decline in such short order. Gibbon detailed the decline alone in six volumes! When the
republican virtue of disinterestedness is replaced with uninterested and disengaged
citizens, decline is perhaps in full swing. But a people disenchanted with dysfunction
amidst a quagmire of corruption in its highest ranks must remember that its
representatives are mere reflections of their respective constituencies. “Our Constitution
was made only for a moral and religious people. It is wholly inadequate to the
government of any other.”18 Maybe the saddest note of a disengaged citizenry is not the
lack of disinterested virtue but rather the dispassionate disposition left in its wake—a
people whose self-interest leads to wholesale and willful disenfranchisement—not by the
genius and ambition of a demagogue but by an apathetic and disconnected body politic.
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